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Executive summaryFROM AUSTERITY TO STAGNATION
HOW TO AVOID THE DEFLATION TRAP
(…)
Yes, how many years can a mountain exist
Before it's washed to the sea?
Yes, how many years can some people exist
Before they're allowed to be free?
Yes, how many times can a man turn his head
Pretending he just doesn't see?
(…)
Blowing in the wind, 1962, Bob Dylan
Five years after the beginning of the financial turmoil in 2008, the euro area is
still in crisis. However, there are some positive signs which have emerged. Some
say that the main imbalances are on their way toward resolution. Others claim
that the euro’s survival of what has proven to be a major crisis is a step forward in
creating a prosperous and sound European Union. Some may rationalize that the
European integration process has always progressed by desperate responses to
critical situations. Some may even interpret migration flows from peripheral coun-
tries to the core, to escape the misery of the crisis, as showing that the optimality
of the currency area has improved.
Our analysis of the state of the European Union and the euro area is strikingly
different. We think that the policies conducted so far, in particular austerity, have
failed and that such a failure has a cost. Imbalances have not been solved but only
displaced, from current account to unemployment, from public deficit to inequal-
ities. Despite tremendous efforts, private or public debt ratios are still high and
deleveraging still stands as the only objective. A large majority of European citi-
zens live in countries still stuck in the crisis and for whom recovery is an abstract
concept (table and Figure 1). We think that alternative policies were possible. In
addition, we believe that other policies can and should be implemented now to
really exit the crisis. 
Table 1. Euro area iAGS forecast, GDP yoy growth
2013 2014 2015
DEU 0.4 1.2 1.6
FRA 0.1 1.1 1.5
ITA -1.8 0.3 1.0
ESP -1.4 0.7 1.4
NLD -1.1 1.0 1.6
BEL 0.0 1.2 1.6
PRT -1.8 0.9 1.4
IRE -0.5 1.4 1.9
GRC -4.1 -0.4 2.4
FIN -0.9 1.7 1.9
AUT 0.4 1.0 1.3
EA -0.3 1.0 1.5Revue de l’OFCE / Macroeconomic Outlook – Special issue (2014)
Source: iAGS 2014 forecast.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report101. The cost of failing
The cost paid to regain confidence from financial markets and from the busi-
ness sector has been far too high. In a time when the fiscal multiplier was at an all-
time high, a historically unprecedented consolidation was conducted. Apart from
the nearly absurd demonstration that such an austerity can be conducted and
accepted by the people, the economic disaster is huge. Unemployment has
reached a record 12.2% in the euro area and is at a rarely matched level in some
countries (Spain, Portugal, and Greece). A generation entering the job market will
endure a long lasting spell of poor jobs if they are fortunate to gain employment
at all.
Even more worryingly, high unemployment levels will pass on to increases in
long-term unemployment which can turn into structural unemployment and
lower growth potential in the future. Estimations imply that 64 percent of the
increase in unemployment within the EU eventually turns into long-term unem-
ployment [see details in chapter 2]. These calculations imply a long-term
unemployment rate above 5.5 percent in the euro area in 2015. An increasing
amount of young people are also facing long-term unemployment. As a conse-
quence inequalities are rising and poverty increasing in many countries, and as
future prospects further deteriorate, the sword of Damocles of austerity requires
plans for a further dismantling of social systems, although they are the last stand
against an expansion of inequalities.
Whining about the past is of no use. But understanding “how much we had
to pay for what” is a necessity in a democracy. Our simulations, in line with a
recent Economic Paper from the European Commission, show that backloading
rather than frontloading austerity would have avoided in most countries the reces-
sion of the years 2012 and 2013, while achieving the a significant reduction in
debt to GDP ratios in 2032. Unemployment would be lower today than it is by
Figure 1. iAGS forecast 2014-2015 for main EA countries
GDP per head, World Bank ppp, 2005 prices
Sources: iAGS 2014 forecast. Eurostat, national accounts and World Bank.
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From Austerity to Stagnation: How to avoid the deflation trap 111.7 points in 2013 and 2014 [see details in chapter 1 of the iAGS 2014]. In some
countries, the difference is even larger: backloading in Spain would have made a
difference of unemployment of more than 3.7 points.
The iAGS 2013 was one of the few to take seriously early warnings that fiscal
multipliers are high in a time of crisis and to make realistic proposals for alternative
policies. The intense debate between economists has shed some light on the
reason why so many persisted in calling for austerity while outcomes worsened,
why such a high price was paid to avoid a problem of free-riding inside the euro
area that we consider vastly exaggerated. Austerity was the consequence of
letting financial markets judge the sustainability of European democracies and be
the strong arm of public finance discipline. That also has been a failure, and in the
end, it was only the resolute action from the ECB that solved the problem during
the summer 2012. Stating definitively that the euro was not going to split,
creating the instrument, OMT, with which, subject to certain conditions, limitless
amounts of under-pressure sovereign bonds (up to 3-year maturity) could be
purchased, and building the needed institutions (among them ESM and the still
to come Banking Union) to deal with short term debt threats has bought time.
Those steps were necessary. But they came too late to delay the austerity
programs of the years 2011 and 2012. One may even fear that frontloading was
the prerequisite for those institutional advances. And the conditionality and link to
the fiscal compact question their effectiveness if “the markets” see fit to challenge
the commitment of the central bank, explaining why austerity has continued
through 2013.
The cost is not only economical but political as well. Six months now before
the 2014 May European Parliament elections, the trust in European institutions is
at rock bottom, showing that the failure has not remained unseen by the people.
According to the latest Eurobarometer, “trust in European Union” and “trust in
national parliaments or governments” are at the lowest level since 2004, the main
concerns being unemployment (according to 51% of the EU population) and the
economic situation (according to 33%).
2. The consequences of failing
The high level of unemployment resulting from the crisis and the remedies
applied to solve it are exerting downward pressure on wages generally and actu-
ally pushing down wages in the crisis countries. This is a costly and dangerous
way to adjust real exchange rates and rebalance the euro area. There is a real and
present danger of it marking the beginning of an unstoppable deflation. ECB offi-
cials1 may distinguish with subtlety disinflation from deflation, but we affirm that
there is only a lag in time. Wage deflation has set in southern Europe: nominal real
wages have been decreasing for the last two years in Spain, Portugal and Greece.
Competitiveness in Spain is thus “improving” by more than 5% per year relatively
1. Like for instance Benoit Coeuré, stating in the French newspaper Les Echos on the 25/11/2013,
that according to him, the disinflation phase should continue in Europe « but without changing into
deflation because of the start of an upswing ». Translated by the authors [Selon lui, la phase de
désinflation (c’est-à-dire un ralentissement de l’inflation) devrait se poursuivre en Europe «sans pour
autant se muer en déflation (une phase de diminution générale et durable des prix, NDLR) en raison d’un
début de reprise de l’activité économique »].
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report12to other trade partners. That process will go on while unemployment is high, and
given the current level and expected speed of reduction, it is easy to anticipate
how long that pressure will continue [see chapter 3 of the iAGS 2014].
Frontloading the deficit reduction has fuelled this process. Continuing the
fiscal squeeze will certainly not stop it. Moreover, what is happening in Spain will
initiate the same in other countries. We need to remember that in the 20’s and
30’s, when the gold standard was preventing devaluation, wage deflation in Great
Britain (Churchill), in Germany (Brüning) or in France (Laval) ended in generalized
deflation, led to an increase of the real burden of the debt and ultimately to the
collapse of the “peg”. The reason is simple: devaluation can succeed only if you
are the only one to conduct it and if national private and public debt is devaluated
as well. Neither condition is met today.
If deflation is not prevented, more unsustainable private debt will emerge.
This in turn will mean more public debt, for, in this crisis, the true name of public
debt is socialized unsustainable private debt. This will lead to calls for more
austerity and in this spiral, the euro will break down.
Moreover, if deflation is not prevented, European households will experience
an unavoidable decline in their income which will lead to a widespread increase in
poverty and inequality. Granted, inequalities so far have not exploded. High
incomes have been hit and lower ones have suffered reduction. But in Southern
European countries like Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy and Greece we can observe a
striking increase in income inequality during the crisis. In Spain, Greece and Italy,
the increase in inequality is driven by an increase at the bottom of the income
ladder. In contrast a group of European countries, such as Belgium, the Nether-
land and Germany have experienced decreasing inequality (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Change in interdecile ratios, 2008-2012 EU
Percentage points
Source: EU SILC, Eurostat. Interdecile ratios are ratio of average decile income after transfers.
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From Austerity to Stagnation: How to avoid the deflation trap 13Together with increasing inequality, many Europeans, especially in Southern
Europe and the Baltic countries, have experienced deterioration in the living stan-
dards of low income groups and increasing poverty rates. Not all groups in society
are hit equally. Children have experienced the largest decrease in living standards
since 2008. This decrease may have large long-term consequences for the
concerned individuals as well as for society as a whole. The low skilled also tend to
be a vulnerable group, as the risk of being poor is three times as high if you have a
low education compared to if you are highly educated. Compared to other educa-
tional groups on low skilled have also suffered the largest increase in
unemployment by far. The improvement in the economic situation will certainly
boost higher incomes, as wealth accounts are already suggesting [more on this in
Chapter 2 of the full iAGS 2014]. Meanwhile wage deflation in many countries
will feed the inequalities between capital owners and the workers. 
3. The way out
The iAGS 2013 proposed an effective alternative to the policies of austerity;
the same can also be said for iAGS 2014. This is a necessity if we don’t want
Europe to be the “United States of Stagnation”.
First, relying on institutional advances, monetary policy must substantially
reduce the sovereign spreads that still exist inside the euro area. Our simulations
show that such a policy can ease significantly the outcome in crisis countries.
Ireland would benefit from a cumulated increase in activity of more than 3% from
2014 to 2032, while Greece and Spain would enjoy 8% higher GDP cumulated
over the same period [Details of this in chapter 1]. As we argued in iAGS 2013,
this aggressive monetary policy should be backed by a credible commitment of
member states toward public finance stability. A well-designed debt redemption
fund is one way of providing this commitment while ensuring that public invest-
ment is maintained and debt repayment is done in a way that burdens aggregate
demand as little as possible.
Second, even if frontloading has been an unnecessary disaster, backloading is
still an option. Public investment has been slashed throughout the crisis,
accounting to a large extent for the overall consolidation (Figure 3). It is high time
to stop destroying our common future and instead get back to investing in it.
Simulations show that higher public investment would substantially boost GDP
and reduce unemployment while improving the fiscal position, despite the higher
public spending incurred.
But there is more. Climate change and the rising cost of our continent’s
energy dependence leave us no other option than to ensure a transition toward a
low carbon economy. Chapter 4 of the iAGS 2014 presents a detailed investment
plan for the EU, organized around existing energy and climate European commit-
ments for 2020, and totalling close to 200 billion euros in annual investments for
a better future. By developing alternatives to road transportation, capturing
energy-saving potential through energy renovation, building up a renewable
energy supply and modernizing the electrical grid throughout Europe, these infra-
structure investments will help to build future wealth. As such, this Green New
Deal should not be accounted for in the same way as current spending. A smart
golden rule would let gross debt increase if net (of collective wealth increase) debt
is steady. Moreover, it is also time to discuss the 60% limit for public debt and
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report14shift toward a new way to account for public capital. Our simulations show that
our proposed investment plan, sustained to 2020, would result in an immediate
boost to GDP reaching close to 2.5% in the EU. Moreover, this boost would not
be only temporary, with lasting positive effects sustained long after the end of the
investment plan. As a result, despite increased public spending, such an invest-
ment plan would achieve a sustained reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the
euro area and could contribute to more well-being.
Thirdly, poverty and inequality must be fought. Poverty and inequality is not
only morally unacceptable, but is also shown to have a deep structural and socio-
economic impact on the economy, in the form of leading to poor institutions,
lower levels of education and, in the end, less economic prosperity. An alternative
approach, consisting of a European investment plan, active labour market
programs, an increase in the education level and a fairer tax system, will together
reduce poverty, inequality and unemployment by creating jobs and wealth. 
Finally, wage deflation has to be addressed directly. A minimum wage norm
across the EU would be a brake to deflation. It would have to be implemented
respecting national practices and economic situations, but it could be a powerful
tool for re-balancing in the medium term the current account positions in a
symmetrical way. Our simulations in chapter 3 of the iAGS 2014 show that it
could in the mid- term solve the current account imbalances and ensure sustain-
ability without risking deflation.
Figure 3. Net Public Investment
In %
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, eo93. Net public investment as a share of potential GDP.
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Chapter 1THIS IS NOT A RECOVERY…: 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES FOR THE EURO AREA 
AND EURO AREA COUNTRIES IN 2013, 2014 AND 2015
In the second quarter of 2013, the GDP of the euro area turned positive
after 6 quarters of decline. This rebound of activity has been renewed the quarter
after, confirming the improvement exhibited by several economic and financial
indicators. Now that the major threat of a split up of the euro area has vanished,
confidence has regained momentum. Financial stress, which was weighing on the
euro area is now decreasing. Besides, fiscal austerity will be progressively allevi-
ated. GDP is therefore expected to grow at a moderate rate. On a yearly basis,
the euro area will remain in recession in 2013. Then, growth will reach 1% for the
euro area as a whole in 2014. All countries but Greece will get out of the reces-
sion in 2014. But, that does not mean that the euro area will recover. Fiscal
austerity will still hamper growth, notably in the 5 crisis countries (Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). The ease in credit conditions will be only
moderate and the on-going fragmentation of the European banking system will
still be mirrored in the retail bank interest rates or in the credit supply conditions.
Thus, employment will not significantly rebound and unemployment risks
remaining at record levels for a sustained period, notably in Spain, Greece and
Portugal. Moreover, new risks will arise. Deflation is threatening the euro area.
The wage deflation process has already taken hold in Spain and Greece, two
countries where the unemployment rate is above 25%. Deflation is amplified by
peer pressure to implement structural reforms mainly destined to liberalise labour
markets and improve cost competitiveness. Yet, the euro area would have done
better if it had resorted to another macroeconomic strategy, one that entailed a
credible and serious path for reducing public debt and based on a more active
monetary policy.
1. A glimmer in the dark
The financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2007 triggered the most
severe recession in European economies since the Second World War. The slump
of economic activity was followed by a recovery, as expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary policies were rapidly implemented. After a decline of 4.4%, GDP growth of
the euro area rebounded to 1.9% in 2010. This recovery was short-lived however.
Fiscal policy turned to a restrictive stance from 2010 in some countries, notably in
Greece, Ireland and Spain. At the same time, these countries experienced a rapid
surge in the sovereign interest rate. Austerity programs were then generalised,
notably urged on by the European Commission and reinforced as financial
markets pressures intensified (De Grauwe and Yi, 2013). Despite the implementa-
tion of tough austerity measures, credibility did not improve significantly and
sovereign spreads continued to increase in 2011 and in 2012. The need to consol-
idate was also imposed by existing fiscal rules. Excessive deficit procedures were
launched for the majority of euro area countries in 2009 even though the outputRevue de l’OFCE / Macroeconomic Outlook – Special issue (2014)
gap was still negative. The euro area entered a double dip at the end of 2011. In
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report16the crisis countries, recession was amplified by the increase in market and retail
banking interest rates. For the euro area as a whole, GDP fell by 0.6% in 2012 and
will decrease again, by 0.3%, in 2013. The depth of the recession has been
strongly correlated with the extent of the restrictive stance of fiscal policy (figure
4).
Yet, recent economic and financial indicators have shown some signs of
improvement. First, interest rates spreads started to decrease after the ECB
announced the new OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) program in
September 2012 by which it stated its willingness, under certain conditions, to
intervene without limit on the secondary market for government bonds. The aim
of the ECB was twofold: restoring the transmission channel for monetary policy
impaired by increasing divergence of national interest rates (Cour-Thiman &
Winkler, 2013), and preserving the euro area from a split up. The purchases are
conditional on countries having signed up to a European Stability Mechanism
program. Even if the OMT has not been activated yet, it has triggered a signal
effect and interest rates on Italian and Spanish public bonds, in particular,
decreased significantly. Actually, the decrease started already in July 2012
(Figure 5) after Mario Draghi explicitly stated that “the ECB is ready to do whatever
it takes to preserve the euro”. For countries that already benefited from European
assistance, market long-term interest rates had become less significant for
financing fiscal deficits as these countries were granted special rates (3.5%) by the
EFSF/EMS. The decrease in market rates generally followed the decision to imple-
ment rescue packages. Irish and Portuguese governments benefited from the
decrease in sovereign yields and were then able to go back on financial markets.
Figure 4. Output gap and cumulated fiscal impulses
Sources: National accounts, OECD, OFCE-IMK-ECLM calculations.
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-2013In March 2013, Ireland issued a 10-year bond at 4.15%, and Portugal did it a few
Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries in 2013, 2014 and 2015 17weeks later (in May) but at a higher rate (5.6%). Whereas long-term interest rates
are still declining for Ireland, the political crisis in Portugal during the summer has
amplified the rise of volatility on bonds markets that followed the announcement
that the US Federal Reserve envisaged phasing out quantitative measures (BIS,
2013). In mid-November, interest rates reached 4% in Spain and Italy, 3.5% in
Portugal and 6.1% in Portugal. 
It is clear that the OMT has played a major role in dampening the tensions
which had arisen on the public debt markets. This decision was part of a global
reinforcement of European governance, which included an enforcement of
existing fiscal rules and the adoption of new coordination tools through the Euro-
pean Semester and the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP). But it was
only with the OMT announcement that it finally became clear that a collapse of
the euro area had been avoided. The rise in bond prices (which move inversely to
interest rates) alleviated the risks weighing on banks' balance sheet, which had
contributed to the vicious circle between the sovereign and the bank crises
(Shambaugh, Reis and Rey, 2012). Meanwhile, the stress on banks' liquidity has
also progressively faded away. The ECB has kept the fixed-rate / full allotment
procedure and has shown, with the exceptional 3-year LTRO (long-term refi-
nancing operation) that it would act to prevent a new liquidity squeeze. A clear
sign that the situation has improved comes from the reduction in the size of the
ECB's balance sheet attesting to the decrease in the demand for refinancing from
the banking system. From a peak above 3000 billion euros at the end of 2012, the
assets held by the ECB amounted to 2300 billion in November 2013. Besides, as
suggested recently by Holton, Lawless and McCann (2013), credit conditions are
correlated to the sovereign spreads. Credit conditions for firms and households in
the euro area tightened strongly at the end of 2011 and then started to soften
Figure 5. Sovereign interest rates
 In %
Source: Datastream.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report18Confidence has progressively increased (Figure 7). Except in the construction
sector, it rebounded from low levels reached in September 2012 in the services,
in October 2012 in the industry and in November 2012 for households. These
factors have surely contributed to the pick up of growth recorded in 2013Q2.
Figure 6. Changes in credit conditions in the euro area
  Net percentages
Net percentage are defined as difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tighte-
ned considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased
somewhat” and “eased considerably”.
Source: ECB (Bank lending survey).
Figure 7. Confidence in the euro area
  In %
Source: European Commission.
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Credit conditions to firms
Credit conditions to housholds (housing credits)
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013
Confidence in the industry sector
Confidence in services
Confidence in construction
Confidence of households
Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries in 2013, 2014 and 2015 19The GDP of euro area has increased by 0.3%, a performance, which is mainly
due to Germany (0.7%) and France (0.5%), whereas Spain and Italy were still in
recession. However, it is too early to conclude that the euro area is out of the
recession. Actually, the CEPR Business Cycle Dating Committee recently stated
that “neither the length, nor the strength of the recovery is sufficient, as of
9 October 2013 to declare that the euro area has come out of the recession”. The
last flash estimate for GDP in the third quarter of 2013 has confirmed the weak-
ness of growth. GDP has slightly decreased in France and in Italy. It was
moderately positive for Spain and the Netherlands. The main country for which
the end of recession is confirmed is Germany. For the euro area as a whole, the
quarterly growth rate did not exceed 0.1%, which is more characteristic of stag-
nation than recovery. Moreover, the unemployment figures clearly show that
the crisis is far from over even if the period of negative growth rates is probably
past. In September 2013, the unemployment rate was still at a record level:
12.2%. In Spain and Greece, it lies above 25% whereas for Portugal and Ireland,
it reaches 16.3% and 13.6% respectively. There is no doubt that this social situ-
ation will leave marks. Inequalities are building up and the living conditions of a
majority of households are worsening (see Chapter 2 of this report for more
details on social issues).
For 2014, the economic outlook will still mainly depend on the pursuit of the
fiscal adjustment. Yet, the recessive forces that dragged down growth in 2012
and in 2013 will partly soften. First, after Germany, Austria and Finland, Italy
displayed a budget deficit in line with the 3% ceiling in 2012. Even if Italian
public debt is still high, forcing the government to pursue consolidation, the
European Commission has stopped the excessive deficit procedure against Italy.
The external pressure to reduce deficits may then be slightly lowered. Besides,
the European Commission has recently granted extra deadlines for France, Spain
and the Netherlands to comply with the target of 3%. In the case of France, the
objective is now set for 2015. In 2014, this will help the French government to
reduce the fiscal effort by almost 0.5 percentage point of GDP (10 billion euros).
Table 2. Fiscal balances and fiscal impulses
In %
Fiscal balance in 2012 Fiscal impulse in 2013 Fiscal impulse in 2014
DEU 0.1 0.4 0.2
FRA -4.8 -1.4 -0.7
ITA -3.0 -1.5 -0.6
ESP -10.6 -1.6 -1.0
NLD -4.1 -1.0 -1.0
BEL -3.9 -1.0 -0.5
PRT -6.4 -1.3 -1.7
IRL -7.5 -1.7 -1.5
GRC -10.0 -3.3 -1.7
FIN -1.9 -1.4 -0.3
AUT -2.5 -0.9 -0.4
EA -3.7 -0.9 -0.4Sources: Eurostat, OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report20The negative fiscal impulse will be lowered in the euro area in 2014 relative to the
fiscal efforts implemented in 2013 (-0.4% against -0.9, see Table 2 for details on
the main euro area countries). It has been slightly revised downward also from the
figures that were expected in the first quarter of 2013. In 2014, the average deficit
for the euro area should fall below 3%, 4 years after a peak of 6.2%. Conse-
quently, the brakes that pushed the euro area into a double-dip recession will
partially and gradually fade away, boosting growth prospects
2. Bottoming out is not enough
Despite these more favourable factors, no recovery is expected in 2014 and
2015 but only a mild rebound in activity. Public and private debt reduction is a
key requirement to expect the end of the crisis. A genuine recovery – one that
starts to close the output gap that has opened up and bring down unemploy-
ment – supposes a reasonable strategy combining return to growth, a low level
of sovereign interest rates and a credible path for fiscal consolidation which
would not overwhelm growth. This strategy needs to define a realistic timeframe,
a sustained process and a coordination of economic policies between countries
and agents.
A key issue for implementing such a strategy is to evaluate the extent to which
the economy could rebound, i.e. the extent of the output gap, on which the
breakdown of public balance into cyclical and structural deficits depends: the
higher the output gap, i.e. the gap between current and potential, non-infla-
tionary output, the higher the cyclical component of the deficit and therefore the
smaller the structural effort required to reduce public deficit. Then, the question
arises regarding the impact on potential output of the biggest slump in Europe
since the Great Depression. Estimating potential output is not an easy task, espe-
cially when economies have been depressed for six years. Should we consider a
permanent downward shock to the level of potential output or only a slowdown in
the potential growth rate? Are the losses of potential output definitive as
suggested by the Spring estimates of the EC? If they are, the output gap in the
euro area is small and the capacity of rebound would be limited (Figure 8).
Another possibility would be to consider that only the growth rate of potential
output has been negatively affected. In that case, a higher rebound could be in
view, involving less structural effort to address the excessive deficit problem. An
even more favourable pattern would leave the potential output fully intact with
no consequence of the Great Recession on both its level and its growth rate
(2.2%). If so, the size of the current output gap would be much higher, around
15%, which would imply a huge cyclical component of deficits in the euro area.
The main problem regarding potential output is that evaluations depend on the
current state of affairs, as suggested by the huge difference between the Spring
2013 estimate of the EC when compared with that in Autumn 2007. As a conse-
quence, austerity may be a self-sustaining process. Given high multipliers, it could
lead not only to depressed current activity but also to downward revisions of
potential output and consequently upward revisions of the structural component
of deficits, which in turn would imply the need for an additional fiscal effort. 
There is no consensus regarding the measure of the level of potential output
or the potential growth. Some indications may be given by survey data on the
utilization of production capacity in the industry sector. The average utilization
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(Figure 9). It is still significantly below the long-term average, suggesting a high
level of production factor hoarding and the potential for a substantial rebound.
Furthermore, in the light of the low level of inflation reached in the euro area,
0.7% y-o-y in October 2013, the existence of a very substantial negative output
gap should be undoubtedly considered.   
Figure 8. Evaluations of potential output by the EC for the euro area 
and different patterns
       Constant 2005 million euros
Sources: EC, calculation OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Figure 9. Capacity utilization rate in the euro area
 In %
Source: DGECFIN, EC.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report22gh the late recognition of the existence of both high multipliers and strong
negative impacts of fiscal consolidation on activity led the Commission to ease the
consolidation path, austerity will still be a driving force of economic developments
in 2014 and 2015. Multipliers should not be lower during the next two years,
given the still high level of unemployment. However, fiscal consolidation will not
drag activity down as much as in the recent years because more countries will
reach, or will get closer to the 3% threshold in 2014, like the Netherlands,
Belgium, and even Greece, in addition to Germany, Finland Austria and Italy, for
which the objective has already achieved in 2013 (Table 3). 
Intermediate objectives for total deficits are still settled, but the EC has said
that attention would also be given to the structural effort to reduce deficit. This
could be seen as an open possibility to avoid additional measures during the
coming calendar year if the objective for government lending is not reached.
Conversely, Spain, in 2012, had to implement three successive consolidation
plans. In any case, the upturn in the growth rate will not be strong enough in
2014 and 2015 to close the output gap if we assume a less deteriorated potential
path of GDP than currently estimated by the EC.
Growth in 2014 and 2015 would benefit not only from a less drastic consoli-
dation scheme but also from a better outlook regarding firm's investment. The
shortfall in private investment since 2008 should start a surge in capital spending
with a view to upgrade plants after six years of slump. In addition, an accelerator
effect could be initiated in some countries from the South of the euro area where
gains in competitiveness are stimulated by wage deflation, i.e. mainly in
Portugal, Spain, and Greece. But it should be stressed that the increase in the
external contribution to growth mirrors the slump of internal demand and the
negative impact of the decrease in wages on private consumption. The recovery
in investment will be constrained by still shaky financing conditions. External
Table 3. Fiscal balance and GDP growth rate in the euro area
Fiscal balance in % of GDP GDP growth in %
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
DEU -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 1.6
FRA -4.1 -3.5 -3.0 0.1 1.1 1.5
ITA -2.9 -2.5 -1.5 -1.8 0.3 1.0
ESP -6.8 -6.2 -5.3 -1.4 0.7 1.4
NLD -4.0 -3.0 -1.9 -1.1 1.0 1.6
BEL -3.4 -2.9 -1.5 0.0 1.2 1.6
PRT -5.8 -3.8 -2.4 -1.8 0.9 1.4
IRL -6.6 -5.2 -3.0 -0.5 1.4 1.9
GRC -7.8 -3.3 -2.1 -4.1 -0.4 2.4
FIN -1.8 -1.2 -0.5 -0.9 1.7 1.9
AUT -2.0 -1.3 -0.5 0.4 1.0 1.3
EA -2.9 -2.4 -2.0 -0.3 1.0 1.5
Sources: Eurostat,OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.financing, regarding both bank lending and market-based funding, remains hard
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conservative lending behavior weighs on firms' financing conditions. As
Figure 10 shows, no signs for a recovery in financing flows are discernible: even
from the very low levels reached again some quarters ago, they were still
declining in the second quarter of 2013.
As a consequence, investment should come primarily from internal financing
resources. The mild rebound foreseen in 2013 and 2014 will be an opportunity for
firms to narrow the cyclical productivity gap and thus to improve their margins
and the self-financing ratios, which drastically suffered from the downturn in
activity, especially in France and Germany. The main drawback of such a dynamic
is that the slow growth will not be enough to close the productivity gap. Mean-
while the expected rebound will take place with few job creations on average in
the euro area which will dampen households' disposable incomes. While unem-
ployment will remain at a high level, dragging down wage rates, the incentives
for a strong recovery in private consumption will be close to zero. Fortunately,
activity will benefit from a mild acceleration in foreign demand and from market
share gains on markets outside the euro area especially by Spain, Portugal and
Greece experiencing a wage deflation. 
The economic outlook has improved, but euro area countries are diverging.
The source of growth will be heterogeneous across countries and the process of
reducing the external imbalances will give rise to new divergence in the standards
of living. The gap between country members divided in “North” and “South” has
widened since the beginning of the crisis1. The GDP per head developments since
the beginning of the crisis show a widening fracture between North, where GDP
per head has returned close to pre-crisis levels, and South where output per capita
Figure 10. Financial liabilities flows
    Millions euro, 4-quarter aggregate
Source: ECB.
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Loansis 8 percent below (Figure 11). This divergence can be seen in all macroeconomic
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report24aspects of the euro area, except current balances for which a convergence process
has started as deficits in the South countries have narrowed.
Public debt and deficit levels in southern countries suffered far more than
those in the North. While all member countries had roughly balanced budgets in
2007, the gap between North and South reached over 2 GDP points in 2012,
although the share of the South's fiscal consolidation in the whole fiscal stance of
the euro area ranged between 60 and 90 percent in 2011/2013. However,
austerity in the South has not been effective in lowering deficits because of high
multipliers, which widened the cyclical components of deficits through a strong
negative impact of fiscal plans on activity. As a consequence, the increase in
public debt ratios has been higher in the South than in the North. Unemployment
reached exceptionally high levels in some southern countries, doubling within a
five-year period in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Such a social and
financial fragmentation between countries may make more difficult the emer-
gence of true solidarity inside the euro area, especially in the pooling of public
debts. Sure enough, to avoid the end of the euro area, the better-off countries,
headed by Germany, agreed to make concessions, but with the counterpart of
drastic austerity in the South. This has had very large consequences for youth
employment, long term unemployment, the poverty rate and social cohesion.
1. North is defined as Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Ireland. South is
defined as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.This geographical breakdown is highly
debatable and is not based on a rational analysis. The issue on the most realistic partition of the euro
area goes beyond the scope of this report. Yet, this figure highlights the ongoing divergence
Figure 11. GDP per capita in euro area
      In euro, constant prices
Source: Eurostat.
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Given the current and scheduled fiscal stance, public deficits in all euro area
countries will fall below the 3% ceiling. In the medium-term, the output gap will
also close. The recent pick-up of growth illustrates the premise of this. But, we
have already stressed that it will take considerable time before a zero-output gap
is achieved and even if GDP finally recovers, the cost of this real adjustment
should not be overlooked. As has been shown in iAGS 2013, austerity has failed
and was not a necessary fatality. Alternative strategies were and still are possible.
Even if they were implemented now, they would significantly improve the
economic outlook of the euro area. An alternative macroeconomic strategy should
draw on less austerity and more active monetary policy. The impact of those
scenarios on the sustainability of public finances and on output losses (compared
with those of the current strategy) is assessed with the iAGS model2. 
The properties and characteristics of the model include assumptions about
the variable size of fiscal multipliers, the long-lasting effects of a real crisis on the
output gap (hysteresis effect), and the incidence of risk premia on interest rates,
three features of strong relevance in the current context. Recent economic anal-
ysis has indeed highlighted that fiscal multipliers may vary with the business
cycles. New agent-based models3, taking into account the heterogeneity of
agents, may also provide new theoretical evidence on this issue (see Box 1).
Box 1. Fiscal multiplier, liquidity constraints, and business cycle: 
an agent-based model
Mauro Napoletano, Jean-Luc Gaffard, Andrea Roventini, Francesco Saraceno
In a forthcoming paper, Napoletano, Gaffard, Roventini and Saraceno
develop a simple model describing an endowment economy with heteroge-
neous households, a commercial bank, a central bank, and a government. It is a
theoretical model that proposes a very stylized representation of an economy in
which a private debt crisis generates a recession and requires a public
intervention.
In the model each household is endowed with a time-invariant share of total
income. Household desired consumption is determined using a simple habit
formation rule. Some households are savers. Some others are borrowers. Savers
are households whose current wealth is larger than desired consumption.
2. iAGS model is a simplified model of the eleven main economies in the euro area (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). For
more details, see Timbeau X., C. Blot, M. Cochard, B. Ducoudré and S. Schweisguth (2012), “iAGS
Model for Euro Area Medium Term Projections,” OFCE Working paper, available at http://www.iags-
project.org/documents/iags_appendix2013.pdf. The aim of the model is to provide a tractable and
simplified toolkit (a small-scale dynamic model) based on sound theoretical foundations. This
reduced-form model is flexible enough to analyse various policy mix scenarios with different sets of
possible hypothesis. 
3. See Gaffard et Napoletano (2012) for detailed insights on these models.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report26Borrowers are households whose wealth is lower than desired consumption and
need financing from credit sector to satisfy their consumption plans. House-
holds who are unable to repay their debt go bankrupt. In addition, bankrupted
households are denied access to the credit market. 
The commercial bank stores the wealth of all agents and grants credit to
borrowers Total credit supply is determined in relation to bank’s net worth.
Credit supply is then allotted to borrowers on a pecking order based on house-
hold leverage. Borrowers whose credit demand is not satisfied are credit
rationed, and their consumption is limited by their own wealth. 
The government sets public spending according to different rules. The tax
rate is proportional to income. The public deficit is financed by the central
bank. Finally, aggregate output is determined by a simple equilibrium condi-
tion in the market for goods. The steady state is characterized by a given
distribution of income shares, by given fractions of savers and borrowers, and
by a given ratio of public spending to aggregate income. Finally, in the steady
state there is no credit rationing, meaning that all borrowers are able to achieve
their desired consumption. 
In such a framework, we introduce a bankruptcy shock, by assuming that a
small fraction of borrowers goes bankrupt. Such a shock has a direct effect on
aggregate output because of the lower consumption of bankrupted house-
holds. Moreover, the bad debt of bankrupted households negatively affects the
net worth of the commercial bank. This leads to credit rationing and to further
reductions in aggregate consumption and output. 
With a constant government expenditure and a constant tax rate, the output
decreases in a first phase before converging toward its initial level. Fiscal policy
dampens the effect of the credit shock and lowers its persistence. The govern-
ment deficit is progressively reabsorbed. 
The fiscal multiplier* is time varying: it is increasing during the recession, and
decreasing during the recovery. Furthermore, higher multipliers are associated
with smaller variations in fiscal policy (Figure 12). In particular, peak multipliers
are below one when the variation in fiscal policy is larger than the amplitude of
the shock hitting the economy. At the same time, the decrease in the size of
the multipliers is faster under stronger doses of fiscal policy. This is explained by
the fact that higher government spending allows a quicker recovery of the
economy to steady state values of output. 
The size and dynamics of the fiscal multiplier are inversely related to the
evolution of credit rationing in the aftermath of the shock. More precisely, the
size of the fiscal multiplier is highest when the credit rationing is stronger, and
then slowly decays as credit rationing fades away (see Figure 13, wherein the
degree of credit rationing is captured by the evolution of the ratio between
effective and desired consumption (right axis)). These patterns are explained by
the dual role played by government spending during a credit crunch. On one
hand, government spending directly sustains aggregate output by replacing
private consumption spending. On the other hand, it helps the recovery of the
latter by sustaining the income of credit-rationed agents. Finally, the fiscal
multiplier is higher the more leveraged is the economy. Bankruptcy shocks and
credit rationing have larger effects in such economies. Consequently the effects
of fiscal policies are stronger. 
Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries in 2013, 2014 and 2015 27Considering the actual path of fiscal consolidation, we simulate the
dynamics of public debt and the output gap under the hypotheses on the
initial conditions and on the growth rate of the potential output. The results
are summed up in Table 4 (see chapter 3 for a description of the main under-
lying hypotheses). In the baseline, we simulate the path of public debt levels
(expressed in percentage points of GDP) until 2032, which is the horizon of
the 1/20th debt rule incorporated in the revised SGP and in the Fiscal
Compact. The simulated path of public debt levels depends on the fiscal
impulses which have been forecast in the euro area from 2013 to 2015. By
Figure 12. Size of fiscal multipliers
Source: Authors' calculations.
Figure 13. Fiscal multiplier and credit constraints
Source: Authors' calculations.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report28Table 4 reflects the extent of austerity all over the euro area: between 2014
and 2015, all member states except Germany and Finland will achieve cyclically-
adjusted primary improvements in their public deficit. The improvement is less
than 2% of GDP for Italy, France and Austria. Spain, Belgium, Netherlands,
Portugal and Greece will make stronger efforts (about 2% of GDP), whereas
Ireland will make a substantial one (3.2% of GDP). This contractionary fiscal
stance will make it ever harder to achieve an output gap at or above zero in our
simulation: all member states except Germany will have to wait until 2020
(Belgium, Finland), 2021 (Austria, France, the Netherlands) or 2022 to close the
output gap. Meanwhile, aggregate euro area GDP will plummet to a maximum
negative output gap of almost -3.9%. Germany and Finland will be exceptions,
thanks to milder consolidation plans.
Real divergence across euro area member states under this scenario will thus
widen: Greece will hit the floor with a massive output gap of -13.7%. Ireland,
Spain and Portugal will face substantial losses with output gaps reaching excep-
tional levels around -8/-9%, and France and Italy will be quite harshly hit,
touching the ground at -5% after austerity measures are implemented. 
This multi-speed euro area in terms of output losses will also be reflected in
structural balances and public debt ratios. In 2018, despite substantial fiscal
efforts, France, Spain, Belgium, and Ireland will not be able to bring their cycli-
cally-adjusted deficit under 0.5% of GDP. It must yet be noted that this
conclusion hinges on the initial conditions regarding the breakdown between
cyclical and structural deficit. France, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland and
Greece will also not be able to reach the public-debt-to-GDP threshold of 60% of
Table 4.  Baseline scenario
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse
(% of GDP)
Average annual 
growth
(%)
Maximum 
negative 
output gap 
reached
(%)
Sove-
reign rate 
spread to 
Germany
(%)
2014 2018 2032 2014 2018 2032 2014-
2015
2014-
2018
2019-
2032
2014- 
2032
2014-
2018
DEU 79 70 42 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 0.2 1.3 1.3 -0.2 0.0
FRA 94 91 76 -1.3 -1.4 -1.7 -1.4 1.8 1.5 -4.5 0.4
ITA 133 121 53 1.2 1.1 4.5 -0.9 0.8 0.3 -5.3 1.7
ESP 96 103 100 -2.2 -2.8 -3.2 -2.0 2.1 1.5 -9.4 1.5
NLD 75 70 43 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -2.1 2.0 1.7 -5.2 0.0
BEL 101 94 64 -1.7 -0.8 -0.2 -2.0 1.7 1.5 -2.2 0.8
PRT 130 122 85 0.2 -0.5 0.2 -2.2 1.9 1.2 -8.8 1.1
IRL 123 117 82 -2.1 -1.6 -0.6 -3.2 2.4 2.0 -7.7 1.6
GRC 181 162 90 2.6 1.4 2.3 -2.0 2.3 1.1 -13.7 0,8
FIN 57 55 44 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 0.0 1.9 1.6 -1.9 -0.1
AUT 75 66 27 -0.5 0.6 1.9 -1.5 1.5 1.4 -2.8 0.0
EA 97 90 61 -0.5 -0.5 0.1 -1.0 1.6 1.3 -3.9 0.8
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.GDP by 2032. The case of Greece is interesting, in this respect: it would not
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of GDP and an outstanding negative fiscal impulse of 5.3% of GDP between 2013
and 2015, which adds to the austerity implemented from 2010 to 2012. Fiscal
efforts by this country will not be sufficient to achieve the debt target, due to a
deflation between 2014 and 2016 which increases real interest rates.
Another striking result is the degree of excess austerity implemented by most
countries reaching a lower debt ratio at the 5-year horizon. Though European
rules require only a maximum deficit of 0.5% of GDP, Italy, Netherlands and
Austria achieve structural equilibrium or surplus. This clearly indicates that there is
leeway to perform less restrictive fiscal policies without breaching EU fiscal rules,
insofar as these countries will face a lower debt-to-GDP ratio than the 60% of GDP
limit in 2032.
Finally, this baseline scenario also deals with the issue of public debt sustain-
ability in the euro area. Consistent with the EA fiscal framework, a 20-year
horizon is fixed for assessing debt sustainability. The simulations are then carried
over this horizon.
It must be acknowledged that the issue of public debt sustainability is theoret-
ically and empirically unsettled, between promoters of investigating the statistical
properties of public finances variables with fiscal limits on the one hand (Daniel
and Shiamptanis, 2013), and, on the other hand, promoters of a "return to
economic thinking" (Bohn, 2007). Stated briefly, sustainability refers to the ability
of the general government to pay back the domestic public debt. This ability
depends on the future scope for spending cuts and tax hikes, but also on future
economic growth.
In our simulations, public debt sustainability is assessed as the ability of coun-
tries to meet the objective of bringing back the debt ratio to 60% of GDP by
2032. This criterion boils down to an institutional view of sustainability but does
not refer to a theoretical view nor reflect the equilibrium value for debt ratio.
Though some countries in our baseline simulations do not reach this 60%
threshold, they achieve substantial reductions in public debt-to-GDP ratios. For
instance, Greece would halve its ratio and Ireland's debt would decrease by 41
percentage points of GDP between 2014 and 2032. This downward trend in
public debt implies enhanced debt sustainability stricto sensu. However the social
costs as well as the cost in terms of fiscal balance could make this adjustment
unrealistic. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, it would indeed require struc-
tural primary surpluses above 3% of GDP for many years, which have rarely been
achieved in the history of fiscal consolidation. 
Our simulations also show that the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio in many euro
area countries is low: 42% in Germany, 43% in Netherlands, even 27% in Finland.
It questions the relevance of fiscal austerity in these countries, because public
bonds are highly demanded on financial markets, especially "risk-free" bonds like
German Bunds. For this reason, it is highly probable that this baseline scenario
goes too far in terms of fiscal sustainability in most euro area countries. To sum
up, this scenario considers fiscal restrictions that go beyond the requirements of
fiscal sustainability, beyond the requirements of EU fiscal rules and beyond the
social resilience of European citizens. Further simulations are therefore required.
First, we simulate a situation in which all countries achieve the public debt
target in 2032, under the assumption that countries below the 60% threshold
stop consolidation or expand to reach the threshold. This scenario is called “fiscal
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report30sustainability” as it refers to the ability of EU countries to converge towards a debt
target of 60% of GDP. We calculate a sequence of fiscal impulses over 2016-2032
that achieve the target, assuming that fiscal impulses for the years 2013 to 2015
are left unchanged. For simplicity, we set fiscal impulses at -0.5 or +0.5 depending
on the gap vis-à-vis the target: the fiscal impulse is positive (resp. negative) if
actual debt is below (resp. above) the target. The cumulated fiscal impulse is
larger than in the baseline scenario for countries which cannot achieve 60% in this
scenario, whereas it is lower for the other countries (in absolute values). For the
last group of countries, we gather some pieces of information as regards the
margins for manoeuvre for future fiscal policy. Structural balance and average
annual growth also indicate the costs or gains in terms of fiscal adjustment and
impact on economic activity of sticking to the debt target at 20-year horizon.
The question of fiscal sustainability is especially crucial for Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain since the debt target is out of reach in the baseline scenario,
whereas the question of the costs of fiscal retrenchment is crucial for countries
that go beyond the requirements of EU fiscal legislation in the baseline scenario. 
Table 5 sums up the simulation results which are threefold. First, all countries
achieve the debt-to-GDP target. The fiscal stance over the period 2013-2032
produces a cumulative fiscal impulse which is close to the baseline scenario, on
average for the Euro area.
Second, Spain, Ireland and Greece achieve the debt target in 2032, but after
substantially more restrictive fiscal stances than in the baseline. Moreover,
between 2014 and 2018, Portugal and Spain would experience slower economic
growth than in the baseline, hence postponing until 2025 (Portugal) and 2026
(Spain) the return to a zero output gap.
Table 5. Is it possible to reach the target of 60% in 2032 and what is the cost 
incurred in terms of growth?
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse
(% of GDP)
Average 
annual 
growth
(%)
Maximum
negative 
output gap 
reached (%)
2014 2018 2032 2014 2018 2032 2014-
2032
2014-
2018
2019-
2032
2014- 
2032
DEU 79 72 60 -0.3 -1.4 -1.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 -0.2
FRA 94 90 60 -1.3 -0.3 -0.1 -2.6 1.6 1.5 -4.5
ITA 133 121 60 1.2 0.7 3.8 -0.4 0.9 0.3 -5.3
ESP 96 103 60 -2.2 -1.4 1.6 -5.6 1.8 1.5 -9.4
NLD 75 71 60 -0.1 -1.3 -1.6 -0.7 2.2 1.6 -5.2
BEL 101 93 60 -1.7 -0.5 0.2 -2.3 1.6 1.5 -2.2
PRT 130 123 60 0.2 0.8 3.1 -4.4 1.6 1.2 -8.8
IRL 123 117 60 -2.1 -0.2 1.9 -4.8 2.2 2.0 -7.7
GRC 181 166 60 2.6 2.5 6.3 -5.5 1.8 1.1 -13.7
FIN 57 57 60 -0.3 -1.9 -2.5 1.1 2.0 1.6 -1.9
AUT 75 68 60 -0.5 -0.8 -1.7 1.3 1.7 1.4 -2.8
EA 97 91 60 -0.5 -0.6 0.3 -1.1 1.5 1.3 -3.9Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
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fiscal leeway: indeed, the cumulated fiscal impulse improves by 1.3 percentage
points in Germany, 0.5 in Italy, 1.4 in Netherlands, 1.1 in Finland and 2.8 in
Austria in this scenario compared to the baseline. Despite fiscal leeway and rela-
tively high fiscal multipliers in the short run, the net gain in terms of economic
growth is very small. The reason lies in the trade interactions within the euro area
(see iAGS 2013, released in November 2012, or Jan in’t Veld, 2013): the enlarged
margins for manoeuvre for some countries are compensated by the larger real
difficulties incurred by the implementation of a more restrictive fiscal stance in
southern countries and Ireland.
3.1. The consolidation path has been costly
We investigate whether the front-loaded consolidation strategy has had costs
to euro area countries in terms of growth, relative to an alternative strategy where
a “spread consolidation” would have been pursued from 2011 on. First, we simu-
late the path to 60% of public debt in 2032 starting in 2011 with historical and
forecasted fiscal impulses from 2011 to 2015. We already mentioned that these
fiscal impulses went in most cases beyond the treaties’ requirements. Then, from
2016 to 2032, we add further consolidation of 0.5 percent of GDP per year and
assess whether the 60 % debt ratio can be met (consolidation means negative
fiscal impulse). We compare in Table 6 these simulation results with those of a
milder consolidation of 0.5 percent of GDP per year that would have begun in
2011, consistent with treaties’ requirements. 
First, in the baseline (front-loaded strategy) every country achieves the debt
target (as in Table 4). In contrast, if countries had spread consolidation over a
longer time period, France, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece would not be able
to reach the 60% debt ratio in 2032. This variant confirms that it would be harder
for Portugal and Greece to delay too much consolidation without harming debt
sustainability. 
Second, for countries achieving the debt target in 2032, spreading consolida-
tion as early as 2011 would have been a better strategy than the front-loaded one
from a macro stabilization point of view: with higher fiscal impulses, growth
would have been higher between 2011 and 2015. As a result, recession in the
euro area would have been avoided in 2012 and 2013.
Third, with slightly higher negative fiscal impulses on average, the debt target
could have been achieved: a consolidation of 0.75 point of GDP per year would
be sufficient for France, Spain and Ireland to reach the target4. With a consolida-
tion of 1 percent of GDP per year, Ireland would achieve the 60% target and
Greece would be near (public debt would be about 73% of GDP in 2032).
Fourth, spreading consolidation would have needed 1.2 percent of GDP of
additional consolidation on average for the euro area between 2011 and 2032.
This is due to slightly higher interest rates since public debt would have been
higher until 2032. The consolidation effort would also have been spread over a
much longer period, implying less economic deterioration and less unemploy-
ment on average. 4. Results not reported here.
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The euro area crisis started out as a crisis of confidence against the backdrop
of heightened uncertainty in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the
flaws of the euro area economic governance architecture. The resulting high risk
premiums on government bonds provoked liquidity troubles and soon more and
more countries were drawn into the vicious cycle of high national interest rates,
fiscal consolidation, recession and faltering banking systems.
As the crisis strategy of euro area governments continually proved to be inad-
equate, the European Central Bank repeatedly came to the rescue to ensure the
financial stability of the euro area and prevent its breakup.5 Three-year refinancing
operations, purchases of government securities and covered bonds as well as the
announcement of possible and potentially unlimited government bond purchases
below 3-year maturity (OMT) went a long way toward stabilizing bond markets.
Nonetheless euro-area financial markets are still fragmented and the monetary
transmission mechanism is impaired. Although ECB rates are at historical lows, the
expansionary monetary impulse fails to reach those euro-area countries most in
need of it.
Given the great uncertainty still manifest in high risk premiums carried by
some euro-area government bonds, a further decrease in the refinancing rate or a
negative deposit rate are unlikely to sufficiently bring down the interest rates
Table 6. Gains and costs of a back-loaded strategy starting in 2011
Variation between delayed strategy and front-loaded strategy
Public debt
 (% of GDP
Structural 
balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse
(% of GDP)
Average 
annual 
growth
(%)
Maximum
negative 
output gap 
reached (%)
Cumulated 
output gap
(%)
2015 2032 2015 2032 2011-
2015
2016-
2032
2011-
2015
2016-
2032
2011- 
2032
2011- 
2032
DEU 3 0 -0.6 0.3 0.6 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.3
FRA 7 12 -3.1 2.9 3.3 -7.1 0.4 -0.2 1.3 -3.7
ITA 4 0 -2.9 1.2 3.2 -4.6 0.5 -0.1 2.0 -0.5
ESP 2 45 -4.9 -0.7 5.8 -6.4 1.4 -0.3 4.4 14.5
NLD 2 0 -2.2 0.5 2.5 -3.0 0.4 -0.1 0.8 0.3
BEL -1 0 -1.0 0.1 1.0 -1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7
PRT 7 97 -7.2 -5.4 8.6 -7.2 1.6 -0.4 4.9 15.8
IRL 1 33 -5.2 0.4 5.8 -7.4 1.2 -0.3 2.5 12.0
GRC -28 117 -8.9 -11.1 13.4 -3.5 4.2 -0.7 10.8 68.7
FIN 2 0 -0.4 0.1 0.5 -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.4
AUT 3 0 -2.1 0.7 2.2 -3.1 0.2 -0.1 0.4 -1.6
EA 4 13 -2.6 0.5 2.9 -4.1 0.5 -0.1 1.8 2.8
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
5. Tober, S., Reluctant Lone Ranger – The ECB in the Euro Area Crisis. In: The Social Dimension of
the Economic Crisis in Europe. Edited by  Heinz Stapf-Finé. June 2013: 9 – 28.
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to steer the euro economy towards a path of low unemployment and high produc-
tivity growth Likewise, it proves very difficult to explain changes in long-term
interest rates by public finance variables (debt and / or deficit) (see Box 2). This led
us to propose a scenario of ad hoc simulation using iAGS Model to assess the
impact of changes in interest rates on the path of public finances to equilibrium. 
A key question is how to bring about these lower interest levels. Monetary
policy could play a role and the OMT has been partly designed to this end. It
would then have to be more active and explicitly target a significant reduction in
government bond yield differentials. Furthermore, in February 2013, the Euro-
pean parliament, national governments and the EU Commission agreed to set up
an expert group to analyze the feasibility of a debt redemption fund.6 A carefully
designed debt redemption fund based on joint guarantee of euro-area public
debt could inspire sufficient confidence to engineer an economic turnaround in
the euro area7 (see Box 3). First and foremost, it would allow for an effective
transmission of monetary policy so that expansionary monetary conditions
provide an effective counterweight to the depressing effects of debt deleveraging
and fiscal consolidation.
Hereafter, we use the iAGS model to illustrate the impact of an alternative
government bond rates scenario on the path of consolidation and growth to
achieve the 60% of GDP debt target in 2032. The first scenario assumes no
convergence of long-term public bond rates for Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and
Greece: risk premiums on bond rates would remain until 2032 at the levels
observed in late 2013. In the alternative scenario, all government bond rates
would converge to the German government bond rate in 2014 and would remain
equal to that rate until 2032.
Table 7 reports results for the scenario in which high risk premiums remain
until 2032. In that case, Spain would have to add 4.7 percent of GDP of negative
fiscal impulse to achieve the debt target, and Greece and Italy more than
2 percent of GDP. This would add massive cumulated output gap losses to those
already incurred by the consolidation necessary to achieve the 60% debt target: -
7.7% for Spain, -5.4% for Greece and -4.4% for Italy. These results stress the
necessity to rapidly close the public bond yields premiums between these coun-
tries and Germany.
Indeed, any device inducing a reduction of risk premiums would relax the
constraint on high-debt countries, by diminishing the cost of refinancing existing
debt and thereby facilitating fiscal consolidation. Table 8 illustrates that point: the
assumption is made that all government bond yields converge to the level of
Germany as early as 2014. The required adjustment of the structural public
balance to achieve the 60% debt target in 2032 is reduced by about 0.5% of
GDP. Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland would then have new margins for
manoeuvre to alleviate the social cost of fiscal consolidation: the needed cumu-
lated fiscal impulse would be reduced by about 1 percentage point for these
6. The working group was launched in July 2013 and is to present results no later than March
2014; EU Commission (2013), President Barroso, in agreement with Vice-President Rehn, launches
Expert Group on debt redemption fund and euro. MEMO/13/635, 2 July 2013.
7. It must yet be noted that this view is challenged notably by Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2013).
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report34countries, and cumulated losses of economic activity would be mitigated by
about 1% to 3%.  
Table 7. Variant: High risk premium
Variation between high risk premium scenario and baseline strategy (60% target)
Average 
public bond 
rate
(%)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
output gap
(%)
2014-2020 2018 2032 2011-2015 2016-2032
DEU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FRA -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.5
ITA 1.3 1.1 0.2 -2.2 -4.4
ESP 1.6 -0.9 3.0 -4.7 -7.1
NLD 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
BEL -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
PRT 0.8 -0.6 0.6 -1.6 -2.8
IRL 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6
GRC 1.1 -0.7 2.3 -3.4 -5.4
FIN 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
AUT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
EA 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.9 -1.5
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
Table 8. Variant: Redemption fund
Variation between Redemption scheme strategy and baseline strategy (60% target)
Average public 
bond rate
(%)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
output gap
(%)
2014-2020 2018 2032 2011-2015 2016-2032
DEU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FRA -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.5
ITA -1.1 0.5 -0.6 0.5 0.8
ESP -0.8 0.5 -0.4 0.8 1.2
NLD 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
BEL -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
PRT -0.9 0.4 -0.6 1.0 2.2
IRL -1.6 -0.1 -0.5 1.3 2.7
GRC -0.6 0.5 -0.8 1.2 2.1
FIN 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
AUT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
EA -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.6
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
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bond yields
According to the literature review by Haugh et al. (2009), a first conclusion
appears: variables associated to public finances have a statistically significant
impact on long-term interest rates (see table 1, pp.8). That being said, this is
the second conclusion from their study: the magnitude of those effects varies,
depending on whether deficits or debts are tested, on the study and the coun-
tries considered. For instance, the effect on the long-term interest rate of a one
percentage point increase in the public deficit to GDP ratio varies from 9 basis
points (panel study on 19 OECD countries by Reinhart and Sack, 2000) to 100
basis points (literature review on the US by Gale and Orzag, 2003). To give an
approximate idea, let us consider the Greek public deficit example, which
increased to a high of 9% of GDP at the peak of the crisis, between 2007 and
2009. The expected effect on the Greek long-term interest rate would have
been between 81 and 100 basis points, which is very far from the increase of
1700 basis points sustained by this state between 2008 and 2012.
The same effect following an increase of one percentage point in the debt-to-
GDP ratio would be between 1.5 basis points (panel study on 7 OECD countries
by Conway and Orr, 2002) and 49 basis points (panel study on 9 countries by
Ford and Laxton, 1999). Given its increase in debt in the Maastricht sense of
more than 60% of GDP during the crisis, between 2007 and 2011, Greece
should have incurred an increase of 90 to almost 3000 basis points in its long-
term interest rates: the increase sustained by the Greek state is indeed within
this range, although that range is so large that its predictive power is limited. It
is difficult to believe that Greek long-term interest rates can be explained
mainly by changes in its public debt, given that a large majority of studies
devoted to the effect of debt on long-term interest rates or on spreads (see
infra) conclude an effect within the lower range of the review produced by
Haugh et al. (2009).
Haugh et al. (2009) also produce their own estimates on the determinants of
the sovereign spread of 10 member states of the euro zone relative to
Germany, between December 2005 and June 2009. They find a significant
positive effect on spreads of the medium 5-year forecast of the public-deficit-
to-debt ratio; slightly higher if the country in question has suffered excessive
deficits before (higher than 3% of GDP). In a study extended to 22 developed
economies, on a sample from 1980 to 2010, Poghosyan (2012) does not find,
however, a significant effect of primary public deficit on spreads of rates,
whereas on average, an increase of one percentage point of GDP in public debt
should produce a nonetheless statistically significant increase in real long-term
interest rates of only 2 basis points…This is exactly the same impact that
Gruber and Kamin (2012) find on nominal long-term interest rates, from a
sample of G-7 countries. According to the authors, this sensitivity is halved
when all OECD countries are included in the sample. This result is very close to
that obtained by Ardagna et al. (2008) on 16 OECD countries studied between
1960 and 2002: the average impact on the long-term interest rate of an
increase of one percentage point in the debt-to-GDP ratio was found to be 0.6
basis points on average. Gruber and Kamin (2012) also find that structural defi-
cits influence long-term interest rates: an increase of one percentage point in
structural deficit to GDP would produce, in the long term, an increase of 15
(respectively, 7) basis points in long-term interest rates for the G-7 country
sample (respectively, the OECD country sample). On American data, Laubach
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and his results are in the lower range for effects of deficits on long-term interest
rates: an increase of one point in deficit to GDP produces an increase of 20 to
29 basis points in long-term rates. Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) show that the
impact of deficits on spread rates is not significant (and positive) as from 2009.
Their sample ends on the first trimester of 2010. On a sample going till
September 2011, Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) show that before 2008, varia-
tions in public deficit to GDP had a significant impact on spreads of rates, but
not after the crisis; as from 2008, only public debt to GDP of the “PIIGS” coun-
tries had a strong impact on spreads.
Box 3. The case for a debt redemption fund
A debt redemption fund was initially proposed in 2011 by Vincente Visco
(Parello/Visco 2012) and the German Council of Economic Experts (2011). The
novel idea behind the debt redemption fund is that a joint guarantee is
extended to that part of the public debt financial markets may have doubts
about, i.e. the national debt in excess of 60% of the national GDP. If well
designed, confidence would return rapidly and national interest rates would
decline not only for the government but for private loans as well. Notwith-
standing the problem that arises with the choice of the public debt threshold
(the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio has never had any economic rationale), the
redemption fund is a step forward in trying to resolve the crisis in the euro area.
All euro area countries would be jointly and severally liable for the debt guar-
anteed under the debt redemption fund. The responsibility for servicing the
debt would, however, remain with each individual country. Member states
would, of course, also be responsible for servicing the 60%-of-GDP debt not
covered by the Fund and commit to keeping national debt issuance at or below
this threshold. An indispensable feature of this debt redemption fund would be
that the guaranteed debt is retired within the predetermined life span of the
fund, e.g. within 25 years.
The debt redemption fund does not envisage a mutualization of debt. It does
not involve financial transfers between euro area countries. It does not identify
any culprits in causing the current crisis. The sole objective of the debt
redemption fund is to restore confidence and allow the euro area as a whole to
exit the crisis.
The main architectural question is which additional features are deemed
necessary to accomplish this feat. Key technical features are country eligibility,
funding and lending modalities of the DRF as well as the starting point and
modality of debt repayment. 
To reap the full potential of the DRF in stabilizing the economy, all euro area
countries should be eligible and obliged to join. In contrast, excluding coun-
tries currently in an adjustment program – as proposed by the German Council
of Economic Experts – would imply that those countries most in need of lower
nationwide interest rates would profit the least.
The DRF would not require paid-in capital but be based on guarantees,
similar to the EFSF. Paid-in capital would furthermore not improve the rating of
the Fund because by construction each country is jointly and severally liable. In
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debt (roughly amounting to their GDP share). 
The refinancing costs of the DRF should be roughly equal to low ones
Germany currently enjoys.8 The market for these bonds will be more liquid
than the one for German bonds so that the high liquidity premium will
compensate at least in part for the lower safe-haven premium which currently
results from the euro crisis. The interest paid by governments should equal the
interest paid by the fund plus a service fee to cover administrative costs of
the fund.
The starting point of repayment and size of annual installments are further
important issues. Debt repayment presupposes either that the respective
country has a budget surplus corresponding to the repayment installment or
that nominal GDP growth yields sufficient new funds to cover the installment
while at the same time keeping the non-guaranteed national debt at 60%
of GDP.
In 2013, the debt ratios of all euro area countries but Germany increased and
currently only 6 of the 17 countries are expected to see a decline in 2014.
However, assuming the DRF is established rapidly and combined with growth-
fostering macroeconomic policies, the coming years should be years of rela-
tively vigorous growth as confidence not only returns to bond markets and the
banking system but to entrepreneurs as well. Within the first three years of the
new DRF-regime, therefore, all countries, except maybe Greece, can be
expected to be in a position of declining rather than increasing debt ratios. 
Consequently, repayment to the debt redemption fund should commence
three years after the fund is established. The DRF should, however, buy long-
term bonds of the member states immediately and refinance them long-term
with an emphasis on ten-year bonds, thus creating a very liquid market
segment of safe assets in the euro area. The stressed euro countries – both
private and public sectors – would then immediately benefit from lower interest
payments. Bonds due within this initial period would be refinanced by the
respective national government.
Notwithstanding the anticipated positive internal dynamics in the euro area,
shocks from international trade or international financial markets as well as
other unforeseen events cannot be excluded. The question therefore remains,
how to determine the installments by which the euro countries redeem their
DRF debt.
The amount that has to be paid back on average each year can be easily
determined by dividing the euro amount of the debt in access of 60% of GDP
by 22 years, the number of years during which the debt must be fully repaid
provided the lifespan of the fund is 25 years and repayment starts in the fourth
year. Such constant euro amounts would, however, imply declining install-
ments in percent of (rising) GDP. The annual target should therefore be
expressed in terms of GDP with a certain amount of flexibility depending on
the state of the economy. If nominal GDP growth exceeds expected trend
growth, for example, repayment should be swifter, if growth falls short, repay-
ment should be deferred. In a world of perfect knowledge this would amount
8. This is likely to be the case even if the fund were not based on several and joint liability, each
member state instead being liable for only their GDP-weighted share of total debt. For example,
EFSF bonds due in early 2022 currently yield 0.5 percentage points more than comparable German
government securities; the yield spread for bonds with a remaining duration of almost 11 years is
0.3 percentage points.
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each and every year. Given the difficulties in determining the structural deficit,
governments should instead predetermine a path for government expenditure,
or rather government expenditure not sensitive to the business cycle. Non-
cyclical government expenditure should increase at a rate compatible with
bringing government debt down to 60% of GDP with the 25 years of the
Fund’s existence. Extensive fiscal surveillance is already in place that would alert
member states to a divergence from the prescribed expenditure path and debt
repayment schedule. Should a member state not live up to its responsibilities,
funds from the structural funds and cohesion fund could be temporarily with-
held and only dispensed once the country is back on track. 
Many features included in the proposal of the German Council of Economic
Experts (2011) mainly serve the purpose of allying fears of moral hazard, i.e. of
governments benefiting from the scheme but then reneging on their repay-
ment obligations. These include the proposed pledging of foreign reserves,
adherence to the fiscal pact and the possibility of ending the proposed roll-in-
phase if conditions of the fiscal pact are not met. Although some measures to
ensure repayment compliance may have merit, the case for moral hazard seems
to be vastly overstated, in part due to a flawed analysis of the causes of the
current crisis. The euro area crisis was caused by flaws in its institutional archi-
tecture, especially a misguided early warning system, not by excessive
government spending. It was also greatly aggravated by the global financial
crisis. The focus of macroeconomic surveillance has now widened to include
unit labor costs, inflation and current account balances. Given the current
dismal economic outlook, high unemployment and drastically high youth
unemployment as well as GDP levels well below their pre-crisis levels, reigniting
growth should be the utmost priority and should actually lower the risks that
individual countries will pursue economic strategies that harm other member
states. With macroeconomic and, specifically, fiscal surveillance in place,
member states straying from repayment targets could be disciplined by
freezing assigned funds from EU funds, such as the structural funds and the
cohesion fund, if such disciplinary are perceived as necessary.
It is conceivable that in ten years’ time euro countries decide that a liquid
euro bond market has advantages for all member states and should be main-
tained. Conceivably, the DRF could then evolve to include new financing for
countries whose public debt would otherwise fall below 60%. But that is
neither the purpose of this proposal nor should such longer run issues be
decided on in the midst of an economic crisis.
APPENDIX: 
Country analyses

Appendix AGermany:
the economy is lacking dynamism
The economic situation in Germany stabilised in the first half of 2013. In the
second half of 2012, an economic recession had seemed probable. The stabili-
sing of the economy has been based on two factors: The first is monetary policy,
where the pledge to make unlimited emergency purchases of bonds has stabi-
lised the monetary environment. This has not only secured a minimum level of
confidence on the finance and capital markets, leading to a recent surge on the
stock markets, but has also ensured more favourable lending conditions for the
real economy. 
The second stabilising factor has been the robustness of the labour market in
Germany. Despite the low growth rates, the level of employment has continued
to expand, with notably faster wage increases. Taken together, this has led to a
perceptible rise in incomes, with consumption thus acting as a strong buffer
against a slide into recession. Along with the monetary stability, improved
consumption has broken the long-standing trend of decreasing investment and
we now see an increase in private capital expenditure, a good sign for
the economy.
Against this backdrop, the GDP in Germany should grow by 0.4% this year,
though the number of people employed has only risen slightly and the number of
unemployed has also slightly increased. But this stability does not indicate a dyna-
mism which could spark a shift into a phase of self-sustaining economic growth.
The potential for such a shift is there, but the strain of the euro-crisis and the asso-
ciated fiscal restraint is too strong and is preventing the emergence of a growth
cycle, despite the economy having reached its probable trough and the gradual
ending of output losses. Should the euro crisis reignite, Germany may slide
towards recession. This is the primary risk in the economic outlook.
As the increase in demand from developing markets has also waned, the
economic environment is not as promising as it had been in 2012. In addition,
the euro has appreciated in value against the currencies of most developing
nations as well as against the U.S. dollar. Over the coming year, however,
exports to these markets should increase and, in particular, deliveries within the
euro area should gradually stabilise subsequent to the economic bottoming-out.
Given that imports will increase more rapidly than exports over this year and the
next, one can expect a negative contribution to GDP from external trade. In
2013, this will amount to a 0.4% reduction in GDP, while in 2014 it will repre-
sent a 0.7% reduction.
Domestic demand therefore remains the most important economic pillar.
Capital expenditure as well as investment in construction are both trending
upwards, having previously dropped for a number of quarters. Private consump-
tion remains – as in previous years – the central engine for domestic demand.
Given the increasing economic momentum in the second half of this year,
the German economy will grow at an improved rate of 1.2% in 2014. A compre-
hensive shift to a strong growth cycle is, however, not to be expected. The level
of employment will increase slightly, with the number of unemployed dropping
somewhat. 
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rise in consumer prices for Germany will mirror the rate for the euro area at 1.5%.
The 2014 inflation rate of 1.5% for Germany will outstrip the euro area average of
1.2% – and that for the first time since the founding of the monetary union. The
fiscal budget will be more or less balanced for the forecast period, and in net
terms monetary policy will provide no growth impulse worth mentioning. The
level of gross debt will continue to decline.
Table. ECLM-IMK-OFCE macroeconomic forecasts
Germany
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP 0.7 0.4 1.2 1.6
Private consumption 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.3
Investment -2.1 -0.7 4.0 5.4
Public consumption 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.6
Exports 3.2 0.1 4.4 3.5
Imports 1.4 1.0 6.6 4.8
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -0.3 0.5 1.7 2.1
     External trade 1.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
     Inventories -0.6 0.2 -0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate 5.3 5.2 5.0 4.8
Inflation 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.5
Public deficit 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Fiscal impulse -1.2 0.4 0.2 0.0
Public debt % GDP 81.2 79.2 76.8 75.8
Current account % GDP 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.5
Source: National accounts, OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Appendix BFrance:
Less fiscal consolidation, more growth
The turnaround in French economic activity after the 2008/09 recession, of
+1.6% and +2% percent in 2010 and 2011 respectively, reflected that growth
was not out of reach after the deep financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s.
However, instead of strengthening in 2012 and 2013, growth came to a standstill,
leading to a stagnation phase and a new pick up in the unemployment rate to
near its historical record level.
Several factors have interrupted the recovery in the euro area, such as the
resumption of the increase of the oil price and the unusual monetary conditions
driven by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. But the crucial factor for the
downturn has been the fiscal consolidation, which was implemented from 2010
and drastically intensified in 2011, 2012 and 2013. In addition, negative external
impulses resulting from the same strategy conducted by European countries have
further dampened national growth.
After two years of weak conditions, the outlook for the French economy is
clearing up, but stagnation is expected due to the persistence of adverse
influences. Although the EC, in May 2013, has postponed to 2015 the achieve-
ment of the 3 percent public deficit target, fiscal consolidation will still be
conducted in 2014. The change in the composition of austerity, an increase in
direct and indirect taxes on households combined with a restriction in public spen-
ding, while unemployment continues to rise, will not lower fiscal multipliers so
that activity will still suffer from weak consumption. External trade will be affected
by wage deflation in south euro area and will not contribute to growth in 2014.
Only a moderate recovery in firm investment can be expected, driven by the need
to upgrade plants and equipment after a long period of continuous decline.
The stagnation that the French economy has been experiencing for two year
follows a phase of recovery which started in mid-2009 after the recession and
which was completed in the first half of 2011. These former developments, which
pushed up the y-o-y GDP growth rate to 2.8 percent in the first quarter of 2011,
suggest that the economy retains a capacity for growth which relies on the
absorption of overcapacities inherited both from the recession and from the 2011
downturn. Many institutions, OECD, IMF, EC, French government, OFCE estimate
a large negative output gap for France, lying between -5 and -3 percent. Business
survey data support the same idea with still high production capacity margins. At
the same time, industrial firms reporting demand difficulties as a factor for limiting
production are in majority.
Business surveys have been more optimistic the last few months, while
national accounts have displayed the highest GDP growth rate since the first
quarter of 2011, +0.5 percent in the second quarter of 2013. However, it is too
early to see in that performance a signal for a recovery. The rebound relied both
on a strong consumption growth, stimulated by bad weather conditions in
spring which led to higher energy consumption, and by a positive contribution of
stocks. By contrast, private investment continued to decrease while foreign trade
did not contribute to growth. The most recent national account release, a -0.1%
percent GDP growth in the third quarter of 2013, confirms that the French
economy is still weak and that a sustained narrowing of the output gap is not in
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pick up in the final quarter of 2013 as a result of the increase in VAT scheduled on
2014 January 1st which may temporarily stimulate purchases before the measure
enters into force.
Household consumption will not support growth in 2014 despite a slight pick
up in the nominal disposable income. Indeed, an acceleration of consumer prices
is expected from the increase in VAT which will offset nominal income gains.
Austerity will still be conducted in 2014, with a higher contribution of households
through a strong rise in both indirect taxes and social contributions while social
benefits should stagnate in real terms. In a context where unemployment will
increase further, budget multipliers will remain high. In contrast, the government
has set up a fiscal package – i.e. Crédit d’Impôts pour la Compétitivité et l’Emploi
(CICE) –, to lower firm tax burden through a tax credit benefit based on the
payroll of companies. In theory, this should enhance competitiveness by giving
firms incentives to lower prices. The resulting government tax losses are offset for
60 percent by an increase in VAT which should be neutral for consumers given the
lowering of the pre-tax prices. The potential benefit for the overall economy lies in
the decrease in export prices which is expected to encourage competitiveness on
foreign markets and thus promote exports.
The success of such a strategy depends on how firms will allocate the tax cut.
In the context where operating surplus ratio seriously worsened since 2008, firms
will probably try to ensure better financing conditions rather than lower selling
prices. As a result, the external trade should not contribute to growth next year
especially as it is suffering from wage deflation in the south in the euro area.
A positive impact can be expected from the CICE as an incentive to plan
upgrading investment programs. However, the recovery in capital expenditures
should be moderate since the accelerator effect will not play its normal role as it
usually did during past upturns.
The expected growth in 2014 will fail to improve the situation of the labor
market. Facing over-staffing, firms will try to restore productivity rather than hire
new workers. Job creation will be carried out by non-profit sectors through
assisted jobs subsidies, only compensating for losses in the private sectors. As a
result, unemployment will continue to rise.
Appendix: Country analyses 45Table. ECLM-IMK-OFCE macroeconomic forecasts
France
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP 0.0 0.1 1.1 1.5
Private consumption -0.3 0.3 0.9 1.1
Investment -1.2 -2.6 1.2 0.0
Public consumption 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.0
Exports 2.5 0.7 3.4 4.2
Imports -0.9 0.6 3.1 4.1
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -0.1 0.1 1.0 1.4
     External trade 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
     Inventories -1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate 10.1 10.6 10.9 11.2
Inflation 2.2 1.3 1.8 0.9
Public deficit -4.8 -4.1 -3.5 -3.0
Fiscal impulse -1.2 -1.4 -0.7 -0.7
Public debt % GDP 90.2 93.3 94.9 94.5
Current account % GDP -2.2 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Source: National accounts, OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.

Appendix CItaly:
a light at the end of the tunnel
By the end of 2012, Italy had managed to reduce its budget deficit to 3% of
GDP and to meet its European commitments. With negative carryover growth of -
1.8% in 2013, Italy’s economy will experience a sluggish second half-year,
marked by flat consumer spending and investment. Several favourable factors
should result in a slight improvement in 2014, and in particular the negative fiscal
impulse will be weaker (0.6 percent of GDP), since the bulk of fiscal adjustment
has already taken place. In addition, foreign trade should boost activity, offsetting
the weakness in private consumption and bringing a halt to the decline in invest-
ment. Investment will also be spurred by the payment of the arrears accumulated
by business, which are expected to come to 27 billion euros in 2013 and 20
billion in 2014. Freed from the shackles of austerity, Italy should return to more
balanced growth in 2015, driven by both internal and external demand.
Considering the size of the fiscal stimulus, the reduction of the budget deficit
has been slow: with a multiplier above 1, reducing the deficit by 0.8 percentage
points in 2012 required a negative impulse of 3 GDP points. This enabled Italy to
get back to a 3% public deficit. In 2013, the fiscal adjustment is continuing with
plans for a new negative impulse of 24 billion euros, or 1.5 GDP points. Unlike in
2012, when three-quarters of the fiscal adjustment was based on a tax increase,
the law of August 2012 and the 2013 budget both focus the bulk of the effort on
cuts in public spending (health and regional expenditures). Some taxes (income
tax, corporation tax) have been revised downwards. In addition, two key
measures, the postponement of the VAT increase and the elimination of the
property tax, reflect how the Letta government has loosened the reins on the
budget, resulting in a loss of more than 4 billion euros for the public purse. We
assume these concessions will be offset in 2013, otherwise the impulse would ulti-
mately only come to a negative 1.2 GDP point, and the deficit would reach 3.2%
of GDP. Indeed, the negative impulse for 2013 will be offset by exceptional
measures authorizing the payment of commercial debts by the government. The
budget deficit will thus rise to 2.9% of GDP by end 2013. Because of these
payment arrears, the debt will peak in 2014 at more than 130% of GDP, before
slowly falling from 2015. In 2014, the fiscal impulse will come to only a negative
0.6 GDP point, with a one-point increase in the standard VAT rate (from 21% to
22%) and spending cuts.
The budget purge was accomplished at the cost of a severe recession, with
eight consecutive quarters of declining GDP. In the first half of 2013, private
consumption fell sharply (-3.3%), as did investment; foreign trade alone helped
cushion the fall in GDP, but only by means of reducing imports.
With regard to households, the increase in taxes and the reduction in income
from employment and capital hurt disposable income in 2012, despite a positive
contribution from social benefits. The unemployment rate continued to rise, to
12% of the labour force in July 2013, which negatively affected wages. Inflation
slowed sharply in the second quarter of 2013, due to lower energy prices. We
anticipate a decrease in gross disposable income in the second half of 2013 and in
early 2014 as a result of high unemployment rates, which are continuing to hurt
wages, higher taxes (VAT, local taxes) and the reconstitution of savings, which at
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decline in late 2013, before picking up very slowly in mid-2014. Lending condi-
tions in the second quarter of 2013 were still tough: interest rates on new bank
loans have stagnated for consumers and business, and the volume of new lending
to consumers and business was still at a historically low level.
On the business side, the increase in unit labour costs that began in 2007 is
continuing, but profits are cushioning the impact on competitiveness. Business
margins in Italy are down significantly, which has helped limit inflation. Due to
the impact of a sharp decline in GFCF in construction, the productive investment
rate plunged in the first quarter to a record low, before stabilizing in the second
quarter. The utilization of production capacity has followed the same pattern, but
rebounded strongly in the second quarter of 2013. Several factors argue for an
end to the deterioration in GFCF and the stabilization of the investment rate in the
second half of 2013 and for a recovery in 2014: these include an improvement in
the investment climate and in order books in the third quarter of 2013, and the
payment of 20 billion euros of arrears by the administration (1.3 GDP points) in
2013, and then in 2014. We expect a recovery in very compressed business
margins, reflecting an improvement in productivity, followed by a pick-up in
investment in early 2014.
Foreign trade remains the main positive factor driving growth in late 2013
and in 2014, with exports picking up pace, while imports continue to be limited
by the sluggishness of consumption. The improvement in the trade balance,
which began in 2011, should persist. Italy will nonetheless continue to lose
market share to its competitors, due to labour costs that are still higher than for
its partners.
Table. ECLM-IMK-OFCE macroeconomic forecasts
Italy
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP -2.4 -1.8 0.3 1.0
Private consumption -4.2 -2.6 -0.5 0.6
Investment -8.0 -5.5 0.1 1.8
Public consumption -2.9 -0.1 -0.3 0.1
Exports 2.2 -0.4 1.6 2.7
Imports -7.8 -4.0 -0.3 2.0
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -4.7 -2.5 -0.4 0.7
     External trade 3.0 1.0 0.6 0.3
     Inventories -0.8 -0.3 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate 10.7 12.1 11.9 11.2
Inflation 3.3 1.5 1.2 1.2
Public deficit -3.0 -2.9 -2.5 -1.5
Fiscal impulse -3.0 -1.5 -0.6 -0.3
Public debt % GDP 127.0 131.7 132.6 131.6
Current account % GDP 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1Source: National accounts, OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Appendix DSpain:
Adjustment via deflation
The latest available indicators for the Spanish economy are looking up. It
seems that production has bottomed out, and confidence indicators are recove-
ring. Fiscal discipline, together with support from the ECB, has made it possible to
normalize the risk premiums on Spanish government debt. Wage deflation has
restored the competitiveness of Spain’s businesses, which are gaining market
share in exports. The adjustment of employment has given a strong boost to
productivity and lifted business margins to a historically high level.
But these glad tidings do not mean that Spain is now out of the woods. The
road will be long before the country returns to the production levels prevailing
before the crisis, and any improvement will be only partial, as further adjustments
are still needed to complete the fiscal consolidation. The situation of households is
particularly worrisome. Mass unemployment, fiscal pressure and constraints on
lending are affecting their ability to consume. Household income is suffering from
a combination of falling real wages, tax hikes, a decline in pensioners’ purchasing
power and the loss of benefits by unemployed people reaching the end of their
rights. Defaults on household debt could thus accelerate, further weakening the
banking system. The depth of the current crisis will affect the country’s long-term
growth potential. GDP will fall by -1.4% in 2013, followed by growth of 0.7% in
2014 and 1.4% in 2015. At end 2015, Spain’s real GDP will still be 5% below its
pre-crisis level, and GDP per capita 6.6% below.
Spain’s economy will get out of the recession in the first quarter of 2014.
Growing exports, driven by the recovery in Europe’s economies and by the
competitiveness of Spanish products, should lead to renewed productive invest-
ment. Since 2009, foreign trade has been the country’s only engine of growth.
Exports of goods and services, measured in volume, rose by an annual average of
7.2% over the last four years, with demand for Spanish exports up by 4.9% per
year. Spain has thus gained 12 points of market share. We forecast an increase in
demand for Spanish exports on the order of 1% per quarter, with exports
growing by 1.5%. Spain will thus continue to gain market share (+9 points by
2015) and will reabsorb its trade deficit. It will even record a trade surplus of 0.3
GDP point in 2015, whereas it ran a trade deficit of 3% of GDP in 2012 and 8.4%
in 2007.
Based on the accelerator effect, strong exports will boost productive invest-
ment, which, having stabilized at around 7.5% of GDP since 2010, will rise to 9%
by late 2015. The construction sector, still suffering from unabsorbed overcapa-
city, will not benefit from this pick-up in growth. Real estate investment is
expected to stabilize at around 12% of GDP.
Business margins have reached a record 41% of GDP, up from 34.5% in
2000. Margins should slide slightly by 2015 due to the downturn in the producti-
vity cycle, but will remain at a comfortable level, allowing companies to finance
their investment projects. Productivity in the market sector has accelerated signifi-
cantly during the crisis, rising from average growth of 0.4% between 2000 and
2007 to a rate of 2.9% between 2008 and 2012. For the years 2013 to 2015, we
expect a decline of 0.5% per year, which will lead to the creation of 550,000 jobs
by 2015.
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second quarter of 2013 to 23% in late 2015. Consumer spending will remain
depressed due to wage deflation. Employees have already lost 5.4% of their
purchasing power in three years, and we expect this downwards trend to
continue. Household disposable income will grow only moderately in real terms,
under pressure from the loss in pensioners’ purchasing power, the continuing
wage freeze for civil servants and further rate hikes in income tax and indirect
taxes (VAT on certain products, environmental taxes). The only relief Spanish
households will experience is from job creation (+0.7% in 2014 and +1.6% in
2015). After a decline of 2.7% in 2013, household consumption will stagnate in
2014 (+0.1%) and increase slightly in 2015 (+0.7%), stabilizing the savings rate.
Whatever the growth potential retained for Spain’s economy, the output gap
has worsened considerably (-11.6% in 2013 by our estimates, -9.6% according to
the OECD). The fiscal situation is still a long way from being healthy, with a debt
approaching 100 percent of GDP and a deficit that we forecast at 6.8% in 2013,
6.2% in 2014 and 5.3% in 2015. The fiscal consolidation announced for 2014 is
continuing to weigh heavily on growth, even if the European Commission’s post-
ponement of the deficit targets has given the government a little breathing room.
But the persistence of the crisis is keeping the fiscal multipliers at a high level (well
above 1), and Spain will see a renewal of a level of growth capable of significantly
reducing unemployment only once the fiscal adjustment has been completed.
Finally, the current level of non-performing loans, which peaked at 11.6% of
total loans in the second quarter of 2013 (17 GDP points), is very bad news for
the health of the Spanish banking system, whose restructuring could be longer
and more costly than anticipated. 
Table. ECLM-IMK-OFCE macroeconomic forecasts
Spain
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP -1.6 -1.4 0.7 1.4
Private consumption -2.8 -2.7 0.1 0.7
Investment -7.0 -5.8 1.6 3.5
Public consumption -4.8 -1.9 -2.3 -1.5
Exports 2.1 5.3 6.8 6.1
Imports -5.7 0.1 5.1 4.8
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -4.2 -3.1 -0.1 0.7
     External trade 2.8 1.8 0.8 0.7
     Inventories -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Unemployment rate 25.1 26.2 25.1 23.6
Inflation 2.4 1.7 0.5 0.8
Public deficit -10.6 -6.8 -6.2 -5.3
Fiscal impulse -3.4 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0
Public debt % GDP 84.1 91.2 96.4 99.6
Current account % GDP -1.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0Source: National accounts OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Appendix EIreland: in the kingdom of blindness,
the one-eyed man is a king
Since 2011, Ireland has been presented as the best student among the crisis
countries. It is often seen as an example of successful austerity. It is true that
Ireland has suffered from a lower decline in GDP compared to Greece, Portugal or
Spain. GDP in Ireland has grown by (+2.3%) from the end of 2010 until the
second quarter of 2013, whereas it has plummeted by 11.9% in Greece and by
5.9% in Portugal. It cannot be denied that Ireland has generally reached the defi-
cits targets receiving positive assessments from the Troika. It has been the first
country among those helped by the EFSF to go back in the financial markets to
raise funds. The sovereign spread has sharply declined from a record level at
13.9% in July 2011 to less than 4% two years later. But social and economic situa-
tions might not be so idyllic. Growth has indeed picked up in 2011 but it has
followed a collapse of GDP between 2007 and 2010 of more than 9%. Compared
to other crisis countries, it cannot be denied that Ireland has done better. But, the
rebound of activity has remained lower than the one observed in France or in the
UK. Per capita GDP is still significantly below the pre-crisis level. More recently,
growth has rebounded (+0.4% in 2013Q2) but it has just taken over from 3 quar-
ters of decline. In 2013, GDP will decrease by 0.5%. Unemployment rate has
recently stabilised but remains at 13.8%. Employment has indeed recently
rebounded but the decrease in the unemployment rate also hinges on a stabilisa-
tion of the work force participation (-3000 since 2011Q3 and – 130000 since
2008Q3). Immigration has strongly slowed down and the migration balance has
become negative for the first time since 1995. Employment is stalling and will
recover only progressively. Avoiding the worst might not be called a success. 
The economic outlook for Ireland should however improve. Compared to the
other crisis countries, Ireland appears indeed in a better position. Before the
outbreak of the crisis, it already benefited from foreign direct investment boosting
exports. Despite a harsh fiscal consolidation, Irish government has preserved the
fiscal advantage of Irish firms1 and households have borne the brunt of the weight
of consolidation. The tax rate on benefits is still one of the lowest in Europe. The
housing bubble has burst but Irish competitiveness has strongly improved, resul-
ting from a decline in wages and from positive productivity developments.
According to the European Commission competitiveness indicators, relative unit
labour costs have decreased by nearly 20 % since 2008. The current account is
now in surplus whereas the deficit reached a peak of 6.7% in 2008. This deficit
mainly stems from the balance of revenues. The rise in exports will be sustained
by the global improvement of external demand from Europe and from the United
States. It will progressively stimulate firms’ investment. Margin rates have indeed
increased as a result of the internal devaluation. Besides, credit constraints should
slowly loosen in line with the reduction of sovereign debt spread. Additionally,
private consumption will remain at low levels. From 2008 to 2013Q2, it has fallen
by more than 9.5%, which is in line with the decrease in the real disposable
income. It must be stressed than in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the decline in the real
disposable income was mainly due to the negative contribution of wages. Social
benefits and reduction in taxes have notably cushioned the shock in 2008 and1. The tax rate on profits has been kept at 12 % in Ireland.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report522009. But once the Irish government started to implement austerity measures, the
stabilisation role of the social and tax system has been reduced. In 2011 and
2012, social benefits have stagnated whereas the negative contribution of taxes
has increased. New austerity measures have been announced for 2014. The
government will however soften the path of consolidation since the fiscal impulse
has been revised downward to 1.5% of GDP. From 2010, cumulative austerity will
amount to 9 points of GDP, that is 1.8 percentage points per year, which is higher
than during the episode of fiscal contraction implemented from 1982 to 1989
where annual consolidation amounted to 1.5% per year. Households will still
suffer from austerity in 2014. Wage growth will also remain subdued. The deleve-
raging process will continue to limit the scope for a buoyant households’
consumption. In terms of disposable income, the debt ratio of households has
decreased by 17 points since 2010 but it is still at 210%. We expect savings’ rate
to increase so that quarterly private consumption growth rate will not exceed
0.1% in 2014 and 2015.
GDP growth is then expected to turn positive (1.4%) in 2014 after a decline of
0.5% in 2013. It will accelerate to 1.9% in 2015. The rebound will be mainly driven
by external trade as exports will grow more than 4% each year. The contribution of
external trade will rise to 2.4 and 1.5 points of GDP respectively. Domestic demand
will recover very progressively through increases in productive investment. 
There remain fragilities as banks should still cope with high risk of default
related to the collapse of the housing market. The Irish economy is also sensitive
to external demand from the euro area but also from the United Kingdom and the
United States. The global economic outlook for the world economy will improve
but a strengthening of fiscal austerity, notably in the US cannot be excluded. It
might then dampen world growth and among the euro area countries, Ireland
would be the first country to be exposed to this risk.
Table. ECLM-IMK-OFCE macroeconomic forecasts
  Ireland
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP 0.1 -0.5 1.4 1.9
Private consumption -0.3 -1.6 0.2 0.3
Investment -0.7 -10.7 0.3 3.7
Public consumption -3.2 -1.8 -1.2 -0.8
Exports 1.6 0.1 4.1 4.6
Imports 0.0 -0.3 2.9 4.7
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -0.7 -2.3 0.0 0.4
     External trade 1.8 0.4 2.4 1.5
     Inventories -0.9 1.4 -0.9 0.0
Unemployment rate 14.7 13.8 13.5 13.5
Inflation 1.9 0.8 1.0 1.0
Public deficit -7.5 -6.6 -5.2 -3.0
Fiscal impulse -2.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.7
Public debt % GDP 117.6 124.6 122.8 120.3
Current account % GDP 4.4 2.3 3.0 3.1Source: National accounts OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Appendix FPortugal:
the end of recession?
The economic stimulus in 2008-2009 had allowed the Portuguese economy
to recover after the financial crisis. But the rebound has been short-lived. Since the
end of 2009, Portugal had been concerned by an excessive deficit procedure and
has to take austerity measures to reduce its deficit. These measures have been
reinforced after Portugal asked for financial assistance to the European Union in
April 2011. Consequently, Portugal has experienced a deep recession since the
end of 2010. After 10 consecutive quarterly declines in GDP, growth finally came
back in the second quarter of 2013. But it should slow down again in the
following quarters and remain very moderate. Public deficit will reach 5.9% of
GDP in 2013, including a one-off support to BANIF bank (0.4% of GDP). Fiscal
restriction should decrease in 2014 and 2015 but should still hamper growth. We
expect GDP to rise by 0.9% in 2014 and by 1.4% in 2015. GDP per capita should
still be 5% lower than its pre-crisis level. Unemployment rate and public debt
should remain very high.
As a result of a slackening growth, the European Commission accepted twice
to push back the deadline for a deficit of 3% of GDP (from 2013 initially to 2014
then to 2015). But it has recently refused the government’s request to increase
the deficit target for 2014 to 4.5% of GDP instead of 4%.
The ability of Portuguese government to return to the financial markets in
mid-2014 seems to be less and less likely as 10-year bond rates remain at a high
level. Besides, financing needs have been underestimated in the first Economic
Adjustment Program in 2011. It forecasted, indeed, that the public deficit would
reached 3% of GDP in 2013 and the public debt 108,6%. Yet, the public debt has
rocketed and reached 131.3% in the second quarter of 2013 according to the
latest data from Eurostat. The increase in interest expenditures (+1.5 points of
GDP between 2007 and 2013), the fall in GDP and the support for financial insti-
tutions (5% of GDP since 2008) explain these bad outcomes despite a very
restrictive fiscal policy. This is also why financial markets’ fears are still important.
Whereas in May 2013, 10-year bond rates reached a low of 5.3%, which allowed
Portugal's Debt Management Agency to issue 10-year bonds for the first time
since February 2010 (at a rate of 5.65%), tensions started again after the genera-
lized rise of interest rates in the US and in Europe. They were strengthened by
July’s political crisis in Portugal. Tensions have eased recently. 10-year bond rates
have decreased but remain high: 6.3% at the beginning of November, forcing the
Portugal's Debt Management Agency to issue only low maturity securities (Trea-
sury Bills). The three-month bills issued in November 2013 had a yield of 1.2%,
while the yield for 9-month issues was 1.7%2. 
In order to support their access to market financing when exiting the current
bailout program, the maturity of loans granted both to Portugal and Ireland
under the EFSM and EFSF have been extended by 7 years in June 2013. For the
2. Comparatively, France and Germany recently issued six-month securities at rates close to zero
(0.03% and 0.08% respectively) and 12-month securities at very low rates (0.11% and 0.15%).
Germany is issuing two-year securities at a rate of 0.06%.
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program. It will probably try to negotiate a precautionary program with the Euro-
pean authorities, i.e. a precautionary credit line for one year, to reassure financial
markets. This credit line would only be used in case of necessity.
The evolution of GDP growth in the next quarters will be crucial for the
improvement of confidence. GDP is expected to grow in the second semester of
2013 and in 2014-2015. Exports will be the main driver of GDP growth, while
internal demand will not grow before 2015. 
Given the recession and the unemployment rate (17% in the second quarter
of 2013), deflationary pressures are emerging: wages have decreased both in
nominal and real terms (respectively -2.7% and -4.1% in 2012). Core inflation is
now close to zero. Improving competitiveness has allowed Portugal to gain export
market shares in 2013 for the third consecutive year and this will continue in 2014
and 2015. In the second quarter of 2013, the trade deficit amounted to 3.1% of
GDP, whereas it reached 12.5% in 2008. But, it should be stressed that only one
third of this improvement stems from the increase in exports, while the rest is due
to the fall in imports resulting from the slump of private consumption in line with
the decrease in disposable income (-1.3% in 2011, -1% in 2012). The govern-
ment wants to stimulate investment and improve competitiveness by cutting by
2 points off the corporate tax in 2014.
Recent statistics and surveys show some signs of improvement or at least
stabilization in the labour market and in the manufacturing sector. Employment
has risen in the second quarter of 2013 and the unemployment rate has
decreased for the first time since 2008. The rate of productive investment has
stabilized and industrial new orders are on an upward trend. Confidence indica-
tors are increasing, although they remain at low levels. The return to growth
depends both on external demand and on fiscal impulse. If external demand turns
to be weaker, it will hamper GDP growth and the reduction of the deficit. Fiscal
impulse should reach -1.7% of GDP in 2014 and again -0.5% in 2015. In 2014,
the budget deficit should decrease to 3.8% of GDP. The bulk of the consolidation
in 2014 will stem from cuts in expenditures:  wage cuts of 2.5% to 12% for civil
servants with wages higher than 600 euros a month, 40-hour work week instead
of 35 in the public sector, reduction of civil servants, pension reform and health-
care reform. There will also be increases in indirect and direct taxes. However,
there are uncertainties about future decisions of the constitutional court, which
has already rejected austerity measures 4 times since 2011.
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Portugal
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP -3.2 -1.8 0.9 1.4
Private consumption -5.4 -2.4 -0.2 0.2
Investment -14.3 -9.3 -2.6 2.3
Public consumption -4.8 -2.4 -1.3 -1.4
Exports 3.2 6.3 5.0 4.8
Imports -6.6 1.9 1.5 2.2
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -7.2 -3.6 -0.8 0.2
     External trade 4.2 1.8 1.6 1.3
     Inventories -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate 15.9 16.9 16.5 16.1
Inflation 2.8 0.7 0.9 1.1
Public deficit -6.4 -5.9 -3.8 -2.4
Fiscal impulse -3.8 -1.3 -1.7 -0.5
Public debt % GDP 123.6 128.9 129.9 128.9
Current account % GDP -1.5 0.2 0.4 0.6
Source: National accounts OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.

Appendix GGreece:
awaiting growth
Greece is still mired in a recessionary spiral in 2013, with a recession of 4.1%
forecast, which follows five previous years of negative growth. As a result, the
country’s GDP will have fallen 24% in real terms between 2008 and 2013. The
fiscal impulse will remain significantly higher than in other euro area countries,
which will cut growth particularly sharply since the fiscal multipliers are still high
due to the heavy liquidity constraints weighing on households. With prices and
wages continuing to fall in 2013 and 2014, the engine of domestic demand is still
seized up. The decline in prices will of course help improve the trade balance;
however, so long as wage cuts do not lead to a significant fall in export prices, any
improvement in cost competitiveness will remain limited, and the added foreign
demand will not be enough to offset the decline in domestic demand.
The recession, which has now lasted five years in Greece, will continue, with
GDP expected to contract by 4.1% in 2013, and to a lesser extent in 2014.
Greece still does not have a solid basis for growth. Indeed, austerity measures are
leading to a fall in domestic demand, and external demand, which is closely
linked to the overall economic situation in the euro area, is also sluggish. Austerity
is proving ineffective: the recession has caused tax revenues to fall off, making it
difficult to absorb the deficit through spending alone.
The particularly sharp reduction in household consumption in 2012 (-9.1%) is
due to the sharp drop in disposable income, with both wages and social transfers
down. Business investment in 2012 has fallen in real terms to a third of its 2007
level. As a result, the contribution of domestic demand to growth was again very
negative (10.4 percentage points in 2012, after -10.1 points in 2011). Foreign
trade was morose, due to widespread austerity in the euro area; the improvement
in the current account mainly came from the drastic drop in imports (-13.8% in
2012) and the more positive trade balance.
The deflationary process is worsening, with the CPI down -0.8% in the third
quarter of 2013. The decline in the price level will continue in 2014. This deflation
is due not only to rising unemployment, which hit 26.8% in the second quarter of
2012, but also to measures that are directly aimed at reducing labour costs, with
hourly labour costs falling by 8% in 2012. Furthermore, the many measures
adopted since 2010 include the 22% reduction in February 2012 of the minimum
wage to 586 euros gross (510 euros gross for those under age 25) and the free-
zing of salary increase clauses until the unemployment rate falls below 10%.
The counterpart of this deflationary process is improved competitiveness, as in
Spain. Greece has gained market share since 2007, and the cost indicator for the
economy as a whole recovered in 2012 to its 2000 level. However, wage cuts
were not fully reflected in export prices, and the improvement in cost competi-
tiveness has thus been limited compared to the effort made on the level of wages.
The effort at fiscal consolidation will continue in Greece. Leaving aside excep-
tional measures, the primary fiscal deficit came to 1.3% of GDP in 2012, lower
than the deficit target (1.5%), and this should balance in 2013 before showing a
surplus in 2014. Another positive development is that the burden of interest
charges on the debt is a bit lighter; the rate of interest on the debt fell from 7.1%
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deficit figures, because of the exceptional measures in 2012 and 2013 related to
the recapitalization of the banks (to bring them into compliance with prudential
requirements), which led to a change of 4.4 points of GDP in exceptional
measures in 2012), which are continuing in 2013. As a result, the public debt will
continue to grow, from 157% of GDP in 2012 to 179% of GDP in 2013, before
reaching a peak in 2014 at 180% of GDP.
In 2013, the new measures being implemented in Greece should represent
5.1% of GDP (9.4 billion), and will focus on reducing public spending (7.6 billion
euros) rather than on increasing revenue (1.8 billion). Among the key measures,
the main focus is on lowering spending on pensions and on civil servant wages
and benefits, on restructuring the administration, and on reducing health care
costs. However, the revenue forecast from privatization fell short of expectations.
While Greece made a commitment to raise 2.5 billion euros by the end of 2013,
IMF estimates predict this will come to 1.5 billion.
Greece’s public debt, which had been reduced to 157% of GDP in 2012, will
continue to grow in 2013, despite the reduction in the primary deficit, due to the
recession, the interest burden and the recapitalization of the banks. In its report of
31 July 2013, the IMF identified a need for refinancing not covered in the Greek
program in the amount of 4.4 billion euros in 2014 and 6.5 billion in 2015, if the
country is to meet the debt reduction target set at 124% of GDP by 2020. Part of
this new need stems from the refusal of the euro area central banks to extend the
maturity of the Greek bonds they are holding, as originally provided for in the
second aid plan. Europeans could again have to come up with new funding in the
amount of 10.9 billion euros.
Table. ECLM-IMK-OFCE macroeconomic forecasts
Greece
In % 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP -6.4 -4.1 -0.4 2.4
Private consumption -9.1 -6.9 -1.6 2.0
Investment -19.2 -4.2 8.1 5.3
Public consumption -4.2 -4.4 -6.2 -4.8
Exports -2.4 3.0 4.6 5.4
Imports -13.8 -6.5 1.0 1.2
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -10.4 -6.2 -1.2 1.3
     External trade 3.7 2.6 1.0 1.2
     Inventories -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate 24.3 26.9 27.0 27.0
Inflation 1.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.6
Public deficit -10.0 -7.8 -3.3 -2.1
Fiscal impulse -5.0 -3.3 -1.7 -0.3
Public debt % GDP 157 179.2 180.5 176.1
Current account % GDP -3.4 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5Source: National accounts OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Chapter 2RISING INEQUALITIES: THE RISK OF FRAGMENTATION 
OF THE EU
The trend towards increasing inequality since the late 1970s is nowadays
uncontroversial (Piketty, Saez, and Atkinson 2011; Piketty and Saez 2013; Piketty
2013; IMF 2007; OECD 2008). Yet, the relationship between income distribution
and economic performance did not play an important role in the economic
debate of the past 50 years. The traditional textbook dichotomy between effi-
ciency and fairness, that underlies the concept of Pareto optimality, has long fed
the idea that the economist’s job is to study the conditions for optimal allocation
of resources among participants to the economic process (in order to maximize
social welfare); once overall welfare is maximized, economists left the task of
choosing the distribution of income to sociologists, political scientists, anthropolo-
gists, provided this distribution did not distort the incentives of agents. As a
consequence of this dichotomy, the debate on the effects of inequality, through
its impact on incentives (to work, to innovate), has long focused on the links
between income distribution and long-run growth, while little has been said on
the possible effects of inequality on business cycles. After a number of studies in
the 1990s (Alesina and Rodrick 1994; Deininger and Squire 1996) broadly
concluding in cross section studies that high inequality tends to be associated to
lower growth, the issue virtually disappeared from the academic and policy
debate alike. The idea that the “tide lifts all boats” would serve as a justification of
the impetuous growth of high and very high incomes (the “superstar economy”,
see Dew-Becker & Gordon, 2005) that accompanied the two prosperous decades
1990s and 2000s. 
The financial crisis challenged this view. First, because in spite of the heavy hit
taken by the financial sector, it disproportionately hit middle and low incomes
(OECD 2011; Stiglitz 2013), although this is not true in every country: in the UK
for example, top incomes have been hit as hard as middle and low incomes.
Second, because it called for a deeper understanding of the impact of income
distribution on economic performance, beyond its effects on incentives. The crisis
marked in effect the arrival point of a process during which inequality either
depressed growth, or triggered increasing debt by households at the bottom of
the distribution (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2010; Cynamon and Fazzari 2008; Fitoussi
and Saraceno 2011). A sharp contrast emerged in particular between the pre-
crisis sustained growth of Anglo-Saxon countries (where consumption out of debt
substituted consumption out of income) and the relatively poor performance of
the main European economies, where institutional and cultural factors led to a
much lower expansion of household debt. The search for high returns on invest-
ment from those who benefited from distributive changes led to the emergence
of bubbles and to the overvaluation of agents’ collaterals, thus easing borrowing.
Increasing inequality therefore did not “cause the crisis”. Rather, it contributed,
together with institutions and increasing financial deregulation, to the increasing
imbalances between savers and borrowers. Within countries this meant increasing
debt of a substantial part of the population; and between countries this led to
increasing capital flows from savers (Germany and China first and foremost; butRevue de l’OFCE / Macroeconomic Outlook – Special issue (2014)
also oil producing countries) to borrowers (the U.S., the European peripheral
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fragile, and amplified the effects of the financial crisis.
While the majority of economists trace the increase of inequality to the effects
of skill-biased technological progress (e.g. Rajan, 2010), some point to the
increasing weight of finance in the economy, that triggered rents and predation
(Galbraith 2012). Our aim here is not to enter into this debate, but rather to high-
light the channels through which inequality contributed to the imbalances
described above.
A number of economists established a link between increasing inequality and
the appearance of bubbles, but they attribute it to the hyperactivism of mone-
tary policy, that attempting to shield low-skilled workers, was excessively
expansionary. Rajan (2010) in particular claims that the right policy would have
been to favour, through structural reforms, the access of low-skill workers to
training and education. While there may be some truth in the argument that
policy in the United States (but only there) was excessively loose in the period
2003-2005, Rajan’s argument is not convincing if one takes a longer perspective.
Imbalances started building in the 1990s, and a first bubble, the dot com, burst
in 2000; policy prior to that episode was much less expansionary than in the
early years 2000.
It is likely in fact that while loose monetary policy may have played a role, the
impact of inequality on macroeconomic performance is more structural. Fitoussi
and Saraceno (2011) argue that from a macroeconomic point of view, the
increase in inequality triggers redistribution from households with high propensity
to consume to households with a lower propensity to consume. The reasons for
this difference in the propensities may be traced back to the work of Kalecki
(1942) and Kaldor (1955) on income distribution, and it may be related to a
minimum (subsistence) consumption level, to liquidity or credit constraints, to a
lexicographic utility function, or to satiation phenomena.
If propensities to consume differ, then the overall propensity to consume is
affected by income distribution, and an increase in inequality causes it to
decrease. The reduction of consumption then, tends to depress aggregate
demand and income1. 
As the increase of inequality has been widespread, one should have observed,
in the past three decades (and especially in the years prior to the crisis), a chronic
deficiency of aggregate demand, and a tendency of growth to stagnate. But why
then did the growth performances in the past two decades in the United States
and Europe diverge? The economies of United States and the European Union
have many similarities in what concerns the level of development, technological
progress and the like. Even what used to be a major difference, market flexibility,
(in particular labour markets), most European countries significantly increased it;
so that the differences in market flexibility with the US are not as large as they
used to be in the early 1980s. Fitoussi and Saraceno (2011) argue that the
apparent contradiction between a common trend of increasing inequality and
differing macroeconomic performances can be explained by the interaction of the
chronic aggregate demand deficiency, common to all the countries, with the
institutional frames and the credit policy responses, which were instead extremely1. The counterpart is increased savings but it will not raise growth if we are in a global saving glut. 
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the share of the lowest quintiles has been compensated by increasing private
indebtedness, in turn made easier by an increasingly deregulated financial system,
able to lend to poorer and poorer households. Both in terms of levels and in
growth rates, short term debt (mostly consumption credit) in the years 2000 has
been substantially larger in the US and in the UK than in continental Europe. In
these countries as a consequence, the level of consumption remained high, but
financed out of debt rather than of income (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008). In
continental Europe, more restrictive rules for financial markets made credit more
costly and difficult to obtain which prevented a similar expansion of debt. Spain is
an intermediate case, in the sense that it experienced a significant increase of both
short and long (mortgages) debt. The level of the former, nevertheless, remained
low, and in fact, the Spanish exceptional growth of the early years 2000 has been
largely determined by the boom of the housing sector. The increase in inequality
which has negative effects on aggregate demand has not had an apparent effect
on the economy because it was compensated by high levels of indebtedness –
enabled by credit deregulation and then expansion – and low savings rates
among the poorest. The puzzle of a common trend of increasing inequality and
differing macroeconomic performance could therefore be explained by the
support given to the rise of credit.
To summarize, consumption was sustained, at the price of increasing debt in
some countries, while it stagnated and originated from excess savings in others.
The excess savings of the latter in turn financed the excess consumption of the
former, creating a fragile equilibrium based on increasing current account
balances. This equilibrium was broken when the crisis hit, and the fragility of the
world economy magnified the shock to financial markets.
Below the crisis impact on inequality in Europe is analysed. The focus is on
both inequalities and the labour market, with a special focus on long-term unem-
ployment, as well as an analysis of the development in income inequalities and
poverty. Finally it is discussed how inequality can be fought. 
1. Long-term unemployment increases risk of rising 
inequality 
Before turning to the question of rising inequalities and the risk of poverty
from a macroeconomic perspective it is worth taking a look at recent labour
market developments that might give rise to rising inequalities and risk of poverty
within the EU. The Great Recession has indeed left its marks. In most Eurozone
countries, per capita GDP is still below its pre-crisis level. The convergence process
that had taken place in the euro area since the 1990’s has been dramatically inter-
rupted and reversed. Divergence will be mainly striking regarding the situation on
the labour markets. Then even if growth is picking up in the years to come, the
social consequences of the crisis will be long lasting.
The dramatic increase in long-term unemployment and in unemployment
among low skilled workers is of particular concern. Past experience shows that the
longer one is unemployed the more difficult it is to get a job. Firms do not find
long-term unemployed workers as attractive as workers who have avoided unem-
ployment or at least long-term unemployment. A number of studies including
Elmeskov and MacFarlan (1993) and Llaudes (2005) thus indicate that long-term
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also lead to some kind of discouragement among the long-term unemployed so
that the job search intensity at some stage may become lower. As a result long-
term unemployment diminishes the effective size of the workforce which as
pointed out in last year’s iAGS, in the end can lead to a higher structural level in
unemployment through hysteresis effects. The increase in long-term unemploy-
ment may therefore stoking up severe problems for Europe in the future. 
Sooner or later the large group of long-term unemployed will run out of
unemployment benefits increasing the risk of poverty if they do not get a job. The
large share of long-term unemployment is therefore very concerning and may
become a deep social issue for the European society and give rise to increasing
inequality and poverty.
Last year the iAGS predicted unemployment in 2013 would reach 12.1
percent in the euro area and more than 11 percent in the EU. The iAGS also
predicted that in 2013 long-term unemployment, ie. the number of people who
have been unemployed for 12 months or more, would reach 9 million people in
the euro area and 12 million people in the EU-27. Unfortunately all of these
predictions have turned out to be correct and long-term unemployment now
stands at the highest level measured in since the late/mid 90’ties. 
Even though overall unemployment is expected to decrease slightly towards
2015, long-term unemployment is still likely to remain high in the coming years.
Estimations performed in this chapter (see Box 4) imply that 64 percent of the
increase in unemployment within the EU eventually turns into long-term unem-
ployment. The calculations actually imply a long-term unemployment rate above
5.5 percent in the euro area and 5 percent in the EU-28 in 2015. Depending on
the size of the labor force this amounts to just below 9 million long-term unem-
ployed in the euro area and some 11½ million in the EU-28 in 2015.
Figure 14. Long-term unemployment
  In %
Note: The vertical line indicates the last observation, i.e. the second quarter of 2013.
Source: Eurostat, OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
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Rising inequalities:  The risk of fragmentation of the EU 63Long-term unemployment actually began to stabilize in the spring 2010 but
since spring 2011 long-term unemployment has increased by approximately
2 million people in both the EU and within the euro area. In the second quarter of
2013 long-term unemployment thus reached 12 million people in the EU who
have been unemployed for a year or longer. Of these 12 million, 9.3 million were
long-term unemployed in the euro area. Long-term unemployment accounts for
almost 47 percent of all unemployment within the EU and for almost 50 percent
of total unemployment in the euro area. 
Looking at the impact on long-term unemployment in the individual coun-
tries one can observe large differences across countries. The troubled countries in
southern Europe and Ireland have suffered the largest increase in long-term
unemployment. In Spain for instance long-term unemployment prior to the crisis
stood at 2.5 percent of the labor force which was below the average in the euro
area. Today more than 13 percent of the labor force are long-term unemployed
corresponding to almost half of the unemployed in Spain.
Figure 15 reflects the effect of the crisis, but the effect of an increase in unem-
ployment on long-term unemployment s likely to be different across countries.
For instance, in the Nordic countries like Denmark and Sweden the impact of the
increase in unemployment on long-term unemployment has been around
47 percent while it has been around 70 percent in many Southern European
countries and in the euro area as a whole.
OECD (2009) estimated the effect of an increase in the unemployment rate
on the long-term unemployment rate using the approach described in Box 4. The
same calculations are made here for Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the UK,
Denmark and the EU. The results are summarized in Table 1 below. The calcula-
Figure 15. Long-term unemployment in the individual countries prior to the crisis 
and today
In %
Source: Eurostat.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report64percentage point will cause the long-term unemployment rate to increase by
0.57 percentage points, so approximately 57 percent of the increase in unem-
ployment in France will turn into long-term unemployment. In Spain the impact
of an increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage point will cause long-
term unemployment to increase by 0.7 percentage points and in Italy the effect is
even larger 0.83 percentage points. But even Germany which has undertaken
large labor market reforms would in the case of an increase in the unemployment
rate of one percentage point suffer an increase in the long-term unemployment
rate of 0.73 percentage points. In Denmark, on the other hand, the impact is
much smaller – only 0.38 while for the EU as a whole, the impact is about 0.64.
The results in Table 9 are rather similar to the results obtained in OECD (2009)
though it should be mentioned that the effect for Germany in OECD (2009) is
estimated to be somewhat larger – namely 0.85. OECD (2009) however do not
include a trend to capture recent labor market reforms which is highly significant. 
Box 4. Estimating the impact from unemployment on long-term 
unemployment
The impact of a higher aggregate unemployment rate on long-term unem-
ployment is calculated by estimating the following dynamic relationship:
LTU = a + b1 LTU-1 + b2 LTU-2 + c0 UNR + c1 UNR-1 + c2 UNR-2
where LTU is the long-term unemployment rate and UNR is the unemployment
rate – both expressed in terms of the labor force. LTU-1 is the long-term unem-
ployment in the previous year (likewise for UNR-1 etc.).  
The relationship between the long-term unemployment rate and the unem-
ployment rate is estimated by using annual data from the OECD labor force
statistics.
Long-term unemployed are defined as people having been unemployed for a
Table 9. Effects of an increase in unemployment on long-term unemployment
Effect on long-term 
unemployment 
Std T-value R2
DEU 0.73 0.03 22.8 0.99
FRA 0.57 0.17 3.37 0.97
ESP 0,70 0.03 22.9 0.99
ITA 0.83 0.04 14.5 0.99
GBR 0.66 0.03 20.9 0.98
DNK 0.38 0.02 19.7 0.96
EU 0.64 0.02 32.5 0.99
Note: To capture recent labor market reforms a trend is also introduced in the estimations. Also dummy 
variables are introduced to capture unobserved features that might cause structural breaks. For Germany a reu-
nification dummy is introduced. The stability of the estimated parameters is satisfactory and there are no signs 
of structural breaks in any of the estimated relations. Also the hypothesis of a unit root in the error terms is rejec-
ted at both a 5 percent and 1 percent significance level in each of the estimated relations. Estimations for EU are 
based on EU-15 because longer time series are available for EU-15 than for EU-28.
Source: OFCE, ECLM, IMK calculations based on data from OECD and Eurostat.year or longer
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of the 5.5 million young unemployed under 25 are long-term unemployed. Long-
term unemployment among youths is also likely to remain high in the coming
years. Youth unemployment is still rising and looking back in history the current
level is the highest that has been measured in EU-15 and in EA-13 since the mid/
late 90’ties. In September 2013, 5.5 million young people under 25 were unem-
ployed in the EU-28 corresponding to an unemployment rate of 23.5 percent. In
the euro area 3.5 million young people under 25 are unemployed corresponding
to 24.1 percent of the young people under 25 in the labour force (Figure 16).
Within the last year, youth unemployment has increased further in already
troubled countries like Greece, Spain, Italy, Croatia and Cyprus (Figure 17). Coun-
tries including France, the Netherlands and Belgium however have also
experienced an increase in youth unemployment within the last year.
Another group that is at risk of poverty and marginalization are the unem-
ployed low-skilled workers and unemployment has continued to rise among low
skilled. In the second quarter of 2013, 20 percent of the low skilled workers (educa-
tion levels 0-2) in the EU were unemployed corresponding to almost 10 million
persons. For workers with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary educa-
tion (tertiary levels 3-4), unemployment is about 10 percent while it is only 6½
percent for workers with higher education corresponding to tertiary levels 5-6. 
Low skilled workers have by far suffered the largest increase in unemployment
compared with other educational groups on the labour market. Looking at the
individual countries it is clear that unemployment among low skilled workers is
very high in many already troubled countries like Greece, Spain, Ireland and
Cyprus. In many Eastern European countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Poland and Croatia unemployment among low skilled
workers is above the EU average. One finds the lowest rates in Romania, Austria,
Figure 16. Youth unemployment
In %
Sources: Eurostat.
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU-28
EA-17the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark.    
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report662. Income inequality and poverty during the crisis
The economic crisis has brought significant changes in the standard of living for
many Europeans. Measuring the changes in income distribution, including inequality
across countries, may be associated with uncertainties, especially in recent years.
Nevertheless, we will attempt to do it below, being well aware of some of the pitfalls.
Figure 17. Youth unemployment in Europe
 In %
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 18. Unemployment among low-skilled workers in Europe
In %
Source: Eurostat.
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Eurostat’s SILC database is the data source to the figure in this chapter.
SILC is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable cross-
sectional and longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty,
social exclusion and living conditions. EU-SILC data are collected by National
Statistical Institutes and could come from different sources. In some participant
countries a new survey was launched with cross-sectional and longitudinal
elements. In other countries a combination of registers and surveys is used, that
is the data for the same respondents are collected partly by interview and partly
from register. The sample size is between 4.000 and 20.000 depending on the
size of the country. Most survey data is associated with uncertainties. There
could be uncertainties associated with the sample size, the sample stratifica-
tion, the response rate, the countries’ different weighting methods etc. The
uncertainty increases when you look at data over time and across countries. 
In the SILC database the uncertainties are especially related to extreme obser-
vations (outliers), being both extremely high and extremely low (including
negative) incomes, as these observations outliers can have large impact on the
results of the various inequality measures. It is especially measures as the Gini
coefficient and the s20/80 ratio that are affected by these outliers. Poverty
targets are not affected by these outliers to the same extent, as they are not
based on the entire aggregate income, but are instead based on the median
income. Nevertheless we have chosen to present survey-based inequality
measures in this chapter. The indicators are presented on a rather aggregated
level in order to make the conclusions as robust as possible. Despite these reser-
vations, the SILC database is still one of the best data sources to describe
inequality across European countries.  
For further reading about the SILC database see - EU-SILC (2012), DIW
(2010), Hauser (2008), JESP (2011), IMPROVE (2013) and ISER (2012).
Our first focus will be on analyzing the evolutions of income inequality during
the crisis. The Gini coefficient and the share of national income per decile are
good indicators to estimate evolution of inequality. Second, we study the evolu-
tion in poverty. To do that, we study the development in the anchored at-risk-of-
poverty rate and the un-anchored at-risk-of-poverty rate for different groups in
society (children, elderly, unemployed) and then we look at the importance of
social transfers and education. 
It is important to distinguish the two analyses. Indeed, inequalities can be
stable while poverty increases and vice versa. Box 6 discusses the difference
between the anchored at-risk-of poverty rate and the unanchored at-risk-of-
poverty rate and the importance of choosing the right indicators when measuring
inequality and poverty in an deep recession.
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at-risk-of poverty rate 
Definitions 
The unanchored “standard” at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the propor-
tion of the population whose equalized disposable income is below 60 percent
of the median income. The indicator is relative to the disposable income in
both time and country, making it an indicator of social inclusion specific to the
year and to the country.
The change in the at-risk-of poverty rate anchored in a particular year is
defined as the proportion of the population whose equalized disposable
income is below 60 percent of the median income in a particular year (here
2008) - adjusted for inflation. In short the anchored indicator defines the share
of the population who would have been at-risk-of-poverty in their country in
2008. In some European countries this share has grown fast, because of overall
income decline, and in others this share has shrunk, because of income growth.
 
Anchored or unanchored?
Whether one or the other measure is appropriate depends on what you are
interested in measuring.
As median disposable income varies between countries, comparison of at-
risk-of-poverty rates becomes difficult. Median income has developed very
differently in the European countries over time, and even more so since the
beginning of the crisis in 2008. This has made country comparisons less mean-
ingful, because median income has grown in some countries and declined in
others.
When using an at-risk-of-poverty indicator anchored in a specific year, the
indicator becomes absolute over time but still relative between countries. This
makes it an indicator of the share of the population with not enough disposable
income to buy a fixed basket of goods and services specific to each country. 
However, since the basket of goods and services considered to be the
minimum acceptable to avoid the risk of poverty tends to expand over time as
real incomes grow, it can also be argued that the standard indicator of the at-
risk-of-poverty rate, which takes account of such an expansion, is the more rele-
vant one for measuring changes in those at risk of poverty, because the people
at-risk-of-poverty should also take part of the general increase in the prosperity
in society.
Growth of median incomes plays a key role in the development of the
anchored measure. If all people become poorer, poverty by definition
increases. If all people become richer, poverty by definition decreases, which is
not the case with the standard unanchored measure. Although it may be prob-
lematic for long-term comparisons, anchoring the at-risk-of-poverty rate
provides a good measure of the changes in living standards experienced by
people in the short run. This makes it possible to compare countries with a
different overall income development. The indicator is still a relative indicator
of social inclusion in the sense, that the threshold is specific to each country. A
family with a specific disposable income can be at risk of poverty in some coun-
tries and at the same time not in others.
Source: European Commission (2011), EU-SILC (2012) and KU LEUVEN
(2013).
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where all people have the same equalized disposable income the Gini coefficient
is 0, in a country where a person has all the income the Gini coefficient is 1002.
Figure 19 shows the change in the Gini coefficient in the EU. As seen in the figure
Southern European countries like Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy and Greece have
seen quite a remarkable increase in income inequality during the crisis, whereas a
group of central European countries, such as Belgium, Netherland and Germany
have experienced decreasing inequality.    
Figure 20 decomposes the evolution of inequalities at the top (S10/S6) and at
the bottom (S6/S1) of the income distribution, using ratios of decile’s share of
income (S6 represents here the share of income received by households of the 6th
decile of equalized disposable income). In Spain, Greece and Italy, the increase of
inequality is driven by an increase at the bottom of the income ladder: the relative
share of national equalized income received by the 10% poorest people (S1)
greatly decreased between 2008 and 2010 compared to S6. On the other hand,
in Germany, inequalities decreased both at the top and at the bottom of the
income. This is also true, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom, where top
incomes were hit by the financial crisis. 
One of the consequences of increasing income inequality and increasing
unemployment is that more Europeans are at risk of poverty. Figure 21 shows the
change in the anchored at-risk-of-poverty rate from 2008-2012. The anchored at-
risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with a national median equalized dispos-
able income after social transfers, here anchored in 2008 and adjusted for
inflation.  
Figure 19. Change in GINI coefficient 2008-2012
Change in GINI
Note: For countries marked with * 2011 are the latest data available. 2012 data for EU-27 and the euro
area are estimated. 2012 Data for Italy are provisional.
Source: Eurostat SILC database.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report70A decrease/increase in the anchored poverty risk over time indicates that the
living standards for low-income groups are improving/worsening compared to the
base year (2008). It is especially Southern European and Baltic countries that have
experienced deterioration in the living standards for low income groups during the
crisis, see Figure 21. Contrary to the standard poverty rate measure, the study of
Figure 20. Evolution between 2008 and 2012 of share of national equivalised
Income per decile
Note: S10 is the share of national equalised income detained by the 10% richest people. S6 is the share of
national income detained by people with incomes between the 5th and the 6th decile income.
Source: Eurostat SILC database. 
Figure 21. Change in the risk of anchored poverty 2008-2012
Pourcentage points
Note: For countries marked with * 2011 are the latest data available. At-risk-of-poverty rate anchored in
2008. Change in the percentage of total population.
Source: Eurostat SILC database. 
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Rising inequalities:  The risk of fragmentation of the EU 71Figure 22 shows the correlation between the change in GDP from 2008-2011
and the change in anchored poverty from 2008-2012 for the euro area and the
EU. There seems to be a strong negative correlation, meaning that the harder a
country has been hit by the crisis, the larger is the increase in the anchored
poverty rate. This is due to the fact that as income decreased for a large part of
the households, many crossed the anchored poverty line. However, when using a
unanchored threshold, this correlation disappears, because GDP declines also
turns into declines in the median income.
Poverty does not affect all age groups in the same proportion. Figure 23
shows the change in the anchored poverty rate for children and Figure 24 shows
the change in the poverty for people at the age of 65 years or more. 
In general it is the same group of countries that experience high increases in
the overall poverty rate, that are also experiencing increases in the child poverty
rate. Child poverty is very concerning since children are an extremely vulnerable
group. This is due to their dependent status (they can only partly influence their
own well-being) but also due to the decrease or the stagnation of family benefit in
many countries during the crisis. On top of that they are the future of Europe and
lack of opportunities during childhood is likely to have long-term consequences
for the concerned individuals as well as for society as a whole.
A slightly different picture is seen amongst the elderly (Figure 24). In the
majority of countries, the poverty rate has decreased amongst the elderly, and in
the few countries where the poverty rate has increased, the increase is signifi-
cantly lower than for other age groups. The reason why the elderly have been
relatively immune to rises in the poverty rate during the crisis properly reflects
that elderly’s incomes are relatively stable and unaffected by business cycles. This
pattern confirms the trends described in previous OECD studies, e.g. OECD
(2013), with youth and children replacing the elderly as the group at greater risk
Figure 22. Correlation between change in GDP and change in anchored poverty: 
                        Euro area                                                            EU
Note: For countries marked with * 2011 are the latest data available. At-risk-of-poverty rate anchored in
2008. Change in anchered RoP from 2008-2012. Change in GDP from 2008-2012.
Source: Eurostat and SILC database.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report72Figure 23. Change in the anchored risk of poverty for children (under 18 years) 
2008-2012
Percentage points
Note: At risk of poverty rate for the population under 18 years. For countries marked with * 2011 are the
latest data available. At-risk-of-poverty rate anchored in 2008.
Source: Eurostat SILC database.
Figure 24. Change in anchored the risk of poverty for pensioners
(65 years or more) 2008-2012
Percentage points
Note: At risk of poverty rate for the population 65 years and more. For countries marked with * 2011 are
the latest data available. At-risk-of-poverty rate anchored in 2008.
Source: Eurostat SILC database.
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Rising inequalities:  The risk of fragmentation of the EU 73Despite the lower living standards for low income groups in some countries,
social transfers have eased the pain and have reduced the amount of people living
in the risk of poverty. Figure 25 shows that the transfers played an important role
in unanchored poverty reduction in the countries hardest hit by the crisis between
2008 and 2012 (Spain, Portugal, Italy). In these countries, the poverty rate after
social transfers increased slower than the rate of poverty before social transfers,
which means that transfers effectively compensated for part of the overall increase
in the poverty rate. However, the impact of transfers varies across countries. In
“Northern countries” (Germany, Sweden), the impact of transfers fell between
2008 and 2012. In this respect, France behaves like Northern countries.
However, the impact of transfers should be relativized. Indeed, these are not
sufficient to compensate for the massive rise in unemployment in some countries.
In Spain, the gap of poverty rates between employed and unemployed has
increased to 5.9 points (Figure 26). These changes can be explained again by the
massive increase in unemployment in the countries concerned. 
As stated above unemployment growth leads to an increase in long-term
unemployment, which means, in a lot of countries, an increase of uncompensated
unemployment. This mechanism leads to a decrease in income for the unem-
ployed and to an increase of inequalities between the employed and the
unemployed (Figure 26). Furthermore, in the long term, the increase in long-term
unemployment could also lead to a loss of human capital (Decreuse and Di Paola,
Figure 25. Evolution of the difference in poverty rates before and after 
social transfers, 2008-2012
Percentage points
Note: For countries marked with * 2011 are the latest data available. Percentage of total population. Pen-
sions excluded from social transfers. Reading: In Spain, the poverty rate before transfers increased by more
than 4 points between 2008 and 2012. After transfers poverty rate increased by only 1,4 point : transfers
are therefore more effective at reducing poverty in 2012 and 2008. 
Source: Eurostat SILC database.
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
IR
L*
LU
X
ES
P
IS
L
G
RC
SV
N
SV
K
IT
A
LT
U
G
BR
*
BE
L*
M
LT
N
LD
C
H
E*
C
YP
D
N
K
N
O
R
PR
T
A
U
T*
FR
A
D
EU
ES
T
FI
N
SW
E
BG
R
PO
L
C
Z
E
RO
U
H
U
N
LV
A
Before
After2002; Jackman and Layard, 1991).
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report74Finally, the risk of poverty is not only unevenly distributed among age groups,
but also amongst education levels, Table 10. There is a significant higher risk of
poverty amongst the European with the lowest education level. This picture is
Figure 26. Evolution of the difference in poverty rates between Employed 
and Unemployed, 2008-2012
Percentage points
Source: Eurostat SILC database.
Table 10. Risk of poverty divided by education level, 2012 (selected countries)
Percent
Level 0-2 Level 3+4 Level 5+6
BEL* 33.7 17.8 10.4
BGR 72.7 45.3 24.2
DEU 36.3 21.7 11.5
GRC 41.8 37.8 18.1
ESP 33.7 25.7 14.0
FRA 24.6 17.7 10.2
ITA 37.0 24.1 15.8
HUN 50.6 28.0 12.2
NDL 16.6 15.5 10.9
PRT 27.3 18.3 8.3
FIN 26.8 20.5 6.4
GBR* 34.2 22.3 12.9
EA 32.4 21.4 12.0
EU 35.3 23.3 11.9
Note: Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2). Upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary education (levels 3 and 4). First and second stage of tertiary education (levels 5 and 6). population 
aged 18 and over. For countries marked with * 2011 are the latest data available. 2012 data for EU-27 and the 
Euro area are estimated. 2012 Data for Italy are provisional.
Source: Eurostat, SILC database.
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Rising inequalities:  The risk of fragmentation of the EU 75seen in all European countries. It is especially in Eastern European counties where
the risk of poverty exceeds 50 percent for the lowest educated in a number of
countries. On the overall European level, the risk of being poor is three times as
high if you have a low education compared to if you are highly educated. This is
partly explained by the fact that low skilled workers are more exposed to unem-
ployment, which could be due to a queuing phenomenon.
3. Inequality and poverty have a deep structural 
and socio-economic impact
Austerity is dominating fiscal policy in Europe, pushing more Europeans into
unemployment and poverty. Oxfam has calculated that, if left unchecked,
austerity policies could put between 15 and 25 million more Europeans at risk of
poverty by 2025 and it could take up to 25 years to regain living standards prior
to the economic crisis OXFAM (2013). The figures above show an overall picture
of a Europe that is not converging but diverging, with some countries lagging
more and more behind. One of the main ideas behind the European Union was to
allow the member countries to converge. The more divided the countries are the
harder it is to create a common direction for fiscal policy and, in the end, a fiscal
union. But as Leschke, Theodoropoulou and Watt (2012) show, those countries in
Europe where social spending was already least generous and inequality highest
tended also to be those that planned to make the largest cutbacks in social
spending, as part of their EU-mandated Stability and Convergence programs, in
the face of the crisis. 
When social security budgets, and public sector services are cut and labour
markets are deregulated, it all serves to weaken the mechanisms that combat
inequality. Austerity both pushes more and more Europeans into unemployment,
but it also erodes the safety net that was supposed to help them. The result is not
surprisingly increases in poverty and inequality.
Poverty and inequality is not only a problem in humanitarian terms. Inequality
and poverty are also shown to have deep structural and socio-economic impact
on the economy. Easterly (2007) has shown a highly significant negative correla-
tion between inequality and long-run economic development. Higher inequality
generates a lower level of economic development, and the causality (cause-and-
effect) is clearly that way. This means that low inequality gives a higher level of
prosperity in the long run. The mechanism goes through poorer institutions and
lower education level. Altogether Easterly (2007) finds that higher inequality leads
to: 1) Poor institutions in the form of more corruption, more political instability
and lower levels of democracy. 2) Lower level of education. And therefore 3) A
lower level of economic prosperity.
These conclusions are supported by other studies. Wilkinson et al. (2010) also
finds that high inequality is associated with lower education outcomes. Increases
in inequality and poverty can put the political legitimacy at stake KU LEUVEN
(2013). One example is that increases in inequality have been found to be
correlated with lower trust between people Wilkinson et al. (2010).
There is an alternative. Below we outline an alternative approach, which will
reduce poverty, inequality and unemployment by creating jobs and wealth. The
alternative is based on four pillars:
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report761) A European investment plan 
2) Active labour market programs
3) Increasing the education level
4) A fair tax system
These four pillars are described below.
3.1. A European investment plan 
We need to rethink our strategy concerning Europe’s way out of the crisis,
stimulating the economy in order to create wealth and jobs. The IMF (2013a) has
recently concluded that “fiscal consolidation has typically led to a significant and
persistent increase in inequality, declines in wage income and the wage share of
income, and increases in long-term unemployment … fiscal consolidation that are
unduly hasty pose risk to recovery. So countries with the scope to do so should opt for
a slower pace of consolidation, combined with policies to support growth”. 
Chapter 4 outlines a European plan for investment, showing how a common
investment plan can create growth and employment in Europe, thereby reducing
poverty and inequality. 
3.2. Active labour market programs 
Increasing expenditures and effort on active labour market programs will also
reduce inequality and poverty. Passive labour market programs are traditionally
unemployment insurance schemes, whereas active labour market programs are
training activities and other reintegration policies targeted at the unemployed, (as
opposed to a general training or education subsidy). Active programs may include
education aiming at upgrading the skills of unemployed workers or employment
programs intended to prevent skill losses during the period of unemployment
Filges et al. (2011). In other words, active labour market programs are aiming at
securing the employability of the unemployed. It is a well-known fact that low
employability is a side effect of being long-term unemployed (see section 1). 
As seen in the Figure 27 below there seems to be a clear negative correlation
between the average Gini coefficient and the expenditures on active labour
market programs from 1995-2010, indicating that countries that are high-
spending on active labour market programs also tend to have better records on
income redistribution than low-spending countries. Investing in employability and
a stronger social protection system will not only protect the weakest in society
here and now, it will also help fighting inequality in the longer run.   
As already stated above child poverty is especially concerning. TARKI (2010)
finds that unemployment is the leading cause of child poverty in the EU. Ensuring
that parents are employed is therefore a crucial mechanism to reduce the risk of
child poverty. Policies that improve the conditions for low income families with
children will reduce child poverty. This could be seen in the form of higher labour
participation among parents, including improved parental leave arrangements,
which makes it easier to return to work after maternity leave.
Increasing the female participation rate is also likely to reduce the risk of
poverty for children. By increasing the female participation we can increase
employment and create more equal opportunities for men and women. One way
Rising inequalities:  The risk of fragmentation of the EU 77to make it more likely for women to participate in the labour force is to develop
and subsidize the public childcare system.
Finally there is the introduction of a minimum wage. A coordinated European
wage policy with focus on minimum wages would raise the incomes at the
bottom and reduce the poverty rate for employed, the so-called working-poor.
Chapter 3 outlines the case for a European minimum wage norm, and shows an
alternative strategy based on convergence and coordination of wage policies.
3.3. Increasing the educational level
As shown earlier the risk of poverty is three times as big if you have no or a
lower education compared to a higher education. Easterly (2007) and Wilkinson
(2010) also find that inequality and education levels/outcome is negatively
correlated. The Figure 28 below shows income inequality spread and variation in
competencies in a number of countries. It is seen that there is a clear positive
correlation between the variation in skills and the variation in incomes. 
By increasing the educational level for the weakest we can lift the incomes in
the bottom and in this way reduce income spread and hereby inequality. The
supply of unskilled labour is reduced relative to that of skilled labour. In this way it
is possible to fight social inequality by getting weaker groups employed.
Increasing the education level will also benefit the large group of unskilled or low
skilled young people in Europe. More young people should have at least an upper
secondary education and more adults, especially those without training, should
have better opportunities to upgrade their skills through adult and continuing
Figure 27. Correlation between Gini coefficient and active expenditures
Sources: The Rockwool Foundation on the basis of OECD and Eurostat ROCKWOOL(2013).
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Reforming the tax system in Europe is an obvious field to reform when it
comes to poverty reduction and creating a more equal Europe. By reforming tax
systems in Europe in order to make it fairer and more progressive, it will not only
create a more equal society. It can also be part of the financing of tax decreases
for low-income earners as well as investments in physical assets, education and
active labour market policy.
Not only income taxation, but also corporate taxation should be reformed. Tax
competition in the EU is already a 'race to the bottom', where corporate tax cuts
and reductions in the top rate of income tax in one country makes other countries
follow. It is an unhealthy tax competition because there is a risk that it will not end,
before the corporate tax rate is zero, and the income tax schedule is markedly less
progressive, threatening the financing of the welfare state. The result is a negative
spiral with no winners, as countries follow each other down, in an attempt to hijack
investments and businesses from each other. It is therefore important to build a
political consensus on a coordinated policy for corporate taxation. 
 The consensus to combat tax evasion and tax havens is broad. The European
Commission has estimated that European countries annually lose in the area of 1
trillion Euros because of tax evasion EU-COM (2012). Therefore, it is gratifying
that the large EU countries have intensified action against tax evasion and against
the European countries that attract money by hiding information from other
countries. The current challenges with the ongoing economic crisis, the unhealthy
Figure 28. Income variation and distribution of competencies
Note: Distribution of competencies measured as the best 95 percent relative to the worst 5 percent.
Income variation in disposable income.
Source: Calculations on the basis of data from OECD.
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Rising inequalities:  The risk of fragmentation of the EU 79eration, and the EU can play a central role in doing so. However, this requires that
the EU cooperation changes track and turns in a more progressive direction.
Another option is to tax high incomes and wealth for a period of time to both
reduce the debt burden and the increase in inequality experienced during the last
decade. There is no simple solution on how such a tax should be put together.
The IMF has proposed a one-off tax on private wealth also called “capital levy”.
The idea is that such a tax, if it is implemented before avoidance measures are
taken, and as long as there is a belief that it will never be repeated, will not distort
behavior (IMF, 2013b). If the IMF position is a step in the right direction,
conceding that if the States in Europe are poor, households are rich, the idea of a
one-off capital levy should be taken with caution. First, the premise is that capital
taxation creates distortion, which should be relativized if we believe we are in a
regime of excess savings. Second liquidity issues make the ‘capital levy’ difficult,
especially on real estate. Third, it is difficult to assess the macroeconomic conse-
quences of such a shock treatment. For all these reasons, a stable annual taxation
of capital at lower rates than the capital levy seems preferable.       
Finally the EU should implement a common Financial Transaction Tax. Eleven
European countries have already agreed on implementing the tax from 2014, but
other European countries should join the initiative. The revenue from the tax
could be used to invest in jobs, to implement active labour market policies, to
invest in education etc. 

Chapter 3AT THE EDGE OF DEFLATION
SUPPORTING REBALANCING THROUGH WAGE COORDINATION
The euro area crisis contains many elements – sovereign debt, the banking
sector, competitiveness, demand – that interlock in complex ways. This chapter of
the report focuses on an important sub-set of those interactions, those between
current account imbalances, wage and price developments, unemployment and
inequality. A particular concern is the way in which current account and competi-
tiveness imbalances in the euro area are being resolved – namely one-sidedly
through deflationary policies. Fiscal austerity and institutional “reforms” force
unemployment up and wages and prices down in the crisis countries. But surplus
countries are failing to offset the negative impact with expansionary policies.
While the adjustment of relative wages and prices in the euro area is essential, to
correct past imbalances, wage and price deflation can be highly dangerous. In a
context of inadequate demand, low interest rates and high levels of indebtedness,
a deflationary spiral is a real risk. Falling prices keep real interest rates inappropri-
ately high, and raise the real value of debts. Demand is depressed further. Under
such circumstances the process of balance sheet repair is delayed or even thrown
into reverse. Hard-won competitiveness gains are offset because the common
currency tends to appreciate. Persistent deflation could yet turn the Great Reces-
sion into a repeat of the Great Depression. 
But, there are alternatives to deflation. A better cooperation is needed to
avoid a prolonged internal devaluation. The adjustment has to be balanced with
surpluses countries playing their part in the reduction of external imbalances. The
aim of this chapter is to shed some lights on the benefits of cooperation in the
area of wage-setting. The adoption of minimum wage norms may indeed be used
to dampen the risk of deflation in crisis countries and to boost internal demand in
surplus countries.
First of all we examine the evidence in the areas relating to competitive rebal-
ancing and identify the problematic elements of the adjustment strategy pursued.
We then present existing national institutional features in terms of minimum wage
system. Finally, we consider alternative policies. While the need for alternative
stabilization policies to boost demand in the euro area is discussed more fully in
Chapters 1 and 4 of this report, we focus here on the role of coordinated wage
policies.
1. Current account imbalances, competitiveness and wage 
developments
In the pre-crisis period, current account imbalances within the euro area, and
within Europe more widely, rose sharply. As already discussed in iAGS 2013, these
imbalances implied an accelerating increase in the foreign indebtedness of the
deficit countries and a corresponding rise in the net foreign asset position of the
surplus countries. The widening gap was financed by a growing flow of private
capital to the current account deficit economies from the surplus countries andRevue de l’OFCE / Macroeconomic Outlook – Special issue (2014)
others, (notably French and German banks, Lindner 2013). After the crisis, both
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report82the ability and willingness of economic agents in the deficit countries to continue
net borrowing and, more importantly, the willingness of private sector agents in
the surplus countries to prolong existing credit and hold government bonds of
deficit countries quickly dried up. The gap was partly filled by various forms of
public lending and the monetary refinancing operations of the ECB. A rebalancing
of the euro area economy and a narrowing, if not a reversal, of current account
imbalances is a necessary condition for a re-emergence of a stable growth model
in the euro area.
On this there is both good and bad news. Some progress has been made in
narrowing current account imbalances (Figure 29), particularly in the bilateral
intra-EMU trade balances. However, that progress has been one-sided, with
adjustment borne disproportionately by the deficit countries. This has meant that
rebalancing has occurred at far lower levels of aggregate output and employment
– with negative knock-on effects on fiscal consolidation – than would have been
possible with a more symmetric adjustment.
In the pre-crisis period, the imbalances increased broadly symmetrically. If we
average the 2007 and 2008 figures, the surpluses – above all of Germany, but also
the Netherlands, Finland, Austria and Luxembourg – and the deficits of, above all,
Spain Italy, Greece and Portugal, increasingly also France, both amounted to
around 3½% of GDP. Initially there was a very sharp contraction of deficits when
the crisis hit, as households and firms in the deficit countries faced restricted
access to funding or were otherwise (bankruptcy, unemployment) forced to
reduce consumption, investment and borrowing. The downward adjustment of
the surpluses was much smaller and, above all, temporary: already in 2010 they
began increasing once more, driven particularly by developments in the Nether-
Figure 29. Current accounts balance
In % of EA GDP
Source: OECD
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At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 83the wake of the tightening of austerity policies and the renewed downturn begin-
ning in 2011, with the contraction driven particularly by Spain, Portugal, Italy and
Greece. France’s deficit, on the other hand, widened further. Current estimates
suggest that already this year, all the crisis countries will have achieved a balanced
current account position or a surplus. France and Finland will be the sole countries
posting a deficit.
This one-sided adjustment, a dramatic push for higher net exports on the part
of the crisis countries, unmatched by a willingness to increase net imports by
surplus countries, had two main consequences. The direct consequence was that
the overall current account position of the euro area moved sharply into surplus,
reaching 2.4% of euro area GDP in 2012 and an expected 3.2% in the current
year. This is a major change, as the euro area current account had been close to
balance since the common currency’s inception in 1999. But unlike within the
euro area, at the global level a built-in equilibrating mechanism kicks in when the
second largest currency area in the world seeks forcibly to raise its overall net
exports: the currency appreciates. As a result the euro has recently substantially
appreciated against the euro area’s major trading partners. Thus while defla-
tionary policies helped improve the crisis countries’ competitiveness within the
currency area, in line with the recommendations of the European Commission but
at great cost in terms of domestic demand and jobs, the appreciation induced by
the rising current account surplus – i.e. from the failure of the surplus countries to
expand domestic demand in a symmetrical way – counteracted such efforts,
weakening their competitive position on markets outside the euro area.
It is important in this context to note the fallacy of an often-heard claim to the
effect that what is being demanded of the crisis countries is no more than to repli-
cate the efforts that Germany had to put in to regain competitiveness in the early
2000s. While superficially similar, the positions of Germany then and the crisis
countries now are very different. The adjustment costs in terms of depressed
domestic demand, while severe, were much lower in Germany because at that
time the overall global economic climate was either fair (early 2000s) or buoyant
(mid 2000s), and its trading partners within the euro area were acting as a coun-
terweight: demand there was booming and nominal wages and prices rising
strongly. In contrast, the crisis countries’ adjustment is occurring under depressed
economic conditions.
Changes in the current account position are dominated by those in the
balance between exports and imports of goods and services (trade balance). A
narrowing of a current account deficit therefore typically occurs via some combi-
nation of contracting imports or rising exports. It is more favourable to follow an
adjustment path focusing on rising exports than contracting imports, as the
former implies rising domestic production, whereas the latter is a sign of falling
domestic demands and incomes. The picture for the euro area is mixed (we focus
here on the crisis-hit countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as
on France and Germany).
If we look at nominal figures (which are decisive for the trade balance) we see
adjustment by the crisis countries on both sides of the trade balance, except in
Greece. Between 2007 and 2013 export growth in current prices was even slightly
higher in Portugal and Spain than in Germany (where it was just over 20%) and it
was only slightly lower in Ireland. In Italy, though, only meagre nominal export
growth was recorded, while Greece had by 2013 not quite regained its 2007
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report84level. Meanwhile imports, again in current prices, were below their 2007 in all
countries (except in Ireland); in Greece they had fallen by around one third. 
In real terms – which is more telling for actual export performance and living
standards – the performance of Portugal, Spain and Ireland relative to Germany is
slightly less favourable, reflecting the fact that their export price increases were
greater than in Germany; nonetheless compared with 2007 the two Iberian states
have increased their export volumes by almost 15%, while Ireland managed a 9%
increase. Of major concern is that high export price increases (15% in Greece and
9% in Italy) hide the fact that in real terms exports have fallen in both countries
(by almost 15% in Greece). On the import side, volumes were growing slowly
after massive crisis-induced contraction, but they stagnated or fell again after
2011. In all crisis countries real imports were down more than 10% by 2013,
while in Greece they were divided by two.  
Figure 30. Exports/imports of goods and services (current prices)
Source: OECD.
Figure 31. Exports/imports of goods and services (constant prices)
Source: OECD.
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At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 85In short, there has been some welcome improvement in export performance
on the part of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In Greece, however, the trade-balance
improvement has largely come by killing demand and driving down imports; this
also occurred in Spain albeit less drastically. Italy is in an intermediate position on
both sides of the trade balance. In France the nominal rates of import and export
growth are broadly similar, but given the existing trade deficit, this implies a
continued widening of the negative trade balance. 
It is noteworthy that export prices have increased substantially in all the crisis
countries over the period, although less so than import prices: in Spain, Portugal
and Ireland by 7-8%, in Italy around 9% and in Greece by more than 15%. By
contrast, in Germany export prices have risen only a little over 4% since 2007. The
strategy of internal devaluation is premised on improving export competiveness
by driving down production costs and in particular unit labour costs. The sharp
rise in export prices suggests that this strategy is not working in the way intended.
However, a somewhat different adjustment path is also conceivable. A combina-
tion of falling (absolute or at least relative) labour costs and rising export prices
would increase export margins, and raise domestic producers' profitability. It
would also trigger a shift from the production of non-tradables to that of trad-
ables (see the discussion in European Commission 2013). We return to this issue
once we have examined labour cost developments. 
Before leaving the issue of trade and current account balances, though, it
needs to be recalled that the changing current account positions and adjustment
paths discussed so far apply to the overall trading positions of the countries
concerned, including both intra and extra-EMU trade. Clearly, the implications for
euro area policy would differ if the picture of one-sided adjustment did not apply
in the case of intra-EMU trade and payments relations.
To look at this we consider Bundesbank data for the bilateral trade and
payments relations between Germany – the largest economy and by far the most
important surplus country in the currency area – and five crisis countries as well as
France, the second-largest EMU economy. The figures are reported from the
German position, so that the line representing “Exports” to, for instance, Spain
represents Spanish imports of goods and services from Germany. We see that
Germany has maintained a current account surplus throughout the period since
the crisis with all the other countries except Ireland. But the current account
surpluses have fallen substantially, by some two-thirds in Spain and Greece and by
around half in Italy and Portugal. In Ireland, though, the trade surplus with
Germany declined in 2012, whereas in France the deficit has more recently
widened. 
If we consider the development of exports and imports separately, a similar
pattern emerges as seen with post-crisis trade relations more generally. Initially
the trade deficits were closed primarily by import-compression. More recently,
though, exports from the crisis countries to Germany have picked up somewhat.
As a combined result of these two trends, the German trade surpluses are now
very limited in most cases (exception: France). The fact that the current account
deficit remains considerably wider is due to the other components of the current
account (factor income and transfers) which have tended to remain rather stable
in the years since the crisis broke. This means that, despite the improvement in
bilateral trade balances with Germany, the crisis countries still have to fund
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report86current account deficits which implies further increasing their net foreign liabilities
vis-a-vis Germany.1 
Greater import absorption by Germany on the back of expansionary policies
and measures to increase wage and price growth would have reduced the costs of
adjustment and the crisis countries would already certainly be running trade
Figure 32. German bilateral trade and current account
In billion euros
Source: Bundesbank.
1. For this reason Erber (2013), who also refers to Bundesbank data, remains less than fully
convincing in his attempt to exonerate Germany from the critique, by Paul Krugman and others, of
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At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 87surpluses and probably also current account surpluses against Germany, enabling
them to pay down foreign debt. It is not too late to rectify this costly error. A
corollary of shrinking bilateral current account surpluses with the EMU crisis coun-
tries is that the continued German current account surpluses of between 6 and
7% of GDP are due to growing net exports in trade with non-EMU countries, for
instance with the US and the BRICS. As we have seen, though, currency apprecia-
tion limits the scope and/or sustainability of such a fortuitous development from
the German point of view. More recently, as the euro has appreciated and some
of the country’s export markets have stumbled, the consequences of the failure to
stimulate domestic demand and thus help to pull up the countries in its “back
yard” have increased Germany’s vulnerability to fickle extra-EU foreign demand.
This has been behind the weakening of German growth this year. Greater import
absorption from the euro area periphery is not, in short, a matter of charity, as it is
unfortunately often portrayed.
Wage developments and competitiveness
As discussed in the iAGS Report 2013, the pre-crisis years saw a close correla-
tion among euro area countries between the development of unit labour costs
and current account positions. Countries with above-average unit labour cost
growth experienced widening current account deficits; those with below-average
increases – most prominently Germany, where nominal unit labour costs were
broadly unchanged over much of the 2000s – posted growing surpluses.
As explained in more detail in last year’s report, the relationship is not a
simple causal one running from rising (falling) labour costs to declining
(improving) competitiveness and thus to growing trade deficits (surpluses).
Rather, the deficit and surplus countries were each locked into a separate, but
symbiotic, process of cumulative causation. In the former the reduction of real
interest rates on joining the euro stoked up domestic demand and pushed up
wages and prices while sucking in imports. The higher inflation rate – given a
uniform nominal interest rate for the entire euro area – kept real interest rates
low, while steadily eroding international competitiveness, depressing exports.
Surplus countries faced higher real interest rates, sluggish domestic demand
growth with strong downward pressure on wages. Their meagre growth was
heavily dependent on net exports, not least to the booming periphery. For many
years private capital flows happily accommodated the build-up of claims by the
in-surplus core against the in-deficit periphery. But what was unsustainable had at
some point to stop.
When the crisis hit, competitiveness, and specifically unit labour costs,
became a prime focus of policymakers’ attention, rivalled only by the obsession
with fiscal consolidation. The Euro Plus Pact was initially termed the Competitive-
ness Pact, and that was its key focus. Unit labour costs were specifically taken up
as an indicator in the Scoreboard operationalising the Excessive Imbalance Proce-
dure (EIP). However, in a clear sign that the above-mentioned complexities and
geographical interdependencies of the interrelationships between labour costs,
competitiveness and current account positions had not been properly understood
– or were being wilfully ignored – the EIP only set a maximum limit on the devel-
opment of nominal unit labour costs (ULC). They were not to grow by more than
3% a year over a three-year period.2 There was no minimum threshold. Wages,2. The limit is 9% over the previous three years for euro-area and 12% for non-Euro countries.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report88apparently, could only ever increase too fast. This asymmetry meant that the rise
in the unemployment rate in some countries triggered a significant downward
adjustment process not just in wage growth but in wage levels. But, even if adjust-
ment was needed, it seems that is has gone out of control. The fall in GDP
following first the recession of 2009 and then the double dip resulted from fiscal
consolidation have given rise to a real risk of wage deflation in some countries
(Spain, Greece and Portugal). 
As can be clearly seen from the Figure 33 and 34, the pattern of a close asso-
ciation between unit labour cost and current account developments and between
ULC and unemployment rate continues. ULCs, too, have adjusted, but very asym-
metrically. The crisis countries (but not Italy) have all by now – Figure 33 include
the first two quarters of 2013 – adjusted so as to return to the trajectory of
average ULC growth in the currency union. Thus the trend identified in last year’s
report continues. The right-hand panel of the next figure shows that all of the
crisis countries except Italy actually achieved negative ULC growth between 2007
and 2012. But even if external imbalances have already significantly narrowed,
the unemployment rate remains at record levels. The wage deflationary pressures
will then continue and may even strengthen if expectations anchor to deflation
equilibrium. Competitiveness will still improve and past current account deficits
may rapidly turn to future surpluses. As long as no backstop to the slow down or
even decrease in wages is put in place, the downward adjustment will continue
until the unemployment gap is markedly reduced.
Germany, on the other hand, has experienced faster ULC growth since the
crisis compared to before, but its ULC growth rates have been broadly in line with
the EMU average: in other words, while it is no longer opening up a competitive-
ness gap vis-à-vis the other EMU countries, neither is it closing the accumulated
gap that had built up in previous years. Worryingly the most recent quarters have
seen renewed sluggishness in German ULC developments, although short-run
and within-year comparisons must be interpreted cautiously. Austria, by contrast,
has been steadily closing the gap with the EMU average from below, offering an
Figure 33. Unit labour costs (total economy)
Q1 2000 = 100
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM calculations on Eurostat data.
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At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 89In interpreting these figures it is important to recognise that the EMU average
cannot in fact be considered an appropriate wage-policy benchmark. This is
important not least in assessing ULC trends in France. French ULC developments
have consistently been slightly above the average for the currency area; a gap of
just over 5% has opened up. However, to a considerable degree this reflects the
fact that aggregate ULC developments have lagged behind the appropriate
benchmark, which is the annual inflation target of the central bank.3 A ULC
increase of 1.9% p.a. would be roughly equidistant between the final data point
for France and for the EMU average.
The figure also enables us to return to the issue briefly mentioned above: the
relationship between unit labour costs and export prices. As we have already seen,
export prices have continued to increase since the crisis, in some cases rather
slowly (e.g. Ireland, Spain), but in others (e.g. Greece and Italy) more rapidly. This
occurred in the face of falling unit labour costs (right-hand panel).
This suggests that firms in these countries are “pricing to market”: irrespective
of changes in their labour costs of production they sell goods on foreign markets
in line with (rising) price trends on those markets. This increases their margins and
profitability and may contribute to increase the share of profits in the value-added
(see Box 7). Looking at the left-hand panel of the figure, we see that during the
pre-crisis period firms in the subsequent crisis countries were unable to pass on
their rapidly rising unit labour costs fully onto sales prices. Spanish companies, for
example, raised prices by just over 15%, implying a loss of competitiveness
Figure 34. Unit labour costs and the unemployment rate gap (total economy)
Source: OECD.
3. This is because ULC and price increases that are equal and in accordance with the central bank
target are a long-run condition for sustainable economic development; sustainable both in terms of
being non-inflationary and of ensuring no change in the functional income distribution (i.e.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report90(unless offset by increases in product quality or shifts in the product mix in favour
of higher-value goods). But this was less than half the increase in unit labour costs.
This suggests that margins had been heavily squeezed in the pre-crisis period,
implying, in turn, that, at least in part, the increasing margins were an important
part of the readjustment process. We can agree with the European Commission
(2013) that this may also have been “necessary“, in a sense, in order to compen-
sate firms for their higher cost of capital. However, this higher cost of capital was
in very large measure a reflection of the failure of EU policymakers to address the
causes of high interest-rate spreads and the broken monetary policy transmission
mechanism. Ultimately, then, this form of compensation by wage-earners cannot
be construed as “necessary“.
Figure 35. Unit labour costs and export prices
Cumulative change 2000-2008
Cumulative change 2008-2012
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM calculations on Eurostat data.
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At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 91More generally, the gap between unit labour costs and export price develop-
ments suggests that export growth could have been stronger if price rises had
been restrained. It is of concern in distributional terms – and is potentially a social
and political flashpoint going forward – if workers in the crisis countries continue
to exercise wage restraint and jobs are being cut in the name of raising competi-
tiveness, but the main effect is to raise profit margins.
Box 7. The share of value-added
Since 2007, in most fragile euro area countries, unit wage costs have either
decreased (Ireland, Greece and Spain) or have grown moderately (Portugal).
Yet, inflation has remained positive notably because of increases of indirect
taxes (due to hikes in VAT rates) and higher import prices (energy). In France,
Germany and Italy, the rise in unit wage costs has exceeded the inflation rate,
which have led to a reduction in firms’ margins (Figure).
The share of the value-added between labour and capital followed diverse
developments in the pre-crisis period. A wage moderation policy was pursued
by Germany over the period 2000-2007 (table). This was also the case in
Austria, Belgium and France but to a lesser extent. Conversely, the dynamic of
the share of value-added has been more favourable to labour in Italy and
Ireland.
During the initial phase of the crisis, firms’ behaviour has partly mitigated the
rise of unit wage costs. Labour hoarding has triggered a fall in productivity and
rising unit wage costs. The downward adjustment of profits has then prevented
from a rise in inflation. Firms were thus hard hit by the crisis over the period
2007-2009. Margins decreased while unit wage costs, in all countries still grew
at positive rate. The share of labour in the value-added increased between 2007
Figure 36. Cumulated developments in unit wage costs and in inflation rate, 
2007-2013
In %
Source: Eurostat, AMECO.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report922010 to 2012, unit wage costs started to decrease in the manufacturing sector,
with the exception of Belgium. Nevertheless divergences are increasing. Some
countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal notably) are engaged in a strategy of
internal devaluation resulting from sharp reduction in wage costs. With a posi-
tive inflation rate, real wage costs are decreasing and firms may progressively
restore their profit margins. Then households bear a larger part of the adjust-
ment and real disposable incomes are decreasing. France and Italy are
exceptions since margins are still deteriorating as the GDP deflator increases
less rapidly than unit wage costs.
2. Minimum wages in Europe: from diversity 
to coordination
The reduction of external imbalances is doubtless needed. Until now it has
mainly hinged on internal devaluation. This strategy is clearly non cooperative
and may lead to a vicious circle where each country will successively seek to
regain lost competitiveness in reaction to internal devaluation carried by its Euro-
pean partners. Deflation will then progressively install, starting in the most fragile
countries. Once the deflation has installed, it becomes a process difficult to stop,
especially when unemployment is high for a long period of time. If agents’ expec-
tations are negatively anchored, it might prove very difficult to change the sign of
these expectations, as we have observed in Japan. The austerity policies taking
place in Europe have accelerated this adjustment mechanism through higher
unemployment, thereby reinforcing deflationary pressures. Wage costs play a
fundamental role in the adjustment but overshooting should be avoided. The
adjustment should be relative in the sense that unit wage costs grow faster in
surplus countries. Even if wages are mostly determined by market forces, govern-
ments may influence the dynamics of wages through minimum wages and other
policy influences. Henceforth, we suggest introducing minimum wage norms in
Europe as it may be used as a discretionary policy tool in each country, to put an
Table 11. Share of labour in the value-added
In % of Value-added
 2000 2007 2009 2013(f)
DEU 60.0 54.3 57.9 58.7
AUT 58.0 53.7 56.7 55.9
BEL 57.9 56.3 58.6 58.9
ESP 55.1 53.3 54.0 49.3
FIN 53.5 53.7 59.5 59.1
FRA 60.3 59.8 61.7 62.1
GRC 38.9 39.7 40.8 35.3
IRL 44.2 47.4 51.4 45.1
ITA 45.3 47.1 48.8 49.7
LUX 52.7 48.4 56.1 52.0
NLD 56.8 55.4 58.2 57.7
PRT 55.7 56.3 57.5 54.1
(f) : forecast
Source: Eurostat, base AMECO, OFCE-IMK-ECLM calculations.end to the downward adjustment. The rise in minimum wages would depend on
At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 93the relative current account positions, with the aim of equilibrating external
imbalances within the euro zone. The advantage of this policy compared to an
automatic adjustment by market forces is that it would rest on cooperation
between euro area countries, holding out the promise of much more favourable
results in aggregate.
This would prevent Europe from falling into the vicious circle of deflation,
while reducing current account imbalances, thereby increasing debt sustainability.
A coordinated solution would avoid non-cooperative competitive devaluations as
is the case for the moment. And not only would it improve the macroeconomic
situation, it would also mitigate the risks of poverty and dampen rising
inequalities.
Unfortunately, this is not the direction that has been followed by European
authorities lately. Initially, the European Union had no competence concerning
wage policy. But within the framework of the “European semester” and of the
“Six-pack”, recommendations can now concern wages to prevent or correct
macroeconomic imbalances. Financial sanctions can be imposed by the Commis-
sion of countries not fulfilling their obligations to rein in imbalances (Koll 2013).
Furthermore, countries benefitting from a bailout (Greece, Ireland and Portugal)
or from a support to the financial sector (Spain) have to implement recommenda-
tions of Memorandum of Understanding which typically relate also to wage-
setting (for more details, see Schulten and Müller, 2013). 
Simplifying, there are three ways in which labour market institutions can
impact on the evolution of wages:
1) the minimum wage level and the share of employees concerned by it, and
also the impact of its evolution on other wages;
2) the system of collective bargaining: wages can be negotiated at different
levels (firm-level or by sector, Table 12), there can be pattern bargaining,
where one sector sets the pace for the whole economy, and also automatic
indexation clauses.;
3) the extension or not of the results of collective bargaining to employees
not directly covered by an agreement. The extension can be practically
automatic in some countries whereas it is very limited in others.
Given this framework, the main EC recommendations to improve competi-
tiveness are: decentralisation of wage bargaining at firm-level, limitation of the
extension of collective bargaining, reform of the level or the procedure to set the
minimum wage. The idea is to facilitate a downward adjustment of wages in a
context of widespread unemployment, i.e. to improve the market-based adjust-
ment of wages. The two boxes below present the main reforms recently approved
concerning wage-setting (Schulten and Müller, 2013). In Greece, reforms asked
were particularly strong, but all countries are to some extent concerned.  
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Main level of wage 
bargaining1 
Use of extension 
mechanism 
Bargaining coverage 
in % (2010/2011)
AUT 3 Limited 99
BEL 5 Extensive 96
BGR 2 Very limited 18
CZE 1 Very limited 41
CYP 2 No 52
DNK 3 No 85*
EST 1 Very limited 25
FIN 5 Relevant 90
FRA 2 Extensive 92**
DEU 3 Limited 61
GRC 5 Extensive 65**
HUN 1 Very limited 34***
IRL 1 Very limited 42
ITA 3 No 85
LVA 1 Very limited 20
LTU 1 Very limited 12
LUX 2 Extensive 58**
MLT 1 No 55**
NLD 3 Relevant 84
POL 1 Very limited 29
PRT 3 Extensive 32
ROU 1 Limited 20
SVK 2 Limited 35
SVN 3 Extensive 92***
ESP 4 Extensive 73
SWE 3 No 91
GBR 1 No 31
1. The bargaining predominantly takes place: 1/ at the local or company level, 2/ intermediate between sector 
and company level, 3/ at the sector or industry level, 4/ intermediate between central and industry level, 5/ at 
central or cross-industry level. 
*2007, ** 2008, *** 2009.
Sources: Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx (2013), Visser (2013), ICTWSS (http://www.uva-aias.net/208).
At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 95Because of these reforms, a lot of employees are no longer covered by a
collective agreement. In Portugal for instance, due to stricter criteria for the exten-
sion of collective agreements since 2012, only 10% of employees were covered by
an agreement in 2012, whereas it was about 30% a year earlier (Eurofound,
2013). In Spain, since 2012, the government has limited the continuation of a
collective agreement to an expiry date: it is now fixed at 12 months, while it was
valid indefinitely before in case of disagreement between social partners. In July
2013, about 1 million workers were concerned by those expirations and are no
longer covered (about 7% of all employees). In Greece, reforms on labour market
in 2011 have fostered wage cuts, by limiting the extension of collective agree-
ments and allowing firm-level agreements to prevail over sectoral ones. 
In a context of austerity amplified by reforms in the labour market, the current
process of disinflation/deflation is not under control and risks creating a long
lasting deflation (see the simulations below), spreading from Spain, Portugal and
Greece. Cost competitiveness will improve, current account deficits may turn to
Interventions of the EC in wage policies in 2011-2012
Recommendations/agreements: Addressed countries: 
1. Country-specific recommendations in the framework of the European Semester: 
    Decentralisation of collective bargaining Belgium, Italy, Spain 
    Reform/abolition of automatic wage indexation Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta 
    Moderation of minimum wages developments France, Slovenia 
    Moderation of general wage developments Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Slovenia 
    Wage developments in line with productivity growth Germany 
    Addressing high wages at the lower end 
    of the wage scale Sweden 
2. Country-specific agreements between EU-ECB-IMF or IMF and national governments 
     within the framework of “Memorandum of understanding”: 
    Decentralisation of collective bargaining Greece, Portugal, Romania 
    More restrictive criteria for extension of 
    collective agreements Greece, Portugal, Romania 
    Reduction/Freeze of minimum wages Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania 
    Reduction/Freeze of public sector wages Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania 
Source: Schulten and Müller (2013).
Decentralization of collective bargaining in countries under surveillance
Measures: Affected countries 
Abolition/termination of national collective agreements Ireland, Romania 
Facilitating derogation of firm-level agreements from sectoral
  agreements or legislative (minimum) provisions 
Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Spain 
General priority of company agreements/ abolition 
  of the favourability principle
Greece, Spain 
More restrictive criteria for extension of collective agreements Greece, Portugal, Romania 
Reduction of the ‘after-effect’ of expired collective agreements Greece, Spain 
Possibilities to conclude company agreements by non-union
  group of employees 
Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Spain 
Source: Schulten and Müller (2013).surpluses but the adjustment threatens to overshoot.
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tion mechanism, and notably by using minimum wage norms. Even if relatively
few workers directly receive the minimum wage (with the exception of France or
Bulgaria, see Table 13), its evolution impacts on the whole structure of wages and
its change over time, especially in countries where few employees are covered by
collective bargaining (Schulten and Müller, 2013). Moreover, it is generally ulti-
mately set by the government – although there are frequently provisions for the
social partners to play a role in its negotiation – and may then be more easily
coordinated at the euro area level. In Belgium and Greece, it was not the case, the
level of minimum wage hinging on a collective agreement between social part-
ners. But under the pressure of the Troika, it is legally fixed from now on in Greece
(see below). 
It is true that a statutory national minimum wage does not exist in all Euro-
pean countries. There are today two groups of countries in the euro area
regarding the institutional features of minimum wage norms. The first group
includes countries where there is a statutory national minimum wage and the
second group concerns countries where minimum wages are negotiated by
region and/or by sector and do not concern all employees (Germany, Italy,
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Cyprus and Finland). They can be relatively high.
However many employees are not concerned by these minimal thresholds,
because of their absence in certain sectors or because of the very limited exten-
sion of these minima to firms not covered by agreements. This is the case in
particular in Germany, although the recent coalition agreement foresees the intro-
duction of a statutory minimum wage in the country starting in 2015. In some
countries (Cyprus for example), the government can set minimum wages in
sectors where they do not apply. 
Table 13 presents information about minimum wages (MW) in countries
where a national statutory minimum wage exists. Their levels vary considerably
across countries, in absolute terms as well as in relative terms (i.e. compared with
median wages). Apart from Belgium, Poland and Estonia, where social partners
normally decide on the evolution of the MW, in other countries, social partners’
proposition can be followed or not by the government. Furthermore, indexation
is quasi-automatic only in France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Malta and
Poland. So governments have big latitude to set the MW. This can facilitate coor-
dination between countries but also allows the EC to put pressure on
governments.
At a time when many European countries are facing an increasing number of
low-wage earners (see the analysis in Chapter 2 of this report) and a reduction in
bargaining coverage and when European enlargement has strengthened the risks
of wage dumping, the debate on minimum wages is regaining momentum. Not
only have trade unions in many countries supported MW but so have also interna-
tional institutions. At the same time not all European trade unions welcome State
or European-level intervention on this subject, particularly in countries where the
tradition of autonomous wage-setting by collective agreement is strong (e.g, Italy
or Denmark). So the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) recommends
setting, in countries where a national MW exists, a level of at least 50% of the
average wage or 60% of the median wage, highlighting the important role it
could play in lowering in-work poverty and wage inequalities (ETUC, 2012). 
At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 97To promote this coordination of minimum wages evolution, many authors
recommend using the open method of coordination (Schulten and Watt 2007,
Schulten, 2008; Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx, 2013) whereby the European
Union defines wage targets and deadlines, and monitors the outcomes, but leaves
member states free to work within their respective national frameworks (statutory
minimum wages, automatic extensions of collective agreements…).
There have also been attempts within the European authorities to set targets
regarding minimum wages. For instance, a resolution (2011/2052 – INI) adopted
by the European Parliament in 2011 asked the EC to start discussions about a
legislative initiative on minimum income in Europe, “with due regard for differing
Table 13. Minimum wages in the euro area
Gross 
minimum 
wage 
in 2013 
(in euros)
Minimum 
wage in % 
of median 
wage in 
2012
% of full time 
employees 
receiving MW 
in 2005
Set by
BEL 1502 51 Collective agreement
BGR 159 16 Government, after tripartite consultation
HRV 401 Government, after consultation of a council about the salary policy
CZE 308 36 2 Government, after bipartite consultation
EST 320 36 4,8 Government, after bipartite agreement
FRA 1430 62 16,8
Government, after tripartite discussions, 
indexation on inflation and possible additional 
increase
GRC 684 43* Government, after bipartite consultation since 2013
HUN 332 54 8 Government, after consultation of a council
IRL 1462 48 3,3 Government, after  consultation
LVA 285 51 12 Government, after tripartite consultation
LTU 290 48 10,3 Government, after tripartite consultation
LUX 1874 42 11 Government, indexation on inflation
MLT 697 1,5 Government, after tripartite consultation, indexation on inflation
NLD 1478 47 2,2 Government, indexation on negotiated wages increases, but it can be exceptionally frozen
POL 369 47 2,9 Tripartite Agreement or government if no agreement, indexation on inflation
PRT 566 58 4,7 Government, after tripartite consultation
ROU 179 45 9,7 Government, after bipartite consultation
SVK 338 47 1,7 Government, after bipartite consultation
SVN 784 60 2,8 Government, after bipartite consultation
RSP 753 44 0,8 Government, after bipartite consultation
GBR 1190 47 1,8 Government, after bipartite consultation
*51% in 2011, before minimum wage cut by 22% in 2012.
Sources: OECD, Eurostat, ILO.practices, and for collective labour agreements and legislation in the various
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the prerogative of each member state”. It pointed the need to combat poverty, to
realize the workers’ right to a decent living and to guarantee an income that is
equal or higher than 60% of the median income in each member state (i.e. the
poverty threshold). 
But so far, recommendations of the EC regarding wages have been paradox-
ical. On the one hand, the EC is concerned by poverty issues and is aware of the
potential effect of minimum wages to fight poverty. But, on the other hand, it also
wishes to facilitate downward adjustment of MW in countries with deficits on
current account. MW are part of the strategy of deregulation of labour market to
foster employment and also contribute to the reduction of current disequilibria. 
In April, 2012, the EC, in a document to support employment (Towards a job-
rich recovery), reaffirmed the necessity of fighting in-work poverty (8% in the EU),
due to low minimum wages or to unequal wages distribution. There was an
implicit reference to Germany. For the EC, differentiated minimum wages
depending on sectors and negotiated by social partners better take into account
economic developments. The paradox is that in-work poverty is high not only in
Germany (7,7% in 2011) but also in countries that are concerned by recommen-
dations to freeze or even reduce minimum wages (11,9% in Greece, 12,2% in
Spain, 10,8% in Italy, 10,2% in Portugal). In reality, for the EC, minimum wages
shouldn’t be too low, to prevent poverty, but it also should be adjusted
depending on the economic situation. In a document published in June 2012 by
ILO, OECD, IMF and the World Bank (Boosting jobs and living standards in G20
countries), conclusions were globally the same: minimum wages should amount
to 30 to 40% of median wages to lower poverty and inequalities and sustain
internal demand. But to preserve employment, it shouldn’t be higher than that.
However, the poverty threshold represents 60% of the median income, after
social transfers. Then, despite social allowances, a minimum wage of 40% of
median wages is likely to be insufficient to protect from poverty. (The relationship
is complex because the minimum wage refers to the individual and only wage
income, whereas the poverty threshold includes all income and is measured at the
household level). Moreover, as indicated in table 13, minimum wages are below
40% of median wage in 2012 only in 2 countries in the European Union (Czech
Republic and Estonia). It reaches between 40 and 50% in 10 countries, and is
above 50% in 5 countries. The maximum is observed in France (62%). 
In countries under bailout, minimum wages have been frozen (Ireland since
2008 or Portugal since 2012) or even been cut (Greece in 2012). The first
Economic Adjustment Program for Ireland planned a decrease of 12% in MW in
2011, because its level was judged too high in a context of widespread unemploy-
ment. Finally, it was frozen at the level of 2008. In Greece, after asking for a cut of
22% in 2012, the MW will be frozen until the end of the bailout. Moreover, the
MW is no longer determined through collective bargaining between social part-
ners, but it is set by the government, after a bipartite consultation. In Portugal,
the MW cannot be increased without the agreement of the Troika. In other coun-
tries, minimum wages have also slowed down, because of the crisis and /or of
recommendations of the EC. As a consequence, real minimum wages have
decreased recently in many countries (Figure 37). Apart from Greece where there
has been a cut of 20% between 2010 and 2013, the fall in real terms has
amounted to 4% in Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Ireland. Minimum wages
have been stable or have slightly increased in France, Slovak Republic, Estonia,
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since 2010. 
As seen previously, the EC strategy and recommendations have predomi-
nantly led to a decrease in the purchasing power of MW, notably in the crisis
countries. It has then certainly contributed to the gain in cost competitiveness. In
a welcome development, the EC has recently shown that it is also concerned with
the “symmetry” of the adjustment in the euro area. For the first time since the
introduction of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure in 2011, Germany is
also concerned since the 13th of November by an Alert Mechanism Report, due
to a current surplus exceeding 6% of GDP for at least the past three years. The in-
depth review which will be published in spring 2014 could lead to recommenda-
tions. In June 2013, the EC already recommended that Germany support
domestic demand via wage growth by two means: a reduction of taxes and social
security contributions for low-wage earners, and an easier transition from mini-
jobs to “normal” jobs (subject to social security contributions). And as noted
above, following the legislative elections of September, the future government
coalition has just decided to introduce a statutory national wage and other labour
market reforms, which will support wage growth and domestic demand, and
have consequences for the adjustment process in Europe (see Box 8 for more
details).
To mitigate the risk of a deflationary spiral, we propose to promote not only
wages coordination but also minimum wage coordination. As already mentioned
by different authors (Schulten, 2012; Herr and Kazandziska, 2011), minimum
wages are an important anchor against deflationary pressures. A coordinated
minimum wage policy could be a tool that would put a limit on internal devalua-
tions (and then on the mechanisms of correction of imbalances). It would also
Figure 37. Evolution of minimum wages, deflated by harmonized indices 
of consumer prices, between 2010 and 2013
 In %
Source: Eurostat.
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doesn’t exist unless collective wage-setting institutions are strong and coverage is
high (as for example in Austria). Secondly, whichever the type of MW (statutory
or set by collective agreements) its evolution should reflect productivity growth or
variation of current accounts / external positions.
Box 8. Good for Germany can be good for Europe
The coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD contains a long
section on European policy that signals a continuation, if not a further tight-
ening, of the restrictive approach to resolving the European crisis, focusing on
fiscal consolidation and so-called “structural reforms” to raise competitiveness,
that have so signally failed. 
Thus it is fortunate that, ironically, when the two parties are not actually
thinking about Europe, but about domestic issues, they promise policies that
will actually benefit the continent as a whole. By far the most important of
these commitments is the introduction of a statutory minimum wage of
EUR8.50 per hour across the whole country from the start of 2015. There are a
number of transitional measures to respect existing collective agreements and
those signed in the meantime by “representative” sectoral organisation, but at
the latest by 2017 the minimum wage will apply nationwide and to all workers.
Moreover, it will be made easier to declare sectoral collective agreements
legally binding on all employers in a sector. This once important mechanism on
the German labour market – the Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung, or AVE to
its friends – had virtually fallen into disuse. It will tend to underpin wage
growth for workers that earn somewhat above the minimum wage.
It is hard to overstate the importance of these changes. In European compar-
ison the proportion of the workforce earning less than 60% of the median
wage is highest in Germany, as is the average pay gap of the low-paid. High
unemployment in the early and mid-2000s, coupled with labour market
reforms, opened up the bottom of the labour market and were largely respon-
sible for the fact that the rise in inequality at the bottom of the distribution in
that period was among the most pronounced in the entire OECD. This, in turn,
was a crucial element in the most important driver of the euro crisis: the
opening up of competitiveness and current account imbalances between the
euro core and periphery.
Pay rises, in some cases substantial increases, for around 14% of German
workers will make a difference. They will strengthen domestic demand in
Germany. But not only that: some of this will leak into higher demand for the
exports of goods and services from other EMU countries. The number of
German workers affected, somewhat under six million, comfortably exceeds
total employment in Portugal, for instance, and is around 2/3 of that in the
Netherlands. The higher wage costs will be partially passed on in the form of
higher prices. This will have the effect of rebalancing competitive positions, and
doing so in a less damaging way to overall demand than the strategy to date of
one-sided cuts in the periphery. (Note that it is not critical that most minimum
wage workers are not employed in Germany’s export sectors. Price competi-
tiveness is a matter of overall labour costs, which include those of the domestic
inputs purchased by manufacturing exporters). Other things equal, this
stronger wage and price dynamic will tend to push down the external value of
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tries without going through bilateral trade balances. (If overall inflation were
close to the ECB target, one could object that the central bank will tighten
policy, with negative effects on the other EMU countries, but this is not the
case. Indeed with inflation at just 0.7% policymakers should be thankful for
every little contribution to reflation).
There is another effect via the public finances. Currently the German states
pay out billions in benefits to low-paid workers. For a substantial number this
will not be necessary once workers are earning the minimum wage. Moreover,
wage income is “tax-rich”: the upward push at the bottom, with knock-on
effects for workers currently earning somewhat above the minimum wage will
lead to a substantial increase in income tax, while higher prices will increase the
revenues from value-added and consumption taxes. This will help to finance a
number of substantial spending promises in the coalition agreement. Fiscal
policy is likely to be somewhat supportive of aggregate demand in Germany,
once again with (limited) beneficial effects in other countries.
3. The benefits of a coordinated wage policy
To analyse the potential impact of a coordinated wage policy, we present
simulations based on an augmented-version of the iAGS model4. The model
includes the main euro area countries5 and is extended to the United States, the
United Kingdom and Japan. 
The main features of iAGS model are that:
— The size of multipliers can vary according to the business cycle: fiscal
impulses have a greater impact on GDP in bad times (when unemployment
rate is very high compared to the equilibrium unemployment rate);
— Fiscal policy can have long run impact on potential GDP through hysteresis
effects (austerity can alter potential GDP if investment is lowered or workers
are excluded for long periods from the labour market for example);
— Euro area economies are interconnected through external trade. A reces-
sion in one country lowers demand to its partners, as its imports and their
exports fall, so that GDP growth slows down in partner countries.
— The model includes a Taylor rule describing monetary policy. A zero lower
bound on interest rate is added. Monetary policy then feeds back on
economic activity and government interest expenditures through its effects
on long term interest rates. The model then produces higher fiscal multi-
pliers when monetary policy is at the lower bound, which is currently the
case for the ECB.
The properties and characteristics of the model include assumptions about
the variable size of fiscal multipliers and the long-lasting effects of a real crisis on
4. The model is not described in the present report but a complete presentation will be available
from the OFCE.
5. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Austria and
Finland.
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model) based on sound theoretical foundations. To provide an in-depth analysis
on deflation and external imbalances, it has been extended to account more
accurately for the price-wage loop and for the impact of competitiveness on
external trade. We have adopted a triangle model, as suggested by Gordon
(1988), to represent the dynamics between prices and wages:
— Inflation now depends on the growth of domestic prices (GDP deflator)
and of foreign prices, computed as the weighted average of the foreign
GDP deflators. All prices are expressed in terms of domestic currency. The
impact of foreign GDP deflator also depends on nominal exchange rates,
which are exogenous;
— The growth of the domestic GDP deflator is determined as a constant
mark-up on the growth of unit wage costs;
— Nominal wages are set according to a Phillips relation where the growth of
wages at time (t) depends on the growth of nominal wages at time (t-1),
expected inflation, the trend of labour productivity and the unemployment
gap between the current unemployment rate and the NAIRU (non acceler-
ating-inflation rate of unemployment). In the long run, real wages increase
with labour productivity. Minimum wages may accelerate or restrain the
growth of wages in the short term, whereas they grow at the same rate in
the long term.
The role of expectations is essential when deflation issues are raised. In the
iAGS model, inflation expectations are adaptive and adjust according to the
spread between past inflation and an anchor, which is equal to the inflation target
set by central banks. For convenience, the target is set at 2% for all central banks.
The adjustment depends on the adjustment speed and may also respond in the
short run to the business cycle. Here, we have indeed considered a scenario where
inflation expectations decrease when the output gap widens.
Table 14 sums up the results of the baseline simulation (see Box 9 for a
description of the main underlying hypotheses). In the baseline, we simulate the
path of inflation, the output gap, public debt levels (expressed in percentage
points of GDP), current account and other macroeconomic variables. This base-
line scenario depends on the fiscal impulses which have been forecast in the euro
area from 2013 to 2015. By assumption, we include zero-forecast fiscal impulses
beyond 2016. Public debt may not converge to the 60% threshold by 2032 in the
baseline. We then compute three scenarios where public debt is brought back to
the target of 60% in 2032, which is consistent with existing fiscal rules.
The baseline scenario clearly illustrates the risk of deflation, not in the euro
area as a whole but in the most fragile countries. In Spain, prices would decline by
1% on average between 2014 and 2020. Deflation would occur despite a GDP
growth recovery and would be triggered by sustained high unemployment. The
negative output gap would also drag down expected inflation, reinforcing the
deflationary pressures at least in the short run. The situation would be worst in
Greece and Portugal, while Ireland would also enter a milder deflation. For the
euro area as whole, inflation would not exceed 0.6% on average, which is far from
the inflation target set by the ECB. France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium
would escape these gloomy perspectives but would nevertheless record inflation
rates below 1%. These countries would then remain under the threat of more
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unsettled because, on the one hand, deflation increases real interest rates, which
has a negative impact on the output gap, but on the other hand, the gain in
competitiveness boosts exports and has a positive impact on the output gap. This
situation is largely representative of what is happening in Spain. The deflation may
hamper the reduction in private and public debts but the low growth of unit
labour costs improves firms’ margins and their ability to increase export market
shares. This may then trigger a significant change in the share of value-added, to
the detriment of workers. 
Besides, this baseline also illustrates the overshooting of the adjustment. The
current account would indeed improve sharply in the countries where deflation
occurs. From 2014 to 2030, which is the horizon over which the current account
stabilizes in the simulations, Spain, Greece and Portugal would unambiguously
become surplus countries. In these countries, real interest rates would be positive
despite the negative output gap. This slows down the recovery as the transmis-
sion of monetary policy in those countries is impaired by deflation. Germany
would yet improve its external balance and only the Netherlands, Austria and
Finland would suffer from a small reduction in their current account balances.
Thus, the average current account surplus of the euro area would also increas-
ingly move to surplus. Nevertheless, caution is needed when interpreting the
results of simulations on the current account. The dynamic of the current account
also hinges on the balance of revenue, that also depends on net external position.
Some asset prices effects are not captured by the model. The feedback effects on
the current account are not taken into account here. The dynamics of the current
account is then essentially explained by net exports, which depend on external
demand and the relative prices (or the real exchange rate). Yet, having this in
mind, it appears clearly that the adjustment of external imbalances risks being
excessive. The current account balance of Spain would indeed improve by more
than 16 percentage points between 2014 and 2032, the horizon where the
current account has stabilised. It is in line with the strong gain in competitiveness
recorded for Spain. The same apply for Portugal, Ireland and Greece. It must be
noted here that in the baseline scenario, only Germany would suffer from a loss of
competitiveness. The current account would slightly improve nonetheless. In this
scenario, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece would not be able to reach the 60%
debt-to-GDP ratio. For Ireland, debt would end at 62%. Nevertheless, it must be
noted that public debt would be significantly reduced for France.
Conforming to the last iAGS-2013 report6, we then determine the additional
fiscal impulse, which is needed to bring back public debt to 60% in 2032 in accor-
dance with the treaties. Assuming that the fiscal impulses are left unchanged for
2014, we calculate a sequence of fiscal impulses over 2015-2032 following a
simple algorithm. As it was largely discussed in the iAGS-2013 report, we consider
fiscal impulses that do not exceed -0.5% of GDP are in accordance with existing
fiscal rules. Additional impulses are then implemented as long as debt exceeds
60% in 2032. We maintain a neutral fiscal policy after 2014 (i-e with a zero fiscal
impulse) for countries which achieve 60% or below. Therefore public debt is left
unchanged compared to Table 14. This simple algorithm implies that the cumu-6. The update of this scenario is presented in Chapter 1 of the present report.
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converge towards a debt above the target, and smaller for others.
Table 15 sums up the results of this simulation. Striking results are threefold.
First, two countries – Portugal and Greece – are unable to achieve the debt-to-
GDP target. The fiscal stance over 2014-2032 produces a cumulative fiscal
impulse which lowers the average annual growth by nearly 0.4 point of GDP on
average. This fiscal stance is inefficient in terms of public finance and highly costly
in terms of growth as the fiscal multipliers are high when output gaps are strongly
negative. Moreover, the rise in unemployment reinforces the deflation loop and
tightens monetary policy through the increase of real interest rates. Second,
France and Spain achieve the debt target in 2032, but under a much more restric-
tive fiscal stance than scheduled, especially for Spain. Both countries also suffer
the same disease as Portugal and Greece: higher fiscal impulse and lower growth
(-0.25 for Spain, -0.1 for France), which weighs on inflation (-0.06). These four
countries also benefit from an improvement of their current accounts thanks to a
competitiveness increase. On the contrary, other countries need less austerity
than scheduled to achieve the fiscal debt target, which permits a small rebound of
growth (from 0 to 0.1 p.p a year). These simulations show how the European
fiscal strategy could widen divergence across euro area member states, reinforcing
deflation in countries with the lowest output gaps, and underpinning the health-
iest ones.
Table 14. Baseline scenario
In %
Average 
annual 
growth
Average 
inflation 
rate
Average 
real 
interest 
rate
REER* 
evolution 
between
Increase (+) or 
decrease (-) in 
current account 
balance between
Public debt
in 
2014-
2020
2014 
2020
2014-
2020
2014-
2032
2014-
2032
2032
DEU 1.5 1.6 -0.5 8.9 1.2 25
FRA 1.9 0.5 0.6 -7.6 2.0 76
ITA 0.7 0.2 1.1 -15.1 7.6 49
ESP 2.2 -1.0 2.6 -28.8 16.7 98
NLD 1.9 0.5 0.7 -15.5 -0.3 35
BEL 1.8 0.8 0.6 -1.5 1.4 50
PRT 1.7 -1.2 3.3 -20.8 11.2 122
IRL 3.2 -0.6 2.4 -19.9 5.9 62
GRC 2.4 -3.9 4.2 -53.1 34.5 244
FIN 1.9 1.5 0.0 -1.6 -2.7 48
AUT 1.7 1.2 0.2 -4.6 -1.7 26
EA 1.6 0.6 0.7 -1.5 4.7 54
* Real effective exchange rate.
Source: iAGS model.
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The simulations start in 2014. To do so, we need to set some starting point
values in 2013 for a set of essential variables. Output gaps for 2013 come from
OECD forecasts. Potential growth for the baseline potential GDP is based on
ECLM-IMK-OFCE projections (see Table 16). Concerning fiscal policy and
budget variables, the main hypotheses are:
—The public debt in 2013 comes from OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
—We use the OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts for fiscal balance in 2013; 
—We use the European Commission’s autumn 2013 forecast of interest
expenditures for 2013; combined with OECD forecasts of output gaps in
2013, and model estimates of the cyclical part of the fiscal balance, which
gives the structural primary balance for 2013;
—Fiscal impulses come from OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts for 2013, 2014 and
2015.
—Current account balances for 2013 comes from IMF.
—Inflation in 2013 comes from OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.
Table 15. Scenario where public debt cannot exceed 60% in 2032
In %
Average 
annual 
growth
Average 
inflation 
rate
Average 
real 
interest 
rate
REER* 
evolution 
between
Increase (+) or 
decrease (-) in 
current account 
balance between
Public debt 
in
2014-
2020
2014 
2020
2014-
2020
2014-
2032
2014-
2032
2032
DEU 1.5 1.7 -0.5 9,0 1.2 23
FRA 1.7 0.5 0.7 -9.5 3.3 60
ITA 0.7 0.3 1.1 -14.4 7.0 52
ESP 1.9 -1.1 2.7 -33.4 20.4 60
NLD 2.0 0.7 0.6 -11.5 -2.0 60
BEL 1.9 0.8 0.5 -0.6 0.8 60
PRT 1.3 -1.3 3.4 -27.6 17.5 67
IRL 3.1 -0.6 2.4 -20.1 6.1 60
GRC 2.0 -4.1 4.4 -61.3 42.0 196
FIN 1.8 1.5 0.0 -2.0 -2.5 43
AUT 1.8 1.3 0.0 -2.8 -2.6 42
EA 1.6 0.6 0.7 -1.5 5.4 47
* Real effective exchange rate.
Source: iAGS model.
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The increase in the average current account balance of the euro area may well
foster an appreciation of the euro compared to the US dollar, the British pound
and the yen. This shock is illustrated in Table 17 where we analyse the impact of a
10% appreciation of the euro each year for 3 years (2014, 2015 and 2016). 
Inflation is lower in all countries and the impact is correlated to the degree of
openness of countries. Ireland is the country where the nominal exchange rate
shock is the strongest, due to the high share of Irish trade with the United States
and the United Kingdom. Deflation would be amplified by 0.5 percentage point in
average due to imported inflation. This would in turn increase public debt and real
interest rates. GDP would be negatively impacted both by the loss of competitive-
ness of Irish firms and by higher real interest rate. More fiscal efforts will thus be
needed to reach the 60% threshold for public debt, lowering growth again (by -
0.6% per year on average between 2014 and 2020). For other euro area countries,
the negative consequences of the shock would be limited. But this result strongly
hinges on the limited number of non euro area countries in our model. The appre-
ciation of the euro is only conducted against 3 countries (the US, UK and Japan).
The inclusion of other European countries (notably East European countries), Asian
and African countries would increase the impact of a euro appreciation.
Globally, the average current account of the euro area would be reduced by
1.5% of GDP, which would help the global rebalancing process. However, there
would be very little internal rebalancing of relative current account positions, as
most countries would experience adjustments comprised between 1 and 2.5% of
GDP, with deficit countries (France, Spain, Italy) deepening their current balance
Table 16. Main hypotheses for 2013
In % unless otherwise specified 
 Public 
debt
Fiscal 
balance
Inflation 
rate
Current 
account 
as % GDP
Output 
gap
Potential 
growth
Source OFCE-IMK-ECLM
OFCE-IMK-
ECLM
OFCE-IMK-
ECLM
European
Commission OECD
OFCE-IMK-
ECLM
DEU 80.8 -0.2 1.7 6.0 -0.8 1.3
FRA 92.9 -4.1 1.3 -1.6 -3.9 1.4
ITA 131.7 -1.9 1.5 0.0 -5.8 0.2
ESP 91.2 -6.8 1.7 1.4 -9.6 1.4
NLD 74.8 -4.0 2.7 10.9 -4.7 1.6
BEL 101.3 -3.4 1.3 -0.7 -2.0 1.5
PRT 128.9 -5.9 0.7 0.9 -8.8 1.0
IRL 124.6 -6.6 0.8 2.3 -8.1 1.8
GRC 179.2 -7.8 -0.6 -0.1 -13.8 1.0
FIN 56.3 -1.9 2.4 -1.6 -2.4 1.6
AUT 74.5 -2.3 2.2 2.8 -2.8 1.4
GBR 93.5 -7.1 2.7 -2.8 -2.4 1.9
USA 110.8 -7.7 1.5 -2.7 -3.1 2.1
JPN 227.1 -11.5 -0.1 1.2 0.0 1.1
Note: the hypotheses used for simulations do not systematically take into account the most recent statistical informa-
tion and may then slightly differ from forecasts presented in chapter 1.
Sources: European Commission, OFCE-IMK-ECLM forecasts.more than surplus countries (Germany, Netherlands). On top of that, all the
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be lower inflation (Figure 38) and lower growth, which would not be offset by the
decrease of real interest rates. Public debt would globally be higher despite
accrued fiscal effort. In Germany and Italy, where the debt-to-GDP ratio is below
60%, the appreciation of the euro would lead to an increase of debt of respec-
tively 2.4 and 3.6 points. For Portugal and Greece, which are anyway unable to
reach the 60% target, the debt situation would be worsened by lower inflation
(+5.4 and +10.6 points respectively).    
Figure 38. Average inflation in the euro area for 3 simulations
Source: iAGS model.
Table 17. Scenario where the euro appreciates by 10% each year for 3 years
Percentage point difference with Table 15
Average 
annual 
growth
Average 
inflation 
rate
Average real 
interest 
rate
REER* 
evolution 
between
Increase (+) 
or decrease (-) 
in current
account balance 
between
Public debt
in 
2014-
2020
2014 
2020
2014-
2020
2014-
2032
2014-
2032
2032
DEU -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 2.2 -1.1 2.4
FRA -0.13 -0.13 -0.03 0.9 -1.7 0.0
ITA -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 1.1 -2.0 3.6
ESP -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 0.5 -2.0 -0.1
NLD -0.13 -0.20 0.00 0.4 -1.1 0.0
BEL -0.15 -0.23 0.04 0.5 -1.6 0.1
PRT -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 1.0 -1.7 5.4
IRL -0.62 -0.53 0.22 -4.3 -2.5 -0.2
GRC -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 1.0 -2.2 10.6
FIN -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 0.8 -1.1 2.5
AUT -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.8 -0.7 2.0
EA -0.11 -0.13 -0.05 -1.9 -1.5 1.5
* Real effective exchange rate.
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Public debt at 60% in 2032
Public debt at 60% and euro appreciation
Public debt at 60%, euro appreciation 
and minimum wage ruleSource: iAGS model.
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rebalancing current account position could be more important than what is
needed, we suggest to introduce a mechanism aiming at avoiding the deflation
trap. The dynamics of wages is clearly central on these issues. Price dynamics is
indeed strongly linked to wage dynamics and wages are a key component of unit
labour cost and competitiveness. Their adjustment will then have consequences
on current accounts. The reduction of external imbalances plays a central role in
European governance. But, as we have seen above, the new MIP (Macroeconomic
imbalances procedure) only sets an upper limit to the increase of unit labour costs
but does not fix any limit to the decrease. The European Commission has
promoted structural reforms to liberalise labour markets and enhance the adjust-
ment of labour costs. But these reforms may fuel the deflation process. 
This is why we call for a European coordination on wage policies. As described
earlier in this chapter, wages are largely determined by market forces but govern-
ments may have their say by stimulating minimum wages. This may be done
easily in countries where minimum wages are set by government or when the
governments play a key role in the bargaining process, but countries with strong
autonomous collective bargaining institutions can also successfully target appro-
priate (minimum) wage trends. Then, coordination of these minimum wages with
the aim to restrein deflationary pressures and with the aim of rebalancing current
accounts becomes possible. It implies that countries with high external surpluses
have higher wage growth through increases in minimum wages. For deficit coun-
tries, the need of adjusting competitiveness would be limited to avoiding
deflation. The minimum wage would then still increase but less than in surplus
countries.
We introduce a simple rule by which minimum wages are adjusted
according to the relative position of euro area countries’ current account posi-
tions. For the group of countries where the current account (as % of GDP) at
date (t-1) is lower by 1 percentage point than the euro area average, the
nominal minimum wage is increased by 1% (deficit countries). If the current
account is higher by 1 percentage point than the average, the minimum wage is
increased by 3% (surplus countries). For the rest of the countries (balanced
countries), the minimum wage is increased by 2%. The rule is applied for
10 years (2014-2024) and countries can move from one group to another
according to the evolution of their relative current account position. The impact
on prices crucially depends on the diffusion of minimum wages to the growth of
nominal wages, which is assumed to be 0.4 in the short term. The results of this
scenario are presented in Table 18.
First, the impact on growth is limited as competitiveness and real interest
rates effects partly offset each other. Deflation in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and
Greece is lessened but not avoided. Inflation is globally higher by 0.7% in the
euro area (Figure 39), with large disparities between country groups. The group
of surplus countries includes Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece7.
There, inflation increases by about 1% on average, which allows Portugal to reach
the 60% target and reduces the Greek debt by 40 percentage points in 2032. As
prices rise, real effective exchange rates appreciate by 10% to 20% in these four
7. Due to the sharp fall of GDP in the crises countries, current accounts imbalances have already
been reduced. Portugal and Greece have then become surplus countries.
At the edge of deflation: Supporting rebalancing through wage coordination 109countries between 2014 and 2032, fostering current account adjustments. All four
countries experience a larger degradation of their current account than the euro
area as a whole.
For deficit countries (France, Italy, Belgium and Finland) the situation is
reversed. Inflation is higher but only by 0.4% on average. Therefore the relative
competitive position is improved with a slightly negative growth of real effective
exchange rates, leading to a small improvement of current account positions.
Spain, Austria and Ireland are either balanced countries or moving from one
group to another. Their adjustment in terms of competitiveness or current
accounts is thus closer to the euro area average. Figure 39 illustrates the change in
the current account position of the euro area which can be directly imputed to
this wage coordination policy. After 20 years, the average current account balance
of the euro area would be reduced by 3.5% of GDP, with Germany, the Nether-
lands and Spain being the main contributors to this rebalancing process. It must
yet be noted that these effects may be overestimated as there are no feedback
effect in our model from the exchange rate. A relative higher inflation rate or a
relative reduction in the average euro area current account balance may indeed
lead to a relative depreciation of the euro. But it rests that our simulations show
that a coordinated wage policy would play a key role in the reduction of macro-
economic imbalances. 
For the euro area as a whole, the average inflation rate increases by 0.7%,
which is non negligible and desirable. However, if coordination of wage policy
Table 18. Scenario with euro appreciation and coordination of minimum wages
Percentage point difference with euro appreciation scenario
Average 
annual 
growth
Average 
inflation 
rate
Average real 
interest 
rate
REER* 
evolution 
between
Increase (+) or 
decrease (-) in 
current account 
balance 
between
Public 
debt
in 
2014-
2020
2014 
2020
2014-
2020
2014-
2032
2014-
2032
2032
DEU -0.04 1.07 -0.36 20.8 -5.1 -1.2
FRA 0.03 0.38 -0.02 -0.2 0.0 0.0
ITA 0.00 0.38 -0.02 -0.1 0.1 -4.2
ESP 0.01 0.38 -0.02 4.5 -3.2 0.0
NLD -0.09 1.06 -0.33 -17.2 -7.3 0.0
BEL 0.01 0.43 -0.05 -1.7 1.0 0.0
PRT -0.07 1.02 -0.32 9.6 -9.8 -12.3
IRL -0.15 0.84 -0.22 5.2 -5.6 0.2
GRC -0.05 0.90 -0.26 14.6 -13.1 -40.9
FIN -0.01 0.38 -0.01 1.7 -0.8 1.0
AUT -0.03 0.85 -0.24 0.8 -0.8 -3.2
EA -0.02 0.67 -0.16 8.1 -2.8 -2.5
* Real effective exchange rate.
Source: iAGS model.may help to boost inflation in a deflationary environment, it may not be suffi-
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report110cient. The exit of deflation may also hinge on other macroeconomic policy or to
a stronger shock on wages. It is then fundamental to avoid excessive fiscal
consolidation. Less austerity would help growth to recover in the most fragile
countries. Unemployment rate would then decline more substantially reducing
the negative impact on wages through the Phillips effect. A European initiative
on public investment could participate to this process. We discuss this in the
following chapter.
Figure 39. Impact of wage indexation on the euro area current account, 
by country
As % of euro area GDP
This graph is built as the difference between two simulations: (2)-(1) 
(1) The euro appreciates by 10% per year during 3 years (2014, 2015 and 2016) 
(2) On top of the appreciation of the euro, a minimum wage rule is put in place, where surplus coutries
implement a 3% increase of minimum wage, deficit countries a 1% increase and balanced countries a 2%
increase. Country groups are redefined every year relatively to the euro area average during 10 years
(2014 to 2024).
Source: iAGS model.
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Chapter 4A GREEN NEW DEAL IN EUROPE: TOWARDS 
A NEW GROWTH MODEL
The global financial crisis required a substantial involvement of govern-
ments, first to rescue banks and second to boost depressed economies.
Consequently, government debt and deficits surged. In striking contrast with the
rest of advanced economies, higher deficits and debts in the euro area fed a sover-
eign-debt crisis. The necessary involvement of European governments, while still
needed, was abruptly cut off, and austerity measures were instead adopted. They
were finally followed by the US government, under an amazing fear of “helleniza-
tion” (Krugman, 2013).
In the past, fiscal austerity tended to be associated with large cuts to public
investment1. The downward trend in public investment came at the cost of dete-
riorating public infrastructure and was at odds with the Lisbon agenda of
“creating the most innovative area in the world” by 2010. 
The decrease in public investment urged a debate about fiscal rules: the fiscal
deficit limit at 3% of GDP which was included in the Stability and Growth Pact in
1997 made it possible to sacrifice public investment and meanwhile to maintain
parts of current spending in order to match the deficit ratio. This policy did not
question the adequacy, relevance and effectiveness of public spending, but rather
endorsed an understanding of fiscal policy from the sole viewpoint of accounting. 
Some economists like Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), Fitoussi & Creel (2002),
and Cacheux (2002) promoted a different view of fiscal policy, without giving up
the requirement of adopting a fiscal rule in the EU. They proposed the adoption of
a “golden rule of public finance” in the EU. According to this rule, government
borrowing should not exceed net government capital formation over the cycle;
hence, current expenditures would have to be financed out of current receipts. 
The theoretical rationale for excluding net public capital expenditures from
the public deficit target is usually linked with the requirement of spreading the
costs of public capital formation over the years during which they will be used. An
additional advantage with this rule should be noted. With European countries
aiming at achieving the Lisbon agenda (in the past) or Europe 2020 (currently),
there should be scope to improve infrastructure and human capital for which
public capital (considered quite widely and loosely) is crucial. An important goal of
expanding investment is to boost potential and actual output2. Nevertheless,
promoting output in a purely quantitative sense is not the only rationale for
undertaking public investment. Rather there are important qualitative concerns.
Public investment provides public goods like transport infrastructures which
1. Balassone and Franco (2000) documented the path of fiscal restraint before adopting the euro
in the late 1990s and showed a decrease in public investment. See also EC (2003) and notably, table
III.3 which shows that fiscal consolidation induced by high debt levels and the need to satisfy the
Maastricht criteria coincided with relatively large cuts in public investment.
2. The seminal contribution to the debate on “productive public capital” is Aschauer (1989). Bom
& Lighthart (2009) made a meta-analysis on this topic and conclude that the output elasticity ofRevue de l’OFCE / Macroeconomic Outlook – Special issue (2014)
public capital spending is positive. 
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report112benefit users and directly or indirectly improve total factor productivity. Public
investment may also improve the educational attainment in the population – as
well as supporting the protection of the environment and a more equitable distri-
bution of income and wealth3. 
Balassone & Franco (2000), then Buti et al. (2003), raised criticisms against
the golden rule of public finance. First, they argued that a rule of this kind would
drive up public debt4. Second, they argued that the ability of excluding public
investment from the deficit target would bias the cost/benefit analysis of public
projects, at the expense of costs5. Third, they argued that a “golden rule”,
promoting public investment, would result in a bias in favor of physical assets, at
the expense of health and education expenditures. Indeed, the definition of
“public investment” in national account statistics includes transactions that lead
to changes in the stock of physical capital (like the construction of infrastructures
or the purchase of computer hardware), but excludes large amounts of expendi-
tures related to the accumulation of human capital, like training or R&D6. 
The Stability and Growth Pact underwent two reforms, one in 2005 and the
latest in 2011, and none endorsed the “golden rule of public finance”. However,
this is certainly not the time for a new package of reforms. We do not advocate
the adoption of a golden rule in the near future.
However, one can be puzzled by the recent evolution of net public invest-
ment in the euro area (see Figure 40). Though the decrease has been substantially
higher in the US economy than in the euro area, the gradual drop in net public
investment since 2002, that accelerated in 2008 at the very moment euro area
member states implemented expansionary fiscal impulses, is striking. Despite the
relative decrease in potential output after the global financial crisis, it turns out
that the drop in net public investment has been faster.
The change in net public investment is quite at odds with the requirement of
a “golden rule”. As Figure 41 shows, most OECD countries decided to implement
a restrictive fiscal stance (the structural primary balance rose substantially in
proportion to potential output), but in so doing they did not maintain net public
investment at its pre-crisis (already-reduced) level. On the contrary, the clear
correlation shows that net public investment reduction has been used as a major
engine for fiscal austerity.
3. See Melonio & Timbeau (2006), Allegre et al. (2012) on public spending in education.
4. However, an endogenous limit to the increase in public investment does exist: with higher debt
producing high interest payments, and with interest payments accounted as current spending,
governments face the requirement to raise tax receipts if public investment increases (Creel, 2003).
Under the assumption that an upper limit exists for compulsory levies (Blanchard, 1990),
governments will then face an upper limit for spending on public investment. The contribution of
public investment to the debt-to-GDP ratio will face a limit. 
5. Provided that governments internalize the existence of an upper-limit on public investment
(see previous footnote), they face the incentive to implement the most appropriate projects (Creel,
2003). Rational governments should not deviate from an unbiased cost-benefit analysis.
6. Le Cacheux (2002) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argued that a change in accounting
rules was necessary, in order to complement the « golden rule » with a rule defining what type of
public spending can be counted as « public investment ». Until now, the distinction between current
and investment expenditures has essentially been conventional.
A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 113The change in net public investment in the euro area is also at odds with the
economic, environmental and social ambitions of Europe 2020. At least since the
beginning of the global financial crisis, a need has opened up for the EU to catch
up on sacrificed public capital expenditures if the objectives of Europe 2020 are to
Figure 40. Net public investment 
In % of potential output
Source: OECD.
Figure 41. Combination of discretionary fiscal stance and net public investment
Sources: OECD, OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report114Since the onset of the financial and economic crises, the drop in European
public investments has amounted to 2% of GDP, or around €240 billion. In the
present chapter, we propose an estimate of the investments necessary to fulfill the
environment- and energy-related objectives of the Europe 2020 agenda, notably
to target transport infrastructure, energy renovation of residential and tertiary
buildings, expansion of renewable energy supply capacity, and improvements to
the electrical grid.
These investments, which are not currently planned nor budgeted, are
summarized in Table 19. Until 2020, they would total an average of €194 billion
annually for the entire European Union, or 1.5% of the GDP of the EU27, and
€133 billion for the euro area – 1.4% of EA17’s GDP. 
Table 19. Average annual investments for a Green New Deal in Europe 
(billion euros. 2013-2020)
 Transport
Energy 
renovation
Renewable 
energy
Electrical 
network
Total 
investment
% of 2012 
GDP
AUT 1.81 1.79 0.64 0.11 4.35 1.4
BEL 1.83 2.34 0.73 0.19 5.09 1.4
BGR 0.98 0.22 0.71 0.02 1.93 4.9
CYP 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.29 1.6
CZE 2.59 0.87 0.58 0.00 4.04 2.6
DNK 0.64 1.58 0.88 0.14 3.24 1.3
EST 0.35 0.10 0.19 0.03 0.67 3.8
FIN 1.66 0.74 1.09 0.08 3.57 1.9
FRA 12.53 10.55 6.43 0.88 30.39 1.5
DEU 12.35 21.29 5.92 3.01 42.57 1.6
GRC 1.22 0.84 0.83 0.03 2.92 1.5
HUN 1.63 0.62 0.69 0.01 2.95 3.0
IRL 0.65 0.27 0.48 0.39 1.79 1.1
ITA 8.18 5.27 3.73 0.71 17.89 1.1
LVA 0.39 0.09 0.24 0.04 0.76 3.4
LTU 0.43 0.16 0.36 0.07 1.02 3.1
LUX 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.6
MLT 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.7
NLD 1.86 2.06 1.16 0.33 5.41 0.9
POL 6.65 2.56 2.65 0.29 12.15 3.2
PRT 1.06 0.33 0.73 0.15 2.27 1.4
ROU 3.40 0.82 1.58 0.07 5.87 4.5
SVK 0.76 0.45 0.30 0.03 1.54 2.2
SVN 0.41 0.14 0.18 0.03 0.76 2.2
ESP 5.85 2.16 4.31 0.48 12.80 1.2
SWE 2.97 2.13 1.11 0.20 6.41 1.6
GBR 9.62 6.84 4.97 1.90 23.33 1.2
EA17 50.70 48.43 26.83 6.65 132.61 1.4
EU27 80.00 64.31 40.60 9.39 194.30 1.5Sources: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
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The construction of a large-scale European investment plan, consistent with
the policy recommendations of the European Commission does not make for a
simple exercise. First, it requires the definition of a Business As Usual (BAU)
scenario, which represents the most likely outcome if projects and financing
already decided were to be fulfilled unmodified. This hypothesis is completed by
some assumptions on the trend of the economy until 2020. Once this first
scenario is defined, an alternative scenario can then be drawn, which features the
investments necessary to meet the mid-term (2020) and thus long-term (2050)
European economic, energy and climate targets. Achieving these targets would
open the way to the high performance, low-carbon European economy called for
by European authorities, but from which austerity policies promise to take us ever
further away. 
We have sought to make the definition of our investment scenario consistent
with the European Commission objectives. Various European roadmaps, such as
the EU climate and energy package (EC, 2007), the Roadmap to a low-carbon
economy in 2050 (EC, 2011a), or the White Paper on Transport (EC, 2011b)
provide relevant milestones to shape economic policy at the Member State level. 
1.1. The Investment Scenario in Transport
In an integrated European economy, investment needs in the transport sector
must be defined at the European level. This has long been a European compe-
tence: the trans-European transport network or TEN-T projects are for instance all
drawn up at the European level. 
The White Paper on Transport sets a wide range of objectives that define a
transport policy oriented towards decarbonized transport uses:
— “Developing and deploying new and sustainable fuels and propulsion
systems”,
— “Optimizing the performance of multimodal logistic chains, including by
making greater use of more energy-efficient modes”, notably:
■ “30% of road freight over 300 km should shift to other modes such as rail
or waterborne transport by 2030, and more than 50% by 2050”
■ “Triple the length of the existing high-speed rail network by 2030, […]
and by 2050, complete a European high-speed rail network”
— “Increasing the efficiency of transport and of infrastructure use with infor-
mation systems and market-based incentives”
Transport projects currently account for the largest share of project financing
conducted by the EU. This is necessary if the EU is to achieve its environmental
targets, as the transport of goods and people will have to be increasingly carried
out using modes alternative to road transportation. Similarly, it has been shown
that investments in transport infrastructure have much larger effects if they are
made on large geographical areas (Roy, 2004). The European scale seems most
appropriate. 
Infrastructure investments would also represent a large lever of economic
action to foster long-term growth. Indeed, a number of studies (Long & Summers,
1991) have shown important correlations between growth and infrastructure
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report116investments. Infrastructures, like all publics goods, generate specific positive exter-
nalities. Investing in rail or waterway transportation would for example decrease
transportation costs, reduce travel times and increase the volume of traffic.
Besides, the shift from road to rail transport reduces negative externalities, such as
greenhouse gas emissions or the social cost of road mortality. Transport network
development also contributes to the expansion of market size. Finally, investments
in transport infrastructure allow the establishment of joint public-private
financing. This type of financing allows the commitment of public funds to be
reduced.
The first step in the calibration of the investment scenario is to define a busi-
ness as usual (BAU) scenario. Based on the TEN-T data and projecting the total
amount until 2012 we obtain €859 billion or an annual investment of €123 billion
for the BAU.
According to the goals exposed in the White Paper on Transport7, the total
amount of investment required to match the expected demand for transport
services is €1,050 billion for the infrastructure (with €550 dedicated to the devel-
opment of the TEN-T by 2020, the remainder being spent until 2030) and €500
for the equipment. Given the voluntary aspect of the proposed investment plan,
the completion of all these investments is advanced to 2020.
The investment scenario is then simply the difference between these invest-
ment needs as estimated by the European Commission and the BAU projection
made above.
In order to distribute this aggregate investment across Member States, we
have considered two indicators that reflect the main issues arising from such a
large-scale investment plan, efficiency and equity. 
To characterize the need for efficiency, we consider that investment in addi-
tional transportation capacity will be determined by the current state of the rail
network. Most exchanges, both in terms of passengers and goods, can be
expected to occur within the economic heart of the EU. Since the investments
considered are dedicated to modernizing the network and building large corridors
for the freight and passenger traffic, they are likely to target countries which
already belong to the core of the European transportation network – and thus
have a large existing railway system. We thus assume that the allocation of the
total investment amount across countries is going to be driven by the relative size
of each national network.
We then use the ratio of each country's GDP per capita, in PPP, to the average
EU level to weigh the share of investment made in each Member State so that less
wealthy countries receive more than their wealthier counterparts. For instance,
while Germany represents 20.6% of the European GDP, it would only receive
16.85% of the total investment based on its sole indicator, since it’s one of the
richer European country (as measured in GDP per capita, in PPP).
The final allocation across countries is computed using both indicators,
weighted equally. The resulting magnitude of the investment made in each
country thus takes into account both its level of economic development (as less
wealthy member states need to benefit from a larger share of the total investment
7. We notably consider paragraph 55: “The cost of EU infrastructure development to match the
demand for transport has been estimated at over €1.5 trillion for 2010-2030”.
A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 117than warranted by their GDP share within the EU) and the size and development
of its railway network (as investment is going to be made in countries already
having a large transport network.
Below, in Table 20 the annualized distribution of allocations:
Our investment plan includes both spending on fixed infrastructure (construc-
tion or renewal of tracks,) and capital expenditure (rolling stock, materials,
energy). To finance this plan, it is important to distinguish these two types of
expenditures. Indeed, as specified in the first, second and third European railway
packages8, infrastructure spending are intended to be financed by public expendi-
ture (and thus debt), capital expenditure should be funded by the private sector.
1.2. The Investment Scenario in Energy Efficiency
As part of its Europe 2020 strategy, the European Union has endorsed a series
of three climate and energy targets to be achieved by 2020 (EC, 2007). One of
these “20-20-20” targets calls for a 20% improvement in the EU’s energy effi-
ciency by 2020. However, it is also the target that appears least likely to be met,
notably because the target is non-binding: while primary energy consumption
has been trending down in the EU since 2007, the decrease remains too slow.
The European Commission estimates that current efforts towards energy effi-
ciency would have to be doubled to achieve the 20% improvement target by
2020 (EC, 2011c).
Since 1990, a large part of the energy consumption growth has happened in
the buildings sector. Buildings now represent close to 40% of final energy
consumption in the EU, while they only accounted for 34% in 1990 (Figure 42).
Over the past 20 years, buildings energy consumption in Europe has grown by 1%
a year, while overall energy consumption was only growing at 0.3%. The central
role of the buildings sector in reducing energy consumption has been confirmed
by the European Commission’s recent assessment of energy savings potentials
Table 20. Annual additional transport investment by country 
(billion euros. 2013-2020)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia
1.81 1.83 0.98 0.06 2.59 0.64 0.35
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
1.66 12.53 12.35 1.22 1.63 0.65 8.18
Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal
0.39 0.43 0.09 0.03 1.86 6.65 1.06
Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK TOTAL
3.40 0.76 0.41 5.85 2.97 9.62 80.00
NB: These amounts must added to the BAU investments to obtain the overall expected annual investment in 
transportation over the period.
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
8. As defined by directives 2001/12, 2001/13, 2001/14; 2004/51, 2004/52, 2004/53, 2004/54;
2007/57, 2007/58, 2007/59
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report118(Fraunhofer-Institute, 2009), with up to 48% of energy savings technically achiev-
able by 2020 in the EU attributable to residential and tertiary buildings.
However, given that the construction rate in most Member States hovers
around 1%9, and that the demolition rate is at least an order of magnitude smaller
(Thomsen & Flier, 2009), the renewal rate of the European building stock is very
low. Capturing the energy savings potentials of the buildings sector therefore
requires a large-scale energy renovation program, which would make use of the
best available technology to deeply retrofit existing buildings.
Such a program, conducted throughout Europe, would trigger massive
investments in the buildings sector. While a lot of attention has been devoted to
the estimation of energy savings potentials in the EU, few studies have tried to
assess the actual volume of investment necessary to achieve those savings and
their associated economic impact. In a recent report, Copenhagen Economics
(2012) estimated that under a “High energy efficiency” scenario, which would
imply the full adoption of best available technologies as outlined above, annual
gross investments to achieve savings in the buildings sector coherent with the
2020 EU targets would reach 65 billion euros from 2013 to 2020.
The overwhelming majority of this massive funding need would not have to
be covered by public investments. However, government policy and public funds
do have a key role to play in ensuring energy renovations can be funded. Deep
energy renovations are expensive, with average costs ranging from 300 up to 450
euros per square meters across Europe (Copenhagen Economics, 2012). Besides,
they are complex operations that require the coordination of many different
Figure 42. Energy consumption in the EU, 1990 and 2010
          Mtoe
Source: IEA.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1990 2010
Others
Industry
Transport
Commercial and public
services
Residential
24% 26%
13%
27%
23%
12%
10%
23%
30%
13%
1 124 total
1 194 total9. Source: Eurostat.
A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 119competencies – a task which requires expert knowledge that cannot be expected
from households seeking to retrofit their homes.
Overcoming both of these obstacles require innovative solutions. Drawing
from experience gained through initiatives such as the German KfW Building
Rehabilitation Program (Schröder et al., 2011), the British Green Deal10, or the
American PACE program11, Saheb et al. (2013) proposes a new market framework
to finance and manage energy renovation (Figure 43).
In this model, an Energy Renovation Agency reporting to the government will
be needed to supervise the entire energy renovation process. When a dwelling is
to be renovated, the Agency sets up a tendering process to be answered by a
cluster of companies that combines all the expertise necessary to successfully carry
out the energy renovation. To finance the renovation, the cluster of companies
takes out a long-term loan that will be reimbursed using future energy savings. 
These savings are guaranteed by an energy performance contracting between
the cluster of companies and the dwelling – that is, companies are responsible for
the successful reduction in the energy consumption of the renovated dwelling. It
is important to note that just as in the PACE program, the energy performance
contract is tied to the dwelling itself, and is to be transferred in case of a change in
ownership. Finally, to facilitate the involvement of commercial banks, loans
granted to finance energy retrofits would be guaranteed by an Energy Renovation
Guarantee Fund, thereby mitigating uncertainties on the actual magnitude of
future energy savings. 
10. https://www.gov.uk/green-deal-energy-saving-measures 
Figure 43. Market framework to enable large-scale energy renovation
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specific to each country, it provides a number of mechanisms to overcome most
of the usual roadblocks in the way towards large-scale energy retrofits in Europe.
Moreover, in such a scheme, existing public funds already targeting energy retro-
fits at the national and European levels could be leveraged to trigger the
investments needed to capture energy savings in the buildings sector conducive
to the achievement of Europe’s 2020 energy efficiency target.
To estimate the impact of such an investment towards energy renovation on
the European economy, investment needs were estimated for each country.
Spending requirements were first broken down across sectors (households and
services) and energy use (heating and insulation, water heating, air conditioning
and ventilation, and lighting), following Copenhagen Economics (2012). These
amounts were then distributed across countries, proportionately to their corre-
sponding expected energy savings, as estimated by Fraunhofer (2009). Finally,
investment needs were adjusted for differences of labor costs in the construction
sector of each country, obtained from Eurostat. The resulting estimates are
reported in Table 21.
1.3. The Investment Scenario in Renewable Energy and Network 
integration
The European Union aims to reach at least 20% of its final energy consump-
tion from renewable energy sources (RES) by 2020. This objective has been
enacted in the EU Directive 2009/28/EC, which gives a framework for EU Member
States’ policy, improves the legal basis for investors, calls for national action plans
and creates cooperation mechanisms to help achieve the targets in a cost-effective
way. The National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) set out how each
Member State aims to achieve its national target in three sectors: electricity,
heating and cooling, and transport. The quantity of renewable energy produced
within the EU-27 increased overall by 72.4% between 2000 and 2010, equivalent
to an average increase of 5.6% per year, and total investments increased to about
€40 billion annually in 200912. Despite the challenges posed by the financial and
economic crises, RES investments have remained high over the last two years. The
Table 21. Annual energy renovation investments by country 
(billion euros. 2013-2020)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia
1.79 2.34 0.22 0.00 0.87 1.58 0.10
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
0.74 10.55 21.29 0.84 0.62 0.27 5.27
Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal
0.09 0.16 0.09 0.01 2.06 2.56 0.33
Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK TOTAL
0.82 0.45 0.14 2.16 2.13 6.84 64.31
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.12. Source: Eurostat
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Figure 44 shows the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption
in 2010 and the indicative targets that have been set for each country for 2020.
The average share of renewables in gross final energy consumption stood at
12.5% in the EU-27 in 2010.
Given objectives set out in NREAPs, EU Member States expect the share of
renewable energy to reach 20.7% of gross final energy consumption by 2020
(EREC, 2011). However, according to the recent European research report RE-
Shaping (Ragwitz et al., 2012), this trajectory appears more ambitious than
warranted by currently implemented and planned policy measures. Based on the
Green-X business-as-usual scenario13, the current policy mix is likely to result in a
RES share in gross final consumption of about 15% by 2020 (Figure 45). This BAU
scenario, which implies that all relevant energy policies and energy market struc-
tures remain unchanged until 2020, is compared to a scenario of “strengthened
national policies” (SNP), which considers improved financial support as well as the
mitigation of non-economic barriers that hinder an enhanced RES deployment. 
Based on Green-X model estimation, annual RES investments in BAU scenario
is €86.2 billion, while in a strengthened national policies scenario, annual invest-
ments would reach €126.8 billion. These investments include capital expenditure,
Figure 44. Share of renewable energies in gross final energy consumption
 In %
Source: Eurostat.
13. The model Green-X has been developed by the Energy Economics Group (EEG) at the Vienna
University of Technology under the EU research project “Green-X–Deriving optimal promotion
strategies for increasing the share of RES-E in a dynamic European electricity market”. Initially
focused on the electricity sector, this modelling tool, and its database on renewable energy (RES)
potentials and costs, has been extended to incorporate renewable energy technologies within all
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report122support expenditure and additional generation cost. The investments needed to
achieve the European renewable energy target by 2020 are considered to be the
gap between these two scenarios, and have been estimated for each EU Member
Estate. The aggregate European-wide amount is distributed across countries
proportionally to their net realizable potential until 202014. The realizable potential
from the Green-X database represents the achievable potential in 2020 assuming
that all existing barriers can be overcome and all driving forces are active.
Figure 45. Gross final energy demand in the EU-27 according to the BAU case
Source: European research project RE-Shaping, Green-X model.
Table 22. Annual additional RES investments by country 
(billion euros. 2013-2020)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia
0.64 0.73 0.71 0.06 0.58 0.88 0.19
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
1.09 6.43 5.92 0.83 0.69 0.48 3.73
Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal
0.24 0.36 0.04 0.01 1.16 2.65 0.73
Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK TOTAL
1.58 0.30 0.18 4.31 1.11 4.97 40.60
NB: These amounts must added to the BAU investments to obtain the overall expected annual investment in 
renewable energy supply over the period.
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.14. Estimate the gap between realizable potential in 2020 and production in 2009.
A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 123The intermittent nature of renewable energy supply can be in a large part
mitigated through improvements made to the electrical grid. Notably, a number
of pan-European interconnection projects have been put forth to help connect
regions across Europe that are rich in different renewable resources (mainly wind
and solar) – thus lowering the intermittency risk for interconnected regions.
 In a recent report (ENTSO-E, 2012), the European Network of Transmission
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) has estimated the additional invest-
ments necessary to accommodate the projected increase in renewable electric
capacity and mitigate its intermittency. It was estimated that €100 billion in new
investments would be needed over the next 10 years for the entire European grid,
along with a detailed country-by-country assessment based on pan-European
interconnection projects known to date. These estimates were used as the basis
for calculating additional investment needs as follows: 
2. Simulation of the investment plan
Based on the detailed analysis carried out above, we propose a large-scale
European public investment plan, which aggregates all sectoral investments
outlined previously. Such a plan would amount in effect to a coordinated fiscal
stimulus throughout Europe. Investments are distributed in each Member State
as follows:
Table 23. Annual additional investments in the electrical grid by country 
(billion euros. 2013-2020)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia
0.01 0.11 0.19 0.33 0.02 0 0.14
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
0.48 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.88 0.03 0
Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal
0.29 0.15 0.08 3.01 0.03 0.39 0.71
Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK TOTAL
0.07 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.2 1.9 9.39
NB: These amounts must added to the BAU investments to obtain the overall expected annual investment in the 
electrical grid over the period
Table 24. Aggregate annual investment in each country 
(billion euros. 2013-2020)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia
4.35 5.09 1.93 0.12 4.21 3.24 0.67
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
3.57 30.39 42.57 2.92 2.95 1.79 17.89
Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal
0.76 1.02 0.25 0.05 5.41 12.15 2.27
Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK TOTAL
5.87 1.54 0.76 12.8 6.41 23.33 194.3Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report124To assess the macroeconomic impacts of this investment plan on GDP,
employment, the balance of trade, or the evolution of the public deficit, we need
to make use of a European-scale macroeconomic model. However, given the
complexity of the modelling exercise, the national investment plans had to be
aggregated. In this section, we distinguish between Germany and the rest of the
euro area.
We use the New Keynesian DSGE model FiMod, which was designed to
conduct fiscal policy simulations by Stähler & Thomas (2012). It is a two region
model of a currency union in which one region represents a member state (in our
case Germany) and the second region the rest of the union (here the rest of the
EMU, REMU). Both regions are modeled in an identical fashion, but structural
differences between regions are captured to some extent by choosing different
parameterizations for each region. As in most medium scale DSGE models
designed for quantitative assessments, there are nominal wage and price rigidi-
ties, and consumption and investment expenditure are subject to habit formation
and investment adjustment costs, respectively. Furthermore, the labor market is
subject to Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type search and matching frictions,
implying the existence of unemployment and more persistent employment and
output dynamic than in DSGE models without such frictions. The model also
features a fraction of non-optimizing households who simply consume their
disposable income. 
The government in each of the regions derives income from taxation of
private consumption, labor income (with a distinction between taxes paid by the
employer and the employee) capital income and lump sum taxes. Government
expenditures include spending on unemployment benefits and other transfers,
government consumption and government investment. The public capital stock
has positive effects on the total factor productivity of private enterprises.15 Hence
the model allows for a variety of feedback mechanisms between the government
budget and the general economic situation. 
The model’s parameters can be broadly divided into three groups. One group
is calibrated such that the steady state values of important ratios, such as the share
of imports in Germany and REMU’s GDP or the government investment-to GDP
ratio corresponds to averages of these variables calculated over the 2000-2012
period.16 The second group was taken from Stähler & Thomas (2012) and
concerns the degree of matching frictions and the productivity of public capital.
The third group comprises parameters also found in more conventional DSGE
models, such as the degree of investment adjustment costs or nominal price and
wage rigidities. These parameters were taken from the estimation of the ECB’s
“New Area Wide Model” in Christoffel et al. (2008).17
15. The elasticity of production with respect to public capital is set to η=0.015, which is within the
range of estimates in the literature (see Aschauer (1989), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), Holtz-Eakin
(1994) Kamps (2004), Leeper et al. (2010)).
16. An exception is the government debt-to-GDP ratio, for which the 2012 annual average was
used.
17. The exceptions are the Calvo (1983) parameters for new and existing matches, which at 0.9
are calibrated substantially higher than in the estimation of the NAW in order to avoid unreasonably
strong effects on inflation. However, higher nominal wage flexibility would only strengthen the GDP
effects of the investment initiative simulated below by further depressing the real interest rate over
the first 10 quarters.
A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 1252.1. Simulation design
We simulate an increase in government investment across the EMU of 1.5%
of GDP. The increase is allocated across the EMU such that the increase in
Germany amounts to 1.7% of GDP, while the increase in the rest of the EMU
(REMU) amounts to 1.4% GDP. It is kept in place for 8 years. Furthermore, based
on market expectations18, the current weak economic outlook and the fact that
the ECB and other forecasters expect inflation to undershoot the ECBs target for a
“prolonged period”, we assume a fixed nominal interest rate for 10 quarters, after
which monetary policy responds to output and inflation according to the interest
feedback rule in the model. 
Strong boost to euro area GDP
As can be seen from Figure 46, the increase in government investment would
provide a strong boost to euro area GDP due to substantial crowding in of private
consumption and investment, especially during the first half of the program
period. The EMU-wide cumulative multiplier, calculated over the duration of the
government investment increase (i.e. 8 years), equals 2.19
The increase in government investment has both an immediate effect on
aggregate demand and output and, via the gradual increase in the public capital
stock, a highly persistent effect on the productivity of private enterprises. It thus
affects private expenditure through a number of channels, most of which have
been discussed in the literature on the effects of fiscal policy at the zero lower
bound in DSGE models (e.g. Christiano et al. (2011), Coenen et al. (2012),
Eggertsson (2009), Woodford (2011)). Higher employment raises the real dispos-
able income of households and thus consumption of non-ricardian households.
Furthermore, the combination of higher expected inflation associated with the
increase in output and a constant nominal interest rate cause a decline in the
expected real interest rate, which supports the consumption of forward looking
households. Private investment is elevated by an increase in Tobin’s Q driven
chiefly by expectations of higher future demand and, to a lesser extent, by the
lower expected real interest rate. 
Furthermore, the persistent increase in total factor productivity implies that
future marginal costs and thus inflation are lower for any given level of output and
employment. This mechanism dampens the increase in the nominal interest rate
which occurs once monetary policy starts following its interest feedback rule after
10 quarters and contributes to making private investment more profitable, as
compared to what would be observed in response to a pure demand side stimulus
without such supply side effects. Finally, the presence of matching frictions in the
labor market imply that marginal cost and inflation are positively related to the
change in employment, which also tends to render monetary policy more expan-
sionary once monetary policy returns to following its interest feedback rule. These
18. As of November 24th 2013, the EONIA swap rate for 24 month contracts equaled 0.165%.
19. The cumulative multiplier over h quarters is calculated as 
where dYt+i and dGt+i denote the deviation of real GDP and government investment from the
ℎ =
∑
∑
,  baseline.
iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report126mechanisms imply that the beneficial GDP effects of the program extend for a
much longer period than the 10 years plotted in Figure 46. 
As is shown in Figure 47, the EMU wide government debt-to-GDP ratio
declines persistently and in the last year of the program is still about 8 percentage
points below its baseline. Somewhat less than half of this improvement is due to
higher inflation, which lowers the real burden of debt, followed by the direct
negative effect of the GDP increase on the debt-to-GDP ratio due to the presence
of GDP in the numerator. Finally, the increase in economic activity lowers the
primary deficit below the baseline for somewhat more than three years. Lower
expenditure on unemployment benefits and increased revenue from labor income
taxes are mainly responsible for overcompensating the direct budgetary conse-
quences of higher government investment (Figure 48). 
The investment initiative would thus provide a welcome boost to the weak
recovery of the euro area economy and would also help to stave off the risk of
deflation. 
Figure 46. Macroeconomic effects of the investment initiative (FiMod)
Deviations from baseline in % or percentage points (PP), quarters
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
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A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 1272.2. Short run effects of an investment plan in the euro area
In addition to the FiMod simulation, the investment plan has also been simu-
lated on the international macroeconomic model HEIMDAL (Hansen & Bjørsted,
2011) for a shorter time horizon. The following calculations show the effects of
increasing public investments in the euro area by 1.5 percent of GDP on average
from 2014-2016. All euro area countries would benefit from coordinating fiscal
policy. If done simultaneously, expanding or contracting the economy simultane-
ously throughout the euro area has an amplifying spill-over effect on each
Figure 47. Effect of the program on the public finances
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
Figure 48. Decomposition of the program’s effect on the primary deficit as a share 
of baseline GDP
Note: Positive numbers imply that the deviation of the respective expenditure or revenue component from
its baseline increases the primary deficit. 
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
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iAGS 2014 — independent Annual Growth Survey Second Report128To illustrate the importance of the spill-over effects, we have modeled an
investment plan where Spain is the only county contributing to the plan as well
as an investment plan where all euro area countries contribute. In the calculations
below Spain’s public investments are increased by 1.4% of GDP in 2014-2016. In
the scenario where all euro area countries increase government investments,
investment is increased by an average of 1.4% of GDP except for Germany who
increase government investments with 1.7% of GDP (see Box 10 for a short
description of the HEIMDAL model and underlying assumptions behind the
calculations). Figure 49 shows the individual as well as the spill-over effect on
GDP for Spain. 
If Spain implements an individual investment plan of 1.4% of GDP in 2014-
2016, by 2016 the deviation of GDP from its baseline will be 1.2%, assuming
that the rest of the euro area keeps public investments unchanged. If, on the
other hand, Spain invests as part of a coordinated euro area investment plan, the
deviation from the baseline in 2016 will be 2.5%. Spain will not only experience
positive effects from its own investments, but also from investments in the other
euro area countries. These increase growth and domestic demand, which will
increase Spain’s exports, and will create even more jobs than if Spain alone raises
investment. 
In the euro area as a whole the GDP-level is lifted by 2.4% compared to its
baseline level in 2016 as a consequence of the investment plan (Figure 50). The
cumulative multiplier of the investment plan equals 1.9 over the 2014-2016
period. 
Table 25 shows in more details the spill-over effects from a coordinated
Figure 49. Effect of the program on GDP in Spain
     In %
Note: Deviations from baseline GDP, %.
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
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A green new deal in Europe: Towards a new growth model 129Increased domestic demand will increase employment. Table 25 shows that a
coordinated investment plan can create up to 440,000 jobs in Spain in three years
compared to only 170,000 jobs if Spain implemented an individual investment
plan. That is a spill-over effect of about 260,000 jobs in Spain. The increase in
domestic demand will also have a positive effect on exports. 
The implementation of a coordinated investment plan in the euro area will
have strong positive effects on employment in the euro area. Table 26 shows the
increase in employment in the individual countries. 
After increasing public investments for three years, the total increase in
employment amounts to almost 3.5 million people in the euro area. 
ECLM has conducted a similar simulation for ETUC, where an investment plan
increases public investments in the European Union by 2% from 2015-2019
(ETUC, 2013). The results from the experiment were an increase in EU-27 employ-
ment by 5.8 million people in 2019 as well as an increase in GDP by 4.9 percent
Figure 50. Effect on GDP in the euro area
Note: Deviations from baseline GDP, %.
Source: OFCE-IMK-ECLM computations.
Table 25. Effect for Spain from a coordinated investment plan
Effect in 2016
Spain 
investing 
alone
All euro area countries investing
(Effect of investing + 
spill-over effect)
Change in GDP (percent) 1.2 2.5
Change in employment (10000 pers.) 17 44
Change in export (percent) 0.4 4.7
Sources: OFCE-IMK-ECLM on basis of HEIMDAL.
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and assumptions behind the calculations 
HEIMDAL (Historically Estimated International Model of the Danish Labour
movement) is an international model developed by The Economic Council of the
Labour Movement (ECLM). The HEIMDAL model focuses on the world economy.
HEIMDAL describes the economy in 15 OECD countries, including 13 Euro-
pean economies: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, USA and Japan. In
addition, the model also accounts for the rest of the world trade. 
Each country is described with its own country model. The relations of each
country model are estimated on annual data, which generally covers the period
1960-2012. The model structure and the estimated relations are based on the
methods and theories traditionally used in the macroeconomic simulation
models. The individual country models are based on a Keynesian theoretical
background in the sense that production and employment are determined by
aggregate demand in the short run. In the long run prices and wages will to
changes in unemployment and capacity utilization, e.g. a fall in unemployment
will increase wages and prices which in turn affect competitiveness and
lowering export and increasing import which lowers the aggregate demand. A
major source of inspiration for the applied relations has been the Danish
models ADAM, SMEC and MONA together with the international models
INTERLINK (OECD), NIGEM (NIESR) and QUEST (EU-Commission).
The economies are interlinked by a broad range of transmission mechanisms
which includes:
✟ Quantities and prices in the foreign trade
✟ Interest rates and exchange rates
✟ Wages both directly through the wage relation and indirectly through
prices)
Some of these transmission mechanisms are functions of empirically deter-
mined relations (e.g. the foreign trade), whereas the interest rate and exchange
rate transmissions are functions of both estimated relations and user defined
reaction functions.
In the above calculations it is assumed that Germany increases government
investments with 1.7% of its GDP in 2014-2016. The rest of the euro area
increase government investments by 1.4% on average in 2014-2016.
In the simulations the short term interest rate and exchange rates are kept
Table 26. Employment effects in the euro area
Effect on employment in 1000 persons
2014 2015 2016
BEL 40 70 80
FIN 30 60 70
FRA 320 570 610
DEU 540 1.030 1.210
ITA 130 260 220
ESP 200 360 440
EA 1.680 3.210 3.480
Sources: OFCE-IMK-ECLM on basis of HEIMDAL.exogenous.    
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